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Abstract 
In analytic philosophy, discussion of oppression has focused on its 
definition. However, whilst definitional approaches are valuable as a 
means of achieving conceptual clarity, they tend to underplay a key 
aspect of oppression: its embodied, emotional dimension. If we attend to 
the descriptions of oppression offered in narratives and first-personal 
accounts, by the oppressed, the centrality of emotions comes to the fore.  
In this thesis I argue that attending to the role of emotions is 
crucial to producing an explanatorily rich account of racial and gender 
oppression. In contrast to those philosophical models that conceive of 
emotions as primarily episodic, disruptive and short-lived, I argue that 
we need to think of emotions as long-lived “patterns” (Goldie, 2012) or 
“attunements” (Bartky, 1990). Only by doing so can we properly explain 
their role in oppression. Moreover, attending to the relational aspect of 
emotions (Ahmed, 2004) allows us to account for the ways structures of 
power operate. Not only are some emotional phenomena partly shaped 
by oppressive structures, they also play an instrumental role in 
sustaining and reinforcing them. I contend that, by conceptualising 
emotions as mechanisms for reproducing structures of power, we can 
shed light on individuals’ complicity and participation in oppression. By 
showing how oppressors have an emotional investment in structures of 
oppression, and how emotions “can attach us to the very conditions of 
our subordination” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 12), we can identify one of the 
reasons of the pervasiveness of oppression.  
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Introduction 
 
To illustrate the philosophical impetus motivating this thesis, I’ll start 
with a story. Benjamin Britten’s opera, Billy Budd (1960), based on the 
novel by Herman Melville, depicts the classical theme of the 
vulnerability of the powerless, impotent against the cruel caprices of the 
powerful. It tells the tragic story of Billy Budd, a sailor who, by virtue of 
his charisma, goodness and innocence, evokes the figure of Christ1 and 
becomes a scapegoat. Despite his stammer, Billy Budd is recruited to 
HMS Indomitable. He stands out among the other recruits, so much so 
that the Master-at-Arms, John Claggart, describes him as “A find in a 
thousand (...) / A beauty. A jewel/ The pearl of great price.” Exultant for 
being made Foretopman, Billy shouts seawards to his old ship, Rights O’ 
Man:  
 
Farewell to you, old comrades!   
Farewell to you for ever. 
Farewell, Rights o' Man. 
Farewell, old Rights o' Man. 
Farewell to you for ever,   
old Rights o' Man 
 
Billy’s rejoicing arouses the distrust of the Master-at-Arms, who wrongly 
suspects him of supporting of the ideals of the French Revolution. 
Nevertheless, his character soon wins him the love of his other 
shipmates, including Vere, Captain of the Indomitable. But his 
popularity feeds Claggart’s envy and hatred. Billy represents everything 
Claggart cannot have: “beauty”, “handsomeness”, and “goodness”. In 
Billy’s light, Claggart sees his own “darkness” negatively reflected:  
 
O beauty, o handsomeness, goodness!   
Would that I never encountered you!   
Would that I lived in my own world always,   
in that depravity to which I was born.   
                                            
1 Thanks to Eleonora Buono for this observation.  
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Claggart’s destructive motivations are rooted in his erotic desire for 
Billy. He hates Billy even more because he loves him and yet cannot 
possess him:  
 
 O beauty, o handsomeness, goodness!   
You surely in my power tonight.   
Nothing can defend you.   
Nothing! So may it be!   
For what hope remains if love can escape? 
If love still lives and grows strong where I cannot enter, 
what hope is there in my own dark world for me?   
No! I cannot believe it! That were torment to keen. 
I, John Claggart,   
Master-at-Arms upon the "Indomitable",   
have you in my power, and I will destroy you. 
 
To destroy Billy, Claggart falsely accuses him of plotting mutiny. Vere, 
however, knows that Billy is innocent, and is not fooled by Claggart’s 
motivations: 
 
Claggart, John Claggart, beware!   
I'm not so easily deceived.   
The boy whom you would destroy, he is good;   
you are evil. You have reckoned without me.   
I have studied men and their ways.   
The mists are vanishing – and you shall fail!  
 
But when pressed by Captain Vere to respond to Claggart’s accusation, 
Billy stammers. Unable to defend himself, he strikes Claggart and kills 
him. Despite knowing that Billy was set up, Vere is forced to denounce 
his crime, and sentences Billy to death by hanging.  
Like any great work of art, this opera, with its undertones of 
Greek tragedy, admits of multiple readings. But I would like to interpret 
it here as revealing the way in which, by attending only to the letter of 
the Law and glossing over the motivations underlying relations of power, 
we fail to understand the harms of oppression. Although he has “studied 
men and their ways”, Vere is impotent in the face of an implacable 
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martial law. If only Claggart’s hostile passions, and his use of the Law to 
conceal them, could be laid bare for all to see, perhaps Billy would not 
have suffered such a tragic fate. 
Studying “men and their ways” was, up to not so long ago, an 
integral part of political philosophy. As Susan James argues, “it was 
until quite recently taken for granted that political philosophy and 
psychology are intimately connected, and that political philosophy needs 
to be grounded on an understanding of human passion” (James, 2003, p. 
222). Hobbes’ Leviathan, Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, and 
Rousseau’s Social Contract, which aims to “take men as they are and 
laws as they might be” (Rousseau, as cited in James, 2003, p. 222) are 
clear examples of this approach. This contrasts with the current 
situation in contemporary analytic political philosophy. Despite a recent 
renewal of interest in the emotions (James, 2003, p. 221), the latter 
remain marginal to much mainstream political theorizing.  
James analyses some of the main reasons for the current tendency 
to dismiss human passions, and offers arguments in favour of giving 
them a more central role. Against the thought that we can rely on our 
common understanding of emotions without making them explicit, she 
objects that this understanding may be less common than is assumed: 
“one theorist’s common sense is another theorist’s fantasy” (James, 2003, 
p. 225). Furthermore, even granting that there may be shared 
understandings of the emotional dispositions at work in political life, 
this is not a sufficiently good reason for neglecting them: “it may be 
informative to make them explicit” (James, 2003, p. 225). 
Considering emotions can help us assess the realizability of a 
political theory, James suggests. We need to explore the psychological 
capacities that an ideal theory such as Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
presupposes.  
 
By examining the emotional dispositions that a theory requires of 
citizens or subsets of citizens, we can build up a picture of the psychic 
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demands it contains, and acquire a richer understanding of what it 
would take to realize it. (James, 2003, p. 232) 
 
Analysing the psychological capacities demanded by a theory forces us to 
attend to its “psychic realizability”. (James, 2003, p.232)  
The work I present here supports James’s general view that 
political philosophy would be enriched by giving greater attention to the 
role that emotions play in our political lives. However, rather than 
discussing the realizability of ideal theories of justice, my analysis is 
more directly concerned with what needs to be done “upstream”.  Rather 
than exploring what our emotional dispositions should be in the ideal 
conditions imagined by some political theorists, I ask what they are 
under conditions of oppression.  
In this respect, my analysis is concerned with what Jonathan 
Wolff calls “real-world political philosophy”, which takes as a starting 
point 
 
the claim, not that some state of affairs would be good (according to the 
best theory) but rather that some aspects of the world as presently 
experienced are problematic, perhaps to a very high degree, in that they 
grossly restrict the possibility for real people here and now to lead 
flourishing human lives. (Wolff, 2019, p. 18) 
 
In a recent paper, “Equality and Hierarchy” (2019), Wolff argues that 
real-world political philosophy is in a better position than ideal theory to 
understand group-hierarchy and address the measures needed to 
mitigate its harms. Wolff claims that political philosophy should “start 
from where we are; consider people psychologically as they are” (Wolff, 
2019, p. 17). While I sympathize with this claim, I find that Wolff’s 
approach, as sketched in his paper, is not up to the task. Wolff advocates 
the need for political realism, and yet, when characterizing the harms of 
group hierarchy, or when sketching out “fundamental human needs”, his 
discussion remains highly abstract. It does not seem to deal more closely 
with the “real world” than the liberal philosophers whose approach he 
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criticises. For example, as a way of exploring “something in the human 
psyche that has not been addressed” in liberal political philosophy, Wolff 
argues that the liberal egalitarian should feel challenged by Simone 
Weil’s claim that “hierarchy is a ‘need of the soul’” (Wolff, 2019, p. 19). 
But, regardless of whether Weil’s view is true or not, it is unclear why 
the liberal egalitarian should take it as a serious challenge. While Wolff 
regards Weil’s claim as particularly insightful, he fails to clarify the 
grounds of her diagnosis, or consider where its validity lies. Without 
wanting to belittle the merits of Weil’s understanding of human 
psychological needs, her view seems to rely on speculation rather than 
on the real-world evidence that political realism calls for. More 
problematically still, Wolff’s argument seems to presuppose that the 
fundamental human needs of the soul stand apart from socio-political 
structures, as if what Weil describes as the need for order and hierarchy 
was not fashioned in part by structures of power. Like Weil’s, Wolff’s 
discussion of the needs of the soul seems unduly ahistorical and 
depoliticized. 
I agree with Wolff that political philosophy should explore human 
motivation and psychology by studying real group hierarchies. However, 
rather than speculating about the needs of the “human soul”, I contend 
that such an exploration should focus on our emotional dispositions. In 
this thesis I examine some of the emotional dispositions that are integral 
to oppression, taking as a starting point the testimonies of oppressed 
people themselves. On the basis of these testimonies, I contend that 
oppression has distinctive emotional features and that, if we are to 
understand it, we need to take them into account. My approach 
contrasts with those taken in a number of recent analytic studies, where 
the emotional features of oppression are largely overlooked. By focusing 
on them, I argue, we can arrive at a richer explanatory account of what 
oppression is and how it harms us. 
More precisely, I claim that attending to emotions allows us to 
give an explanatory account of how oppression “works”, in a triple sense: 
17 
 
 
1. Attending to the emotional dimensions of oppression 
enables us to explain how structures of power partly shape 
the affective characters of the oppressed and their 
oppressors. I develop this claim by establishing that certain 
patterns of emotion are non-accidentally connected 
with structures of oppression and privilege.  
 
2. Emotions play an instrumental role in the ways 
oppression is enforced and sustained over time. Attending 
to the emotional components of oppression and privilege 
helps us to explain why oppression continues.  
 
3. Attending to the emotional aspects of oppression gives us a 
better grasp the harms of oppression, in a way that 
abstract notions of “injustice”, “imbalance of power” or 
“inequality” do not. In other words, if we want to 
understand what oppression is, we should pay attention to 
what oppression does. The narrative testimonies of 
oppressed people reveal that what oppression does has a 
powerful emotional dimension.  
 
Although I claim that emotions tend to be neglected in contemporary 
analytic discussions of oppression, some of them do of course take these 
psychological elements into account. Such is the case of Ann Cudd, who 
aims to offer a “univocal theory of oppression” (Cudd, 2006). However, 
although Cudd discusses the psychological harm done by oppression, and 
considers how oppression is reinforced by these very harms, she 
nevertheless tends to privilege cognitive aspects of oppression over 
emotional ones. Emotional phenomena are mainly considered as 
derivatives of cognitive states, above all of beliefs. The relationship 
between beliefs and emotions is enormously complex, and lies beyond the 
scope of this investigation. My discussion of emotions takes it for 
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granted that emotions have a cognitive element, although not in the 
strong sense required by many cognitive theories of emotions 
(Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1993). Rather than exploring the relation 
between cognition and emotion, my aim is to focus on a different 
relationship, to which Cudd gives relatively little attention, namely the 
relationship between feeling and embodiment.  
Cudd also rejects the psychoanalytic tradition as a source of valid 
insights into the psychological aspects of oppression, on the grounds that 
it lacks empirical corroboration and relies on “dubious assumptions” 
(Cudd, 2006, pp. 58–59). Instead, she grounds her theory on the findings 
of cognitive psychology. A detailed discussion of the epistemological 
questions around psychoanalysis is also beyond the scope of my thesis.  
However, I do not think Cudd’s arguments against psychoanalytic 
explanations are convincing, and I find some psychoanalytic insights 
compelling. In discussing the emotional aspects of oppression, I therefore 
draw on philosophical literature that is indebted to psychoanalytic 
theory. 
 
Before I summarise the contents of each chapter, three final 
remarks about the use I make of the notion of “emotion” and about the 
scope of this thesis are in order. 
As the title of my thesis indicates, I aim to show “how emotions 
contribute to oppression”. In so doing, I am not interested in a narrow 
understanding of “emotion”, as a concept that has sometimes been 
distinguished from other notions such as “feelings”, “affect”, or 
“sentiment”. Nor am I interested in offering a new typology in order to 
define “emotion”. First of all, this would be an extremely complex 
endeavour surpassing the scope of this work. The different ways in 
which emotions are conceptualised is the outcome of a long process of 
evolution. Notions such as “passion”, “affect”, “feeling”, “affection”, 
“sentiment”, and “emotion” do not have univocal meanings. They have 
often been used interchangeably across different periods and carry their 
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history with them. For many centuries, philosophers have attempted to 
organise emotions into diverse hierarchical typologies that answer to 
their particular problems and presuppositions (James, 1997, p.4). This 
suggests that, whether neatly distinguished or not, what we call 
emotion, feeling, passion or affect, are not natural kinds. Since they are 
historically and culturally constituted concepts, we do not possess a 
ready-made, easily applicable template allowing us to differentiate 
them. 
Alongside this general warning, my main reason for not explicitly 
distinguishing emotion, feeling, affect, etc. is more directly tied to the 
problem that I aim to explain. As will become clear as I develop my 
argument, what I find in narrative accounts of oppression is that the 
emotional phenomena with which I am concerned cannot easily be 
divided into these different categories. Rather, as I shall go on to contend 
in chapter 3, what I describe as “emotions” or “emotional phenomena” 
are internally complex and temporally extended. Moreover, their 
manifestations can take multiple forms. For example, as I’ll discuss in 
chapter 4, bodily feelings are sometimes more salient than the cognitive 
or evaluative components of what is felt – as, for example, when one 
feels discomfort, inadequacy, or a confused sense of being out of place, 
but does not consciously acknowledge these feelings, or have a clear idea 
of their aetiology. In other cases, both the cognitive component and the 
bodily feelings may be felt as part of a unitary emotional phenomenon. 
At a superficial level it may seem that, by drawing sharp distinctions 
between feeling, affect, emotion, mood, etc., we gain more clarity. 
However, as I contend, there is a greater danger that we actually lose 
some of the elements that allow us to throw light into the complex ways 
in which structures of oppression and affective phenomena are 
interconnected. 
I will therefore use the term “emotions” in a pluralistic sense, as a 
placeholder for a wide range of affective phenomena, which encompasses 
unconscious embodied habits, and both conscious and unconscious 
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feelings and sensations, which in some cases are cognitively and 
evaluatively rich, and in other cases may be less so. Similarly, I will 
sometimes use “feelings” and “emotions” as synonyms (as in “feelings of 
shame and guilt”), and “affective” and “emotional” as synonymous 
adjectives (as in “affective phenomena” or “emotional phenomena”). By 
using “emotions” in a broad sense to include a wide range of affective 
manifestations I aim to highlight the unitary form of the phenomena 
with which I am concerned. 
 
Due to constraints of time and space, my analysis focuses on two 
long-lasting forms of domination, gender and racial oppression and 
privilege. To a lesser degree, I consider how other structures of 
domination, such as class and sexuality, inflect the ways in which 
oppression is emotionally “constituted”. However, other forms of 
oppression that I do not consider clearly cry out for analysis, and two 
particularly deserve to be mentioned. I do not examine the case of 
antisemitic oppression. Although antisemitism may count in many ways 
as a form of racism, and although some of the emotional harms2 it 
produces are similar to those I discuss in the case of anti-Black racism3, 
I consider antisemitism to be a form of oppression with its own 
distinctive features and complex historical roots. This thesis does not 
attempt to examine it. Nor do I deal with transphobia, the form of 
oppression suffered by transgender women and men. While transgender 
people suffer from the kinds of racial and gender oppression that I do 
examine, transphobia is a further and irreducible form of harm. Again, I 
do not discuss it.  
 
Summary of the Argument 
 
                                            
2 As narrative testimonies from survivors of Nazi Concentration Camps during World 
War II show, such as Primo Levi’s If This is a Man (1947) and The Truce (1965).  
3 For a historical discussion of the relationship between Jewish identity and whiteness, 
see (Gordon, 2016).  
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In Chapter 1, I discuss Sally Haslanger’s (2012) account of oppression. I 
use Haslanger’s account to exemplify the way oppression tends to be 
discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy and show the limitations 
of this kind of approach. I offer a preliminary defence of the importance 
of attending to emotions in our theories of oppression. 
 
In Chapter 2, I present evidence for the main claims of my thesis 
through several narratives, which show how emotions play a central role 
in oppression. I defend the epistemic and normative value of these 
narrative testimonies for thinking oppression and defend the 
methodology of my thesis. 
 
In Chapter 3, I clarify the conception of emotion on which I rely in order 
to show that oppression has distinctive emotional or affective features. I 
take issue with Gabrielle Taylor’s (1985) account of shame, as an 
example of a common view of emotions which reduces them to discrete 
and short-lived episodes, and which I find insufficient for the purposes of 
this research. I argue that Bartky’s (1990) notion of “emotional 
attunement” and Goldie’s (2012) account of “emotional patterns” offer a 
more fruitful basis for understanding the connection between oppression 
and emotion. Moreover, against the individualistic framework of 
approaches such as Taylor’s, I contend that Sara Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) 
account of emotions as relational is better suited to understanding the 
entanglements between emotions and structures of power. 
 
In Chapter 4, I explore the nature of the connection between emotions 
and oppression more deeply. After considering whether this link can be 
grasped by stipulating necessary and sufficient conditions, I reject this 
view. I argue that, by taking a bottom up approach based on the 
narratives discussed in Chapter 2, we can hypothesize that there is a 
non-accidental connection between certain patters of emotion and 
oppression. I discuss some difficult cases that seem to contradict this 
22 
 
claim and show how they provide further evidence that oppression has a 
significant emotional dimension. 
 
Having mainly analysed the non-accidental emotional patterns of the 
oppressed, I move on to explore the emotional patterns non-accidentally 
connected to white privilege in Chapter 5. Drawing on the philosophical 
literature on white ignorance, and on Shannon Sullivan’s (2005) analysis 
of the unconscious embodied habits of white privilege, I extract some of 
the salient emotions through which white privilege is sustained. In other 
words, I analyse the emotional dimensions of white complicity in 
perpetuating racism. 
 
In Chapter 6, I turn to masculinity as a form of domination. Drawing 
on Bonnie Mann’s (2014) account of sovereign masculinity, which centres 
on the phenomenology of lived bodily experience, I contend that fear-of-
being-shamed is a fundamental emotional structure non-accidentally 
connected to masculinity. I argue that, in Mann’s account, masculinity 
emerges as a reaction to shame, achieved through strategies of “shame-
to-power conversion” (Mann, 2014). These strategies involve emotional 
mechanisms such as projection, but also demands for admiration and 
esteem. 
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1. The definition route 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In “Oppressions: Racial and Other” (2012), Sally Haslanger aims to show 
how racial oppression is best understood as a structural phenomenon, 
unavoidably embedded in a complex background of institutions, policies, 
and cultural representations. Tackling an individualistic approach that 
primarily aims to explain oppression by appeal to agents’ intentions, 
Haslanger offers a definition of structural oppression for which she 
claims a number of advantages. First, this definition allows us to 
distinguish between different kinds of oppression that can occur 
simultaneously, as when a group is oppressed on grounds of race but 
also gender and class. Secondly, Haslanger contends that her account 
can encompass cases where a group is not explicitly targeted, but is 
nevertheless oppressed, because there is a non-accidental connection 
between belonging to a group and being subject to injustice. After 
presenting Haslanger’s main arguments, I first will take issue with two 
points: with a distinction between being an oppressor and merely 
occupying a privileged position, which plays a significant role in her 
argument; and with her view that, in the context of structural 
oppression, individuals are oppressors insofar as they abuse their power. 
This will constitute the main constructive work of this chapter. 
In a second part of the chapter, I will argue that Haslanger’s 
distinction between “privileged” and “oppressors” is insufficient to 
account for how privileged groups contribute to sustain oppression by 
the mere fact of being privileged. Drawing on Alison Bailey’s (1998) 
expansion of Marilyn Frye’s (1983) notion of privilege, and on Barbara 
Applebaum’s (2010) analysis of complicity as a way of explaining 
privileged subject’s participation in oppression, I argue that oppression 
is “not just a matter of doing, but [is] also a matter of being” 
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(Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 2010). In this sense, I contend 
that to be “privileged” is to be an “oppressor”. I conclude this chapter by 
arguing that closer attention to the emotional phenomena connected to 
structures of oppression may allow us to deepen our understanding of 
the ways in which oppression is perpetuated. This last point will be the 
main focus of the subsequent chapters of my thesis and I will just offer 
here a preliminary defence of its importance. 
 
1.2 Oppression: agents and structures 
 
Haslanger points out that, although the notion of oppression is 
commonly used to identify situations of injustice, it remains vague. In an 
attempt to clarify the concept, she distinguishes between “agent 
oppression”, a conception favoured in individualistic interpretations, and 
“structural oppression”, a notion employed in accounts that aim to show 
how oppression is embedded in institutions, laws, and cultural and 
social representations. 
 
1.2.1 The individualistic approach 
 
According to a prevailing individualistic account, oppression is primarily 
conceived in terms of agents harming others by a misuse of their power. 
However, Haslanger argues, this doesn’t say enough about the parties 
involved: are we talking about individual or collective agents and 
patients? And what is the nature of the power exercised in cases of 
oppression? 
In order to clarify these two preliminary issues, Haslanger 
distinguishes four categories of relation between the oppressing agent 
and the oppressed subject: 
 
(1) An individual oppresses an individual (e.g., cases of abuse in 
parent-child or marital relationships). 
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(2) An individual oppresses a group (e.g., a tyrant oppresses the 
people). 
(3) A group oppresses an individual (e.g., a community punishes a 
scapegoat). 
(4) A group oppresses a group (e.g., a ruling oligarchy oppresses 
the people). 
 
Haslanger argues that, in any of these cases, the nature of the power 
exercised by the oppressor(s) needs to be specified. She distinguishes 
therefore two sources of oppressive power. First, power may be socially 
grounded, in the sense that its source lies in a pre-existing social 
hierarchy. An example of this is the socially grounded power that men 
have with respect to women, or White people with respect to Black 
people4. For example, in the case of gender violence against women, 
male aggressors misuse the social power they have over women in a 
patriarchal society. Gender violence does not merely consist in the use of 
physical force to coerce, but in the fact that the aggressor  
 
(a) has social power over women sustained in/by institutions or 
cultural representations, and 
(b) by virtue of his social power, believes himself to be entitled to 
use physical force to coerce women. 
 
Secondly, and by contrast, Haslanger argues, power may not be socially 
grounded. There may be cases of “agent oppression” where the oppressor 
does not hold more social power than the oppressed. For example, a 
woman could psychologically and physically harm a man, even though 
she has less social power than him; a poor man could kidnap a rich man; 
                                            
4 I will follow Haslanger’s use of capitalization for the names of races “to highlight the 
difference between ordinary color words and the homonymous use of such words as 
names for some races, and to highlight the artificiality of race in contrast to the 
apparent naturalness of color (or geography)” (Haslanger, 2010, p. 311n1) 
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or a man could exercise physical violence against another man who 
shares his social power and status.  
Seen exclusively from an individualistic perspective, the latter 
examples appear to imply that oppressive relations do not necessarily 
involve misusing a social power which derives from a pre-existing social 
hierarchy. Rather, these cases suggest that oppression could consist in 
the misuse of any kind of power to harm another person unjustly. 
However, Haslanger contends, claiming that oppression consists in 
misusing any kind of power to cause unjust harm is unsatisfactory 
because it encompasses too much, not allowing us to clearly delineate 
the specificity of oppression with respect to other kinds of harms.   
Moreover, the individualistic approach is insufficient in that it 
reduces the wrongs of oppression to the agents’ wrongful intentions, 
thoughts or actions:  
 
On an individualistic approach, agent oppression is the primary form of 
oppression and the agents’ wrongdoing is its normative core: oppression 
is primarily a moral wrong that occurs when an agent (the oppressor) 
inflicts wrongful harm upon another (the oppressed); if something other 
than an agent (such as a law) is oppressive, it is in a derivative sense, 
and its wrong must be explicated in terms of an agent’s wrongdoing. For 
example, one might claim that laws and such are oppressive only insofar 
as they are the instruments of an agent (intentionally) inflicting harm. 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 318)  
 
Hence, accounts that conceive oppression as primarily a moral harm 
performed by an individual or a group (understood as a collection of 
individuals) fail to explain cases of oppression in which it is unclear 
where the agent’s responsibility lies; for example, when their intentions 
are not manifest. 
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1.2.2 The institutionalist approach: structural oppression 
 
Opposed to an individualistic approach that tends to reduce oppression 
to a moral wrong requiring an agent’s hostile intention, an 
institutionalist account of oppression focuses on its effects. On this view, 
what matters are not the intentions or actions of an individual agent 
(say, a tyrant), but the effects of political structures by virtue of which 
the agent is a tyrant and the people are oppressed (tyranny): “Tyranny is 
wrong not because (or not just because) tyrants are immoral people 
intentionally causing harm to others, but because a tyrannical 
governmental structure is unjust.” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 314) 
The individualistic account, centred on agents’ intentions, 
thoughts and actions, requires a moral theory to determine the wrongful 
character of a situation. By contrast, the structural analysis requires a 
political theory or a theory of justice to “provide the normative 
evaluation of the wrong” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 314). Haslanger’s 
examples of structural oppression present some cases in which social 
groups are explicitly targeted by formal legal discrimination such as 
“Jim Crow” legislation in the United States. But there are other cases 
where groups have suffered injustice despite not being explicitly 
targeted: “Under ‘Jim Crow’, poll taxes and (often rigged) literacy tests 
prevented nearly all African Americans from voting; although such 
practices did not explicitly target Blacks, they were oppressive.” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 315). Furthermore, structural oppression, 
Haslanger contends, is not exclusively enforced by legislation. The 
impact of cultural norms and representations on the distribution of 
labour and the undermining effects of negative stereotypes are part of 
what constitutes structural oppression. Importantly, in cases of 
structural oppression, the intention to discriminate or harm is not 
necessary. Two examples illustrate the fact that, often, neutral intent, 
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thoughtlessness and indifference can be sufficient to generate 
oppression: 
 
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case in which Blacks 
were systematically disqualified for certain jobs due to mandated tests 
that could not be shown to correlate with successful job performance. 
The Court found that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their 
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they 
operate to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory practices” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 315) 
 
In reference to a 1985 case involving legislation that discriminated 
against disabled people, the Court ruled “that unjust discrimination can 
occur not just as a result of animus but simply due to thoughtlessness 
and indifference” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 315). 
Additionally, one of the advantages of a structural account of 
oppression, as opposed to an individualistic one, is that it allows us to 
more precisely pin down the source of the problem in common cases 
where oppression is an effect of how structures distribute power: “When 
the structures distribute power unjustly, the illegitimate imbalance of 
power becomes the issue rather than an individual abuse of power per 
se” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 315). If correctly identifying the issue is a 
necessary step towards the reduction or eradication of oppression, the 
structural account will therefore be preferable.  
 
1.2.3 Relationship between structures and groups 
 
In order to understand racism, sexism and other forms of oppression as 
structural, it’s important to clarify the nature of the connection between 
a social structure and a social group. As Haslanger asks, “[W]hat makes 
a particular instance of structural oppression ‘group-based oppression’, 
such as racist, sexist or class oppression?” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 322). 
Before we can answer this question, several issues need to be analysed.  
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First, as Haslanger points out, “it is not always clear under what 
guise members of a group are being subjected to injustice” (p. 322). In 
some cases the type of oppression is racial, in others it’s sexual, in other 
cases both are combined. For example, in cases of racialized misogyny 
and racialized sexism, Black women and other women of colour are 
commonly assimilated to racially and sexually charged stereotypes (such 
as being associated with exoticism and perceived as hypersexual and/or 
aggressive) in ways that White women tend not to be5. As Haslanger 
concludes, any satisfactory analysis of oppression must therefore be 
intersectional (Crenshaw, 1995), i.e., it must be attentive to how forms of 
oppression intersect and/or have their own particular ways of 
manifesting: working-class Black women’s oppression will not be 
adequately understood by separately mobilizing categories of class, race 
or gender without attending to their interconnections. 
Secondly, we need to attend to the problem of how social groups 
are targeted by forms of oppression. How are such groups constituted? 
How are they identified? How does the “targeting” take place? In answer 
to these questions, Iris Marion Young (1990) suggests (a) that social 
groups pre-exist the oppression that affects them, and (b) that groups 
are oppressed on the basis of their conscious identities. For example, one 
is oppressed as Latina in the United States if one recognizes oneself as a 
member of the group “Latinas”. Haslanger, however, is not convinced. 
Against Young, she argues that a social group X may be oppressed as F, 
although it does not identify itself as F.  Furthermore, the identity of a 
group is not necessarily a pre-existing given, but a dynamic reality 
continually in the process of being constructed. In this process, 
institutional practices play a significant role. For example, before being 
taken from Africa to the American continent, the populations that were 
enslaved, and later on would form the group of Black slaves, did not 
exist as such, nor did they recognize themselves as such. Similarly, being 
                                            
5 Moya Bailey (2014) coined the term misogynoir to describe the ways in which Black 
women are subjected to unique forms of racialized misogyny.  
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enslaved, and therefore becoming part of the social group “Slaves” as a 
result of the institution of slavery, was accompanied by distinctive forms 
of cultural production in resistance to this institution, which 
subsequently became part of the group’s cultural identity (oral 
storytelling, songs and laments). In other words, the identity of a group 
takes form through, or in resistance to historical socio-political and 
economic structures. Therefore, a satisfactory analysis of the oppression 
of groups must allow for these points. 
For these reasons, Haslanger rules out the following criteria as 
necessary conditions for structural group oppression: 
 
1. Identification of members X of the group G with their being 
oppressed as F. 
2. Explicit targeting of the group G by formal and informal policies 
and practices. 
3. Intention to oppress on behalf of policy makers. 
  
Haslanger proposes instead a definition of the structural oppression of 
groups designed to account for the complexities we have just sketched. 
In some cases, the institution in question targets a social group 
explicitly; in some cases, it does not explicitly target such a group but 
has clear ramifications for it; and in other cases, its target is a group 
that has not previously had an established sense of itself (Haslanger, 
2012, p. 325). The first formulation of the definition of structural 
oppression of groups is the following: 
 
(SO1) Fs are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in context C iffdf in 
(∃R) (being an F nonaccidentally correlates with being disadvantaged by 
standing in an unjust relation R to others) and I creates, perpetuates, or 
reinforces R.) (Haslanger, 2012, p. 325) 
 
As an example, the definition is applied to a case of gender oppression: 
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Women are oppressed as women by cultural representations of women 
as sex objects in the United States in the late twentieth century iff being 
a woman in the United States in the late twentieth century 
nonaccidentally correlates with being subjected to systematic violence, 
and cultural representations of women as sex objects create, perpetuate, 
or reinforce the systematic violence. (Haslanger, 2012, p.323) 
 
Haslanger draws on Shattered Bonds, Dorothy Robert’s (2002) analysis 
of racist child welfare policies in the United States and lays down the 
factors that are relevant in determining whether there is a non-
accidental correlation between belonging to a group and being 
oppressed. In the cases examined by Roberts, Black people were 
oppressed by child welfare policies in Chicago during the 90’s in virtue of 
a double factor: primarily as poor, and secondarily as Black. Using this 
example, Haslanger next goes on to offer a more complete definition of 
structural oppression by introducing a distinction between primary and 
secondary oppression: 
 
(S02) F S are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in 
context C iffdf in C (∃R) (((being an F nonaccidentally correlates with 
being unjustly disadvantaged either primarily, because being F is 
unjustly disadvantaging in C, or secondarily, because (∃G) (being 
F nonaccidentally correlates with being G due to a prior injustice 
and being G is unjustly disadvantaging in C)) and I creates, 
perpetuates, or reinforces R.) (Haslanger, 2012, p. 332) 
 
In the context described in Shattered Bonds the definition applies as 
follows: 
 
Blacks are oppressed as Blacks by child welfare policies in Chicago in 
the 1990s because in that context being poor results in having one’s 
family unjustly disrupted [primary oppression], and being poor 
nonaccidentally correlates with being Black due to a prior injustice 
[secondary oppression], and the child welfare policies cause or 
perpetuate unjust disruption of families. (Haslanger, 2012, p. 332) 
 
Haslanger argues that this definition of structural oppression can also 
be useful when applied to cases of (intentional or unintentional) agent 
oppression. Where O is the oppressor and V the victim: 
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O oppresses V as an F by an act A in context C iffdf in C (V is an F (or O 
believes that V is an F) and (being an F (or believed to be so) 
nonaccidentally correlates with being morally wronged by O) and A 
creates, perpetuates, or reinforces the moral wrong. (Haslanger, 2012, p. 
334) 
 
Haslanger claims that this definition has two significant strengths: it 
can account both for cases of structural oppression in which agents of 
oppression are not easily identifiable, and for cases in which groups or 
individuals can be recognized as agents. 
 
1.2.4 Strengths of the institutionalist approach 
 
Haslanger claims a number of epistemological and pragmatic 
advantages for her institutionalist analysis. First, unlike an 
individualistic approach, a structural analysis allows us to understand 
the relational nature of social power: “[the latter] depends on the 
institutions and practices that structure our relationships to one 
another” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 316). When an individual uses their power 
to oppress, they do not simply act out of wickedness, but are empowered 
by a context that facilitates or even rewards this use of power. 
Secondly, the institutionalist approach can account for forms of 
oppression “for which no individual is responsible” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 
318) or for situations where it is unclear which agents in particular are 
responsible.  
Thirdly, the institutionalist explanation is preferable for 
pragmatic reasons. Whilst the individualistic approaches tend to suggest 
that ending oppression would require the moral transformation of 
oppressors – an unrealistic goal – the institutionalist perspective points 
towards more achievable and effective aims such as modifying the 
institutions and practices that facilitate oppression. 
However, Haslanger warns against the potential misuse of the 
definition of structural oppression if applied to people who are 
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“attempting to navigate as best they can the moral rapids of everyday 
life” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 320). Her worry is that the proposed definition 
may wrongly classify some individuals who occupy structurally 
privileged positions as oppressors, when in fact they may not necessarily 
be so. We need to remember, Haslanger contends, that not all privileged 
people are oppressors – in fact, some of them may fight against 
oppressive practices. So, although there are powerful reasons for taking 
an institutionalist approach, it is important in her view to avoid a form 
of reductionism that doesn’t take sufficient account of individual 
differences in the uses of power. 
Thus, in an effort to do justice to the complexity of racial and 
gender oppression, Haslanger seeks to find a middle ground between two 
perspectives that, taken in extremis, could narrow our understanding of 
the phenomenon: 
 
I believe that an individualistic approach to group domination is 
inadequate because sometimes structures themselves, not individuals, 
are the problem. Likewise, an institutionalist approach is inadequate 
because it fails to distinguish those who abuse their power to do wrong 
and those who are privileged but do not exploit their power. I 
recommend a “mixed” approach that does not attempt to reduce either 
agent or structural oppression to the other. (Haslanger, 2012, p. 320) 
 
1.3 Some problems 
 
1.3.1 Usefulness of a formula? 
 
In presenting a definition of structural oppression, Haslanger intends to 
offer an analytic tool applicable to ethnoracial groups in order to 
recognize possible cases of racial oppression. Equipped with her formula, 
we only need to find Fs, Is and Rs. However, as Haslanger herself points 
out, the definition does not pretend to offer an objective criterion for 
distinguishing oppression from other harms, or from false claims of 
oppression (as for example, when white supremacist groups claim to be 
oppressed by Affirmative Action or masculinist groups say they are 
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oppressed by women’s rights). Haslanger notes that such controversial 
cases cannot be solved by an epistemic criterion alone; ultimately, they 
depend upon substantive notions of right and wrong. Haslanger points 
out that her goal “has not been to analyse ordinary uses of the term 
‘oppression’ or to legislate how the term should be used, but to highlight 
how we might better understand structural group domination” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 333). We may ask then if the definition is really 
applicable and useful to cases other than the ones Haslanger discusses. 
If the definition is meant to be applicable as a formula, it should allow 
us to understand the structural domination of all relevant groups. But if 
the definition fails this test, it is not clear how far it is useful for 
understanding oppression as a structural phenomenon. 
 
1.3.2 Problematic distinctions 
 
In this section I will address a number of objections to Haslanger’s 
distinction between “the privileged” and “the oppressors” with the aim of 
showing that her account does not fully capture how structures of 
oppression are sustained by those who benefit from them. I will also take 
issue with her claim that individuals or groups are agents of oppression 
in the context of structural oppression insofar as they abuse their power. 
If individual agents can be oppressors without intending to treat 
others unjustly, Haslanger may be right to claim that merely being 
privileged is not a sufficient condition of being an oppressor. Developing 
this line of thought, she frames the distinction between the 
oppressiveness of structures and the oppressiveness of individuals as 
follows: social and political structures are oppressive by misallocating 
power unjustly; individuals are oppressive by (intentionally or 
unintentionally) abusing their power. “Structures cause injustice 
through the misallocation of power; agents cause wrongful harm through 
the abuse of power (sometimes the abuse of misallocated power).” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 320). 
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On this account, the privileged are only virtually or potentially 
oppressors. We can distinguish the oppressor in potentia (let’s call it the 
“Merely Privileged”) and the oppressor in actu (the “Oppressor”). What 
makes the Merely Privileged different from the Oppressor is that the 
latter abuses their power, while the former does not. In fact, the Merely 
Privileged may use their power, Haslanger argues, to fight against 
oppression. 
There are several aspects to unpack in Haslanger’s distinction. 
First, I will show that the notion of abuse of power is problematic as a 
means for analysing how individual agents contribute to oppression. 
Secondly, Haslanger’s argument seems to downplay the role of privilege 
itself in maintaining structures of oppression. I contend that her account 
of privilege seems close to what Alison Bailey (1998) calls a “negative 
notion of privilege”. Thirdly, Haslanger seems to make oppression 
exclusively a matter of what one does: one could be privileged without 
acting as an oppressor. However, on this account, it is not clear what 
might prompt agents to occasionally “abuse” their power. More 
problematically, Haslanger’s argument seems to imply that there’s 
nothing wrong with maintaining one’s privilege just as long as one does 
not abuse one’s power. I argue that this view does not challenge the 
ways in which structural privilege may function as a mechanism that 
maintains oppressive structures in place. For example, in the context of 
white supremacy, this account is insufficient for challenging “white 
saviourism” and “white exceptionalism” in attitudes and practices that, 
whilst apparently attempting to undermine oppression, may in fact hold 
oppressive structures in place.  
 
1.3.3 Are all privileged oppressors? 
 
Haslanger introduces the notion of privilege as implied by structural 
oppression: “Practices and institutions oppress, and some individuals or 
groups are privileged within those practices and institutions” 
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(Haslanger, 2012, p. 316). However, the notion of the “privileged” is 
introduced here to be immediately distinguished from the “oppressors”: 
 
But it would be wrong to count all those who are privileged as 
oppressors. Members of the privileged group (...) may in fact be working 
to undermine the unjust practices and institutions. Nevertheless, in the 
context of structural oppression, there may be some who are more 
blameworthy than others for perpetuating the injustice; they may be 
more responsible for creating, maintaining, expanding, and exploiting 
the unjust social relationships. In such cases, an individual counts as an 
oppressor if their moral wrongdoing compounds the structural injustice, 
that is, if they are agents of oppression within an oppressive structure. 
But not all those who are privileged by an oppressive structure are 
oppressive agents (Haslanger, 2012, p. 316. My italics). 
 
Haslanger seems to consider this distinction to be an important one. In a 
different passage she points out that 
 
Although it is important to capture the sense in which all of us 
perpetuate unjust structures by unthinkingly participating in them, it is 
also important to distinguish between those who abuse their power to 
harm others and those who are attempting to navigate as best they can 
the moral rapids of everyday life (Haslanger, 2012, pp. 319–320. My 
italics) 
 
What distinguishes the Merely Privileged from the Oppressors, in 
Haslanger’s view, is not the presence of good or bad intentions, but the 
fact that, unlike the Merely Privileged, the Oppressor abuses their 
power, whether intentionally or unintentionally, or even “unthinkingly” 
by being indifferent or insensitive. By contrast, Haslanger argues, an 
individual who is structurally privileged is not an oppressor as long as 
they do not abuse their power. 
The example Haslanger uses to illustrate the case of a Merely 
Privileged agent is that of a male professor, named Larry, who disobeys 
racist legislation by granting women of colour access to his lectures. A 
noteworthy element of Haslanger’s contrast between the Merely 
Privileged and the Oppressor therefore seems to consist in the fact that, 
whilst an Oppressor abuses their power, a Merely Privileged person is 
37 
 
not an Oppressor in that they are actively committed to undermining 
oppression. In all the examples given by Haslanger, the Merely 
Privileged person actively resists structurally unjust institutions or 
conventions. This suggests that, in Haslanger’s view, refraining from 
abusing one’s power (i.e., from being an Oppressor) requires more than 
passive abstention. 
However, Haslanger’s distinction between the Merely Privileged 
and the Oppressor seems problematic for three reasons. First, it is 
unclear whether Haslanger thinks that actively working to undermine 
oppressive institutions and social conventions is a sufficient condition for 
not being an oppressor. Arguably, privileged individuals may in good 
faith attempt to undermine oppression while at the same time 
unknowingly reinforcing it. In this scenario, only privileged individuals 
who are highly aware of the causes of structural oppression would be in 
position to actively and effectively work against it. An enlightened elite 
would thus have more chance to qualify as Merely Privileged. However, 
oppressed groups have often documented how even those privileged 
subjects who actively attempt to dismantle oppression and are in a 
position to have a good knowledge of how structural oppression works 
often fail to do so, instead reproducing the oppressive mechanisms that 
they in principle intended to undermine. The conflictual encounters 
between Black feminists and White feminists are testimony to this. An 
example is offered by Marilyn Frye (1983) in her essay “On Being White: 
Thinking Toward A Feminist Understanding of Race and Race 
Supremacy”: 
 
This matter of the powers white feminists have because of being white 
came up for me very concretely in a real-life situation a while back. 
Conscientiously, and with the encouragement of various women of color 
(...) a group of white women formed a white women’s consciousness 
raising group to identify and explore the racism in our lives with a view 
to dismantle the barriers that blocked our understanding and action in 
this matter. (...) In a later community meeting, one Black woman 
criticized us very angrily for ever thinking we could achieve our goals by 
working only with white women. (...) It seemed like doing nothing would 
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be racist and whatever we did would be racist just because we did it. We 
began to lose hope; we felt bewildered and trapped. (...) She [the critic] 
seemed crazy to me. That stopped me. I paused and touched and 
weighed that seeming. It was familiar. I know it as deceptive, defensive. 
I know it from both sides; I have been thought crazy by others too 
righteous, too timid and too defended to grasp the enormity of our 
difference and the significance of their offenses. (Frye, 1983, pp. 111–
112)  
 
From the perspective of Black feminism, bell hooks (1989) gives an 
account of how liberal White feminists tended to reproduce racist 
oppression while at the same time attempting to disrupt it: 
 
As I write, I try to remember when the word racism ceased to be the 
term which best expressed for me exploitation of black people and other 
people of color in this society and when I began to understand that the 
most useful term was white supremacy. It was certainly a necessary 
term when confronted with the liberal attitudes of white women active 
in feminist movement who were unlike their racist ancestors – white 
women in the early woman’s rights movements who did not wish to be 
caught dead in fellowship with black women. In fact, these women often 
requested and longed for the presence of black women. Yet when 
present, what we saw was that they wished to exercise control over our 
bodies and thoughts as their racist ancestors had – that this need to 
exercise power over us expressed how much they had internalized the 
values and attitudes of white supremacy. (hooks, 1989, p. 112) 
 
Based on these examples and following Haslanger’s criteria for being 
Merely Privileged but not an Oppressor, we could say that racially 
privileged liberal White feminists actively attempted to undermine 
racial injustice. They acted on good intentions by requesting the 
presence of Black women in the feminist movement and took action by 
forming consciousness-raising groups in order to examine their 
prejudices. Nevertheless, their attempts were insufficient to prevent 
them from being oppressive towards Black women. Thus, Haslanger’s 
distinction does not clearly show what kind of effort to undermine 
oppression would qualify some people as Merely Privileged, and what 
kind would qualify the privileged as Oppressors. 
Arguably, Haslanger’s distinction only holds if the attempts of the 
Merely Privileged to dismantle oppression are successful. However, her 
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argument is also dependent upon the view that to be an Oppressor is 
mainly a matter of performing specific actions, rather than a general 
way of being. I will show how this perspective obfuscates the way in 
which the structurally privileged perpetuate structures of racial and 
gender oppression by the mere fact of being privileged6. 
 
1.3.4 Abuse of power? 
 
Another problematic aspect of Haslanger’s distinction between the 
Merely Privileged and the Oppressors lies in her use of the notion of 
abuse of power to account for the cases where people act as agents of 
oppression. How is it that, in the context of structural oppression, 
individuals abuse their power? Let’s examine some of her examples to 
illustrate how individuals are agents of oppression. The first example is 
that of a professor called Stanley, who discriminates against women of 
colour by giving them low grades independently of their merits. The case 
presupposes a context in which the relationship between students and 
professor takes place within a “just” (i.e., non-racist) legal framework. 
The example is meant to illustrate how sometimes people are wronged in 
virtue of the actions of individuals alone, even in the absence of 
structural injustice. How to understand the notion of “abuse” here? It 
seems that in this case, Stanley abuses his power because he uses it in 
an illegitimate way, i.e., against what the law stipulates. The “abuse” 
lies here in a misuse of power: Stanley exercises his power in ways that 
he is not (explicitly or implicitly) authorized to. The idea here is that the 
                                            
6 Insofar as Ann E. Cudd draws a similar distinction between being privileged and 
being an oppressor, my critique to Haslanger applies to her account as well. For Cudd, 
“Even if one is a member of a privileged group, one need not oneself be an oppressor 
(…). One could, for instance, struggle against the social system from which one gains 
through one’s group membership, even if one is powerless to renounce that 
membership. (…) To be an oppressor (…) one needs to be a member of a privileged 
group, to gain from oppression of another social group, to intend to so gain, and to act 
to realize that intention by contributing to the oppression of the oppressed group from 
whose oppression one gains” (Cudd, 2006, p. 25).  
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exercise of Stanley’s power is circumscribed within the limits that are 
defined by the nature of his role as a professor; when such limits are 
trespassed, there is “abuse of power”. 
Stanley is an agent of oppression merely because he “abuses” his 
power by using it to wrong individuals without legitimacy. However, 
because this thought experiment presents the context as “just”, the 
example does not allow us to understand what it is to be an agent of 
oppression in the context of structural oppression. A privileged agent 
becomes an Oppressor, in the context of structural injustice, if their 
action reinforces the pre-existing oppressive structure: 
 
(...) in the context of structural oppression, there may be some who are 
more blameworthy than others for perpetuating the injustice; they may 
be more responsible for creating, maintaining, expanding, and 
exploiting the unjust social relationships. In such cases, an individual 
counts as an oppressor if their moral wrongdoing compounds the 
structural injustice, that is, if they are agents of oppression within an 
oppressive structure. But not all those who are privileged by an 
oppressive structure are oppressive agents. (Haslanger, 2012, pp. 316–
317. My italics) 
 
Haslanger argues that, within the context of structural oppression, 
individuals are Oppressors because they “abuse their power”: “[...] 
agents cause wrongful harm through the abuse of power (sometimes the 
abuse of misallocated power).” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 320) Therefore, in 
compounding structural injustice, agents abuse their power. Going back 
to Stanley’s case: if, in the context of sexual and racial structural 
oppression, Stanley gives lower grades to his female students of colour 
regardless of their merits, he is at least responsible for maintaining 
unjust social relations. But would Stanley be abusing his power? 
According to Haslanger, he would. However, in a context where laws and 
institutions are de jure racist, Stanley would be acting in a legitimate 
way. In a white supremacist context (e.g., during “Jim Crow”), 
discriminating against women of colour would be one of the powers that 
Stanley would be authorized to exercise. Yet, his actions would surely be 
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oppressive. Thus, contrary to Haslanger’s claim, an agent can be an 
Oppressor not necessarily by abusing power, but by simply exercising 
the social power conferred to them. Consequently, it’s the very nature of 
the power exercised by agents which, in the context of structural 
oppression, constitutes oppression, rather than an abuse of power as 
such. Haslanger’s formulation could thus be modified as follows: 
“Structures cause injustice through the misallocation of power; agents 
cause wrongful harm through the abuse of power; [within the context of 
structural oppression, they cause harm by using misallocated power.]” 
I contend that agents do not need to abuse their power to be 
Oppressors. In the context of structural oppression, it is enough for an 
individual to use the misallocated power to which they are entitled in 
order to be an agent of Oppression. Haslanger is right to insist that 
there are differences of degree in the uses of power, and some uses have 
a greater impact in maintaining and reinforcing oppressive structures 
than others. However, while she draws a sharp distinction between the 
Merely Privileged and Oppressors, I argue that there is only a difference 
of degree. Furthermore, distinguishing the Merely Privileged from 
Oppressors suggests the existence of a “pure” space where some subjects 
who are privileged simpliciter could be located. In the context of 
structural oppression there is no such a thing as a “pure”, oppression-
free space that some could inhabit. Within an oppressive system, 
privileged people (individuals and groups) may be more or less 
oppressive, depending on how they use their social power. 
 
1.3.5 Privilege as being, oppression as acting? 
 
A third problematic aspect of Haslanger’s distinction between the Merely 
Privileged and Oppressors lies in the fact that being an oppressor mostly 
consists in performing particular actions. This is manifest in her 
application of the definition of structural oppression of groups to the 
cases in which agents are identifiable as oppressors:  “O oppresses V as 
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an F by act A in context C iffdf in C (V is an F (or O believes that V is an 
F) and (being an F (or believed to be so) nonaccidentally correlates with 
being morally wronged by O) and A creates, perpetuates, or reinforces 
the moral wrong.)” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 334) According to this 
framework, one can be socially privileged in a context of structural 
oppression, but one does not become an oppressor unless one effectively 
engages in actions that harm other individuals or social groups. Being 
privileged would thus be a social condition, whereas being an oppressor 
would belong to the realm of action: one may be privileged, but one may 
or may not act oppressively. 
However, this attempt to draw a distinction between being 
privileged and acting oppressively overlooks the complex ways in which 
oppression is part of a way of being, and not merely a matter of 
performing concrete actions. In other words, “being” and “action” are not 
disconnected, and acting as an oppressor derives from particular ways of 
being in the world and in relation to others. Haslanger’s attempt to 
break the connection between “being” and “acting” may be informed by 
what Alison Bailey (1998) describes as a “negative conception of 
privilege”, which tends to obfuscate the role played by privilege itself in 
sustaining structures of oppression. 
According to Bailey, the negative conception of privilege derives 
from Frye’s birdcage metaphor, which illustrates the systematic 
dimension of oppression. In order to understand oppression, Frye 
argues, we need to look not only at the particular obstacles and lack of 
choices that oppressed people face, but also at how these obstacles or 
barriers are systematically interconnected, like the wires of a cage:  
 
[Oppression is] the experience of being caged in… Consider a birdcage. 
If you look very closely at just one wire, you cannot see the other wires. 
If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic 
focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and 
be unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire… it is 
only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, 
microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you 
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can see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a 
moment. (Frye, 1983, pp. 5–6, as cited in Bailey, 1998, p. 105) 
 
What happens if we use the metaphor of the birdcage to mirror the 
notion of privilege in it? Arguably, if to be oppressed is to have one’s life 
options reduced by a set of systematic and interconnected barriers, then 
to be privileged is to be exempt from those barriers. However, Bailey 
contends, this image is insufficient for understanding the nature of 
privilege: “privilege is more complex than simple immunities from the 
systemic barriers of which Frye speaks.” (Bailey, 1998, p. 115) In Frye’s 
account, privilege is reduced to its negative dimension, as receipt of 
benefits due to an absence of barriers. By contrast, for Bailey privilege 
has a positive dimension, which consists in “the presence of additional 
perks that cannot be described in terms of immunities alone.” (Bailey, 
1998, p. 115) By paying attention to this positive sense of privilege we 
can more clearly show how privilege itself sustains oppression, and 
therefore, how privileged subjects participate in oppression by the mere 
fact of being privileged.  
How to understand these additional perks or advantages that 
privilege confers? Here Bailey draws some important distinctions in 
order to clear out a common confusion:  
 
Just as all oppression counts as harm, but not all harms count as 
oppression, I want to suggest that all privilege is advantageous, but that 
not all advantages count as privilege” (Bailey, 1998, pp. 107–108).  
 
Bailey clarifies the difference between “privilege” and mere “advantages” 
by first distinguishing between earned and unearned advantages. A 
second distinction concerns how these assets or advantages are 
conferred: either systematically, or accidentally. Thirdly, this conferral 
may be either justified or arbitrary. Employing these distinctions, 
privilege is defined as consisting in the arbitrarily and “systematically 
conferred nature of (...) unearned assets.” (Bailey, 1998, pp. 107–108) 
For example, in virtue of racial privilege, people racialized as White 
44 
 
have a surplus of credibility by which they are perceived as more 
reliable, honest and competent than non-White people (Fricker, 2007)7.  
Privilege is also dynamic in its nature. It does not just consist in 
receiving a series of concrete assets (such as money or properties). 
Rather, it’s a mechanism that produces and reproduces assets: privilege 
has “an unconditional ‘wild card’ quality” in that “its benefits cover a 
wide variety of circumstances and conditions” (Bailey, 1998, p. 108). 
While particular advantages or assets can be concrete and 
circumscribed, privilege is adaptive in its way of functioning so that 
assets can generate further assets. Therefore, privilege can be described 
as a mechanism of systematic reproduction of advantages distributed to 
members of dominant groups on an arbitrary basis i.e., solely based on 
their membership of these groups. 
The last point becomes easier to grasp if we pay attention to the 
fact that the distinction between “earned advantages” and “unearned 
assets” is not clear-cut. Privilege can be thought not only as the 
systematic and arbitrary conferral of unearned assets, but also as a 
dynamic structure that systematically and arbitrarily facilitates the 
acquisition of earned advantages as well: 
 
Perhaps the point here is not that earned advantages and privilege are 
necessarily distinct, but rather that some advantages are more easily 
earned if they are accompanied by gender, heterosexual, race or class 
privilege. Privilege and earned advantages are connected in the sense 
                                            
7 This phenomenon has been analysed by Miranda Fricker with the notion of epistemic 
injustice, which she defines as “a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity 
as a knower”. Fricker distinguishes between two main forms of epistemic injustice: 
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice: “Testimonial injustice occurs when 
prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word; 
hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of 
their social experiences. An example of the first might be that the police do not believe 
you because you are black; an example of the second might be that you suffer sexual 
harassment in a culture that still lacks that critical concept. We might say that 
testimonial injustice is caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility; and that 
hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the economy of collective 
hermeneutical resources.” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1)  
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that privilege places one in a better position to earn more advantages. 
The link between earned advantages and unearned privilege generates 
a situation in which privileged groups can earn assets (e.g., control of 
resources, skills, a quality education, the attention of the mayor, a good 
reputation, a prestigious well-paying job, political power, or a safe place 
to live) more easily and more frequently than those who don’t have 
white, male, heterosexual, or economic privilege. (Bailey, 1998, p. 110) 
 
Privilege thus understood operates as a dynamic structure or 
mechanism that produces and reproduces enabling effects for to whom it 
applies. 
The problem with reducing privilege to its negative sense is that 
doing so obscures the extent to which the latter depends on the 
structures that systematically and arbitrarily disadvantage some people 
with respect to others. By contrast, understanding privilege in its 
positive sense allows grasping how to be structurally privileged is, by the 
same token, to be implicated in the perpetuation of oppression. 
Therefore, with the positive notion of privilege we can get a more 
complete understanding of oppression: 
 
If the structural features of oppression generate privilege, then a 
complete understanding of oppression requires that we also be attentive 
to the ways in which complex systems of domination rely on the 
oppression of one group to generate privilege for another. (Bailey, 1998, 
p. 117) 
 
As an illustration of the distinction between negative and positive 
privilege, Bailey gives the following account: 
 
I first became aware of this distinction during a conversation I had with 
a young white male student in my “Introduction to Women‘s Studies” 
class. Once he became aware of the unearned aspects of his male 
privilege, this student was eager use it in politically useful ways. He 
suggested that one way to do this would be to accompany women on a 
Take Back the Night March, a historically women only demonstration 
against sexual violence. Since men can go out at night with little risk of 
sexual assault, he reasoned, he might use this unearned privilege to, in 
his words, “protect the women as they marched.” What this student had 
in mind, no doubt, was to exercise his role as protector to defend the 
marching women against members of his gender with predatory 
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leanings. In other words, he wanted to use his privileged protector 
status in a way that supported feminist projects. (Bailey, 1998, p. 115) 
 
The example shows two dimensions of privilege: being a White man, the 
student faces fewer barriers than women to circulate safely at night 
(negative privilege). But by the very fact that women are in danger due 
to being oppressed by a heterosexist system, the male student has access 
to the superior status of a protector (positive privilege). However, 
because the student only understands privilege in its negative sense, he 
fails to see how he contributes to sustain women’s oppression by being a 
“protector”, since “when male protectors step in, the symbolism of the 
march is undermined”: 
 
In his eagerness to help the cause he does not notice the systemic links 
between his heterosexual male privilege as a protector and women‘s 
oppression. He does not notice how his offer of protective services 
reinscribes the function of the hetero-patriarchal protector/predator 
gender role assigned to men. In attempting to [be] supportive he falls 
into his scripted role as a protector. (Bailey, 1998, p. 116) 
 
Bailey’s account makes “visible the role of privilege in maintaining 
hierarchies.” (Bailey, 1998, p. 117) As it stems from her analysis, the 
difference between being merely privileged and acting as an oppressor is 
not straightforward: by being merely privileged (positive sense), one also 
participates in oppression.  
 There’s an additional element in Bailey’s account that casts light 
on the insufficiency of Haslanger’s distinction between being Privileged 
and acting as an Oppressor. Privilege, in both its negative and positive 
senses, is a mechanism that “structures the world” in a way that tends 
to be invisible to those who benefit from it. In consequence, it tends to 
remain unacknowledged by the privileged. Privilege, in this sense, is 
characterized by a “structured invisibility”. The combination of the 
structuring of one’s world and the invisibility of this structure has 
consequences for how the privileged tend to perceive themselves and 
their capacities. In other words, by invisibly structuring one’s world, 
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privilege also conditions the perception of the self. For example, 
privileged subjects will tend to think of themselves as more capable of 
achieving goals on the basis of their own individual merits:  
 
The structured invisibility of privilege insures that a person's individual 
accomplishments will be recognized more on the basis of individual 
merit than on the basis of group membership. Redirecting attention 
away from the unearned nature of privilege and toward individual merit 
allows persons born on third base to believe sincerely that they hit a 
triple. In fact, the maintenance of heterosexual, white, or male privilege 
as positions of structural advantage lie largely in the silence 
surrounding the mechanisms of privilege. (Bailey, 1998, p. 113) 
 
This has consequences for how a privileged self may take shape with a 
sense of inhabiting a world that largely fits their needs and doesn’t seem 
to present much resistance to their volitions and efforts. However, 
“structured invisibility” is closely connected to the ways in which 
mechanisms of privilege maintain and/or reinforce oppression. For 
example, the privilege of a White man’s relative ease in finding jobs and 
being promoted has its flipside in the disadvantages of women in the 
work market, and especially of women of colour. Thus, if to be privileged 
is to be involved in sustaining structures of oppression by the very fact of 
inhabiting a world that has systematic enabling effects for one’s self in 
virtue of its disabling consequences for others, then to be privileged is to 
participate in oppression and, in this sense, to be an oppressor. In 
consequence, the participation of the privileged in sustaining oppression 
cannot be simply reduced to a matter of discrete actions or occasional 
behaviour in which they may occur. 
However, from the fact that there is no sharp distinction between 
being privileged and acting as an oppressor, it does not follow that there 
are no differences among oppressors. In the first place, oppression can 
take many forms. Each system of oppression is embedded within 
particular cultural and historical contexts that shape the beliefs and 
behaviour of oppressors and oppressed, so that, for example, members of 
the ruling class in seventeenth-century India will differ significantly 
48 
 
from Spanish colonizers in sixteenth-century America or eighteenth-
century slaveholders in the United States. In addition, we can 
distinguish between oppressors with respect to other criteria such as 
their degree of awareness of the harm they are doing or contributing to, 
the extent of their explicit or implicit adherence to the system that 
sustains oppression, or the seriousness of the harms they inflict upon the 
lives of the oppressed. There may be important differences of degree. Not 
all oppressors are responsible to the same extent for the harms of 
oppression. 
Summing up, Haslanger’s account of the participation of agents in 
structural oppression in terms of “abuse of power”, as well as her 
distinction between being privileged and being an oppressor seem 
conceptually insufficient. First, agents do not need to abuse their power 
to participate in oppression. In the context of structural oppression, it is 
often enough for them to use a power that is in itself oppressive. 
Secondly, her distinction between “being privileged” and “being an 
oppressor” is unclear in terms of the efforts it requires in order not to be 
an oppressor. Thirdly, her account seems to be based on a negative 
conception of privilege as passive receipt of assets, which results in an 
insufficient examination of how privileged subjects participate in 
enforcing and maintaining oppressive structures by the mere fact of 
being privileged. Drawing on Alison Bailey’s account of privilege as a 
mechanism of systematic and arbitrary conferral of unearned assets and 
facilitating the acquisition of earned advantages, I took issue with 
Haslanger’s distinction between Privileged and Oppressors, which 
mirrors the difference between “being” and “acting”. 
I contend that, insofar as privilege is a dynamic mechanism that 
structures the world, and inasmuch as it does so in ways that are 
invisible and unrecognized for its beneficiaries, to be situated in a 
position of privilege is to be placed in the position of the oppressor, since 
the very same structures that enable some individuals are the ones that 
disable others. The distinction between merely being privileged and 
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acting as an oppressor thus becomes very hard to delineate and 
maintain. 
 
1.4 Complicity: how the privileged participate in oppression 
 
Haslanger’s distinction between those who are merely privileged and 
those who act as agents of oppression is also indebted to a conception of 
responsibility tied to notions of causality and blame. As she argues, 
“there may be some who are more blameworthy than others for 
perpetuating the injustice; they may be more responsible for creating, 
maintaining, expanding, and exploiting the unjust social relationships” 
(Haslanger, 2012, pp. 316–317. My italics). Or again, “Whether an 
individual or a group is blameworthy for the injustice will depend on 
what role they play in causing or maintaining the unjust structure” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 317).  
However, an emphasis on causal responsibility and blame may 
obscure how privileged groups – and their individual members – are 
responsible for enforcing and maintaining structures of oppression. 
Reducing responsibility for oppression to a matter of blame and 
causation also reflects an individualistic conception of agency that is 
insufficient for our purposes. Another model is needed in order to 
account for how privileged groups are responsible for sustaining 
oppression.  
An alternative way to challenge the distinction between “being” 
privileged and “acting” as an oppressor can be found in the notion of 
complicity. In her book Being White, Being Good. White Complicity, 
White Moral Responsibility and Social Justice Pedagogy (2010), Barbara 
Applebaum develops a critique of traditional accounts of responsibility 
(which focus on notions of causality and blame) and argues that a notion 
of responsibility tied to the concept of complicity is better suited to 
capturing how the privileged participate in oppression. 
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Applebaum notes that, whilst questions of complicity have been 
given considerable attention in critical race theory and feminist 
scholarship, such accounts have traditionally centred on the complicity 
of the oppressed in their own oppression and engage to a lesser degree 
with the question of the complicity of the structurally privileged in 
perpetuating systemic injustice.  
However, as Applebaum contends, recent developments in Critical 
whiteness studies have explored how “white people, through the 
practices of whiteness and by benefiting from white privilege, contribute 
to the maintenance of systemic racial injustice” (Applebaum, 2010, p. 2). 
This claim, called by Applebaum the “white complicity claim” is tied to 
the question of responsibility in that “the failure to acknowledge such 
complicity will thwart whites in their efforts to dismantle unjust racial 
systems and, more specifically, will contribute to the perpetuation of 
racial injustice” (Applebaum, 2010, p. 3).  
White people’s belief in their own moral innocence, good 
intentions and purity tends to operate as a screen that conceals their 
awareness of their participation in oppression. The belief of White people 
in their own moral innocence is encouraged by models of moral 
responsibility that remain tied to notions of causality and blame. Based 
on such notions, White people tend to think that only those who are 
explicitly racist (such as the KKK or white supremacist groups) should 
be held responsible for their participation in racism, while believing 
themselves to be “off the hook”, for example, by their good-willed 
declarations of anti-racism. As a result, White people tend to vigorously 
resist any suggestion that they might also be implicated in sustaining 
racist oppression by the mere fact of being White: 
 
Traditional conceptions of moral responsibility (...) not only fail to 
expose white complicity but also contribute to the normalization of 
denials of complicity that protect systemic racism from being 
challenged. One of the problems with traditional conceptions of moral 
responsibility is the presumption that moral innocence is attainable. 
Because such notions of responsibility center on the question “what can 
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I do?” rather than the question “what needs to be done?” they encourage 
moral solipsism, heroism and white narcissism. (Applebaum, 2010, p. 5) 
 
I will come back to this exploration of the privileged’s complicity with 
oppression in future chapters of my thesis. My aim is to show how 
complicity with oppression is channelled by emotional phenomena, in 
order to offer an account of oppression that makes sense of its 
pervasiveness.  
 
1.5 Looking forward: why we need to pay attention to the 
emotions 
 
My analysis of Haslanger’s discussion of oppression is, I suggest, enough 
to show that it is insufficient. A satisfactory account of oppression needs 
to take into consideration a series of complexities that her account 
denies or overlooks. First, I argued against Haslanger that, in the 
context of structural oppression, agents do not need to abuse their power 
in order to participate in oppression. Secondly, I contend that her 
distinction between “being” privileged and “acting” as an oppressor is 
conceptually weak in that it fails to give a clear criterion for their 
distinction. Thirdly, Haslanger’s analysis offers a negative conception of 
privilege as passive receipt of advantages. Drawing on Alison Bailey’s 
expansion of the notion of privilege and on Barbara Applebaum’s notion 
of complicity, I suggest that Haslanger’s conception leaves unaddressed 
the complex ways in which structurally privileged groups and 
individuals enforce and sustain structures of oppression by the mere fact 
of being privileged.   
There is, however, a further problem with Haslanger’s stance, to 
which I now turn. This will be the main theme of my thesis and will 
occupy me in the following chapters. At this stage my aim is to introduce 
it, and provide a preliminary defence of its importance. 
Philosophers such as Haslanger who draw attention to the 
structural dimensions of oppression rightly identify the inadequacy of 
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analyses of oppression that focus primarily on the individual motivations 
of members of privileged groups.  Such analyses are theoretically and 
normatively insufficient. On the one hand, they do not adequately 
diagnose the causes of oppression and the mechanisms through with it is 
produced and reproduced. On the other hand, due to this epistemic 
deficiency, they tend to overemphasize the role individuals can play in 
reducing oppression. As a result, they offer naive and unrealistic 
proposals aimed at changing the way individuals think or feel, which 
have little impact in real life struggles against oppression. 
As we have seen, these accounts leave the structural roots of 
oppression unchallenged. As Haslanger points out, it’s often “structures 
themselves, not individuals, [who] are the problem”. But they also suffer 
from a further limitation. They largely fail to take account of the ways in 
which oppression partly shapes emotions and underestimate the extent 
to which people’s resulting emotional “constitution” limit their ability to 
change. Theoretical proposals for changing the way people think or feel 
often fail to take into consideration the extent to which a satisfactory 
account of social change must examine and engage with the emotional 
characters of oppressors and oppressed.  
Moving beyond Haslanger’s discussion, we have seen that 
institutionalist analyses tend to overlook issues related to individuals’ 
complicity in oppression. But here, too, we find a deficiency. Like their 
individualist counterparts, structural analyses tend to underplay the 
emotional impact of structures of oppression, both on the oppressed, and 
on those who benefit from oppression. The emotional mechanisms 
through which oppression is produced and reproduced are in general 
neglected in the analysis of oppression as a structural phenomenon. 
When emotions are taken as a central element in oppression, the prism 
of analysis tends to be psychologizing and individualistic, and this tends 
to produce a justified suspicion in those who are committed to 
institutionalist analyses. For these reasons, attempts to address the role 
emotions play in oppression are often suspected of being naive and 
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misguided. This mistrust is visible, for example, in Haslanger’s critique 
of individualistic accounts on oppression: 
 
Bigotry, hatred, intolerance are surely bad. Agreement on this is easy, 
even if it is not clear what to do about them. But if people are prevented 
from acting on their bigotry, hatred, and intolerance – at least 
prevented from harming others for these motives – then we can still live 
together peacefully. Living together in peace and justice does not 
require that we love each other, or that we even fully respect each other, 
but rather that we conform our actions to principles of justice. 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 335) 
 
Haslanger’s argument rightly rejects a naive approach to transforming 
people’s hostile emotions through a sort of affective conversion. Even if 
people who respect principles of justice are hypocritical, she points out, 
the fact that they respect them is enough to reduce oppression. What is 
therefore crucial is that institutions be just: 
 
Should we be concerned if some members of the community are 
hypocrites in acting respectfully toward others without having the 
“right” attitude? Of course, this could be a problem if hypocrites can’t be 
trusted to sustain their respectful behavior; and plausibly hatred and 
bigotry are emotions that involve dispositions to wrongful action. 
Nonetheless, for many of those who suffer injustice, “private” attitudes 
are not the worst problem; systematic institutional subordination is. 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 335) 
 
On this account, emotions are relegated to the private sphere. Although 
this is not the focus of her argument and these remarks occupy a 
marginal position in her account, Haslanger nevertheless seems to rely 
on the view that the emotional element does not merely belong to the 
individual as something private and idiosyncratic, but it is instead 
linked to structures of power. This claim is presented as an additional 
support for her argument that the focus of any struggle against 
oppression should be transforming the structures of power, rather than 
the individuals’ cognitive and emotional biases: 
 
Cognitive and emotional racial biases do not emerge out of nothing; both 
are products of the complex interplay between the individual and the 
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social that has been a theme throughout this chapter. Our attitudes are 
shaped by what we see, and what we see, in turn, depends on the 
institutional structures that shape our lives and the lives of those 
around us (Haslanger, 2012, pp. 335–336). 
 
Haslanger’s focus on the structural element of oppression, and her 
opposition to “an undue emphasis on racist individuals and racist 
attitudes in recent philosophical work” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 336) seems 
to suggest that tackling the structural element will contribute to 
modifying emotions such as hate and bigotry, so that there is little need 
for any independent discussion of how to modify the emotions and 
attitudes of individuals. As an example, if structural changes are 
introduced so that police stop systematically targeting Black people and 
people of colour, then we may expect that the negative stereotype of 
Black men as being dangerous and the fear correlated with it will 
significantly be reduced. This is suggested by the following example, 
drawn from Haslanger’s work: 
 
Is it hard to imagine that young White people who look around and see 
police locking up people of color at disproportionate rates, might 
conclude there is something wrong with these folks? Something to be 
feared then perhaps despised? (Wise, 2000, as cited in Haslanger, 2012, 
p. 336) 
 
Contrary to an individualistic and psychologizing view of emotions, 
which conceives them as internally configured in the individual psyche 
and as becoming externalized when expressed (the “inside out model”, on 
Sara Ahmed’s terms), the view that our emotions and attitudes are 
shaped by structures – and that, as a consequence, changing the 
structures will suffice to modify our emotions – is perhaps located too far 
on the opposite side (the “outside in model”). Without rejecting the ways 
in which social, cultural and political structures shape our attitudes and 
feelings, we may still find such a view problematic insofar as (1) it may 
reinforce the idea that individuals are passive in how they “take in” the 
emotions that are “outside” in the social world; (2) it presupposes too 
sharp a distinction between an inside (individual) and an outside (the 
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social), as Sara Ahmed (2004a) points out. Haslanger seems attentive to 
this risk of reducing individuals to matter passively shaped by social 
structures, adding after Wise’s example quoted above that 
 
Of course, individuals are not merely passive observers; attitudes are 
not inert. We stand in complicated relationships to the collectively 
formed and managed structures that shape our lives. Structures take on 
specific historical forms because of the individuals within them; 
individual action is conditioned in multiple and varying ways by social 
context. (Haslanger, 2012, p. 336) 
 
The challenge therefore remains to think about how emotions are 
involved in oppression in ways that (1) do not reinforce an individualistic 
and psychologizing perspective; (2) do not reduce groups and individuals 
to passive observers; (3) do not disregard the active role that emotions 
play in sustaining oppression. 
Approaching the role emotions play in oppression through an 
individualist lens will not yield an epistemically or normatively 
satisfying analysis. But refusing to engage with the way emotions are in 
play by concentrating exclusively on structural mechanisms is also not 
enough. It leaves unaddressed some important elements that we need to 
acknowledge in order to think about how oppression works and how it 
can be reduced. Attention to the interplay between emotions and 
oppression may allow us to understand why structures of oppression 
resist change. In addition, analysing the connections between oppressive 
structures and emotional dynamics is useful in accounting for the 
complex relations between social structures and individuals: insisting 
only on the structural element may have the downside of obfuscating 
individuals’ complicity with oppression, and leave unaddressed 
questions of how individuals may be responsible for their participation 
in it. On the other hand, as argued above, insisting only on individuals’ 
behaviour produces a very limited analysis and solutions. 
While it is true that “for many of those who suffer injustice, 
‘private’ attitudes are not the worst problem; systematic institutional 
subordination is” (Haslanger, 2012, p. 335), it is in my view still crucial 
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to examine how institutions themselves are catalysts of affects and 
involved in their social reproduction. When institutions reinforce sexism 
or racism, they “secrete” affects that play an important part in the 
formation of the characters and relationships of those who are 
disadvantaged or rewarded by them. Moreover, if oppression manifests 
as well through interpersonal exchanges, our emotions may have more 
impact and weight than Haslanger acknowledges. What’s left out, what 
we need to address, is the role of emotions in sustaining and reinforcing 
oppression. This will be the subject of chapter 2. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I took issue with Haslanger’s account of oppression and 
argued that simply producing a definition fails to give us a rich enough 
understanding of this phenomenon. I challenged Haslanger’s claim that, 
in the context of structural oppression, individuals are agents of 
oppression insofar as they “abuse” their power, and criticised her 
distinction between being merely privileged and being an oppressor. 
Drawing on Bailey’s expansion of Frye’s account of oppression, I 
contended that Haslanger’s view of privilege is insufficient for 
explaining the ways in which the privileged are complicit in sustaining 
oppression. Finally, I offered a speculative proposal, to be expanded in 
the chapters that follow, that a richer and more nuanced account of 
oppression requires a deeper consideration of emotions.
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2. The narrative way 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter ended with a preliminary defence of the 
importance of emotions in our conceptualization of oppression. In this 
chapter, I shall present a series of testimonies and narratives that 
provide evidence for the main argument of my thesis, namely, that 
emotions8 play a fundamental role in oppression. In future chapters, I 
shall explore the nature of the role of emotions in oppression in more 
detail. In other words, through these preliminary examples, I shall show 
that emotions play an important part in oppression; in future chapters I 
aim to account for how they do so. 
These testimonies, narratives and phenomenological analyses of 
the lived experience of oppression reveal essential features of this 
phenomenon. I start by offering arguments about the importance of this 
narrative and conceptual material for any philosophical theorizing of 
oppression (2.2). One dimension of racial oppression has consisted in 
treating the bodies of the oppressed as “spectacular”, as the object of the 
gazing, knowing white subject (Yancy, 2017), and as the site of projection 
of the emotions of the oppressors. Precisely because this history has 
silenced and denied the agency of the oppressed, I argue that it is crucial 
to engage with their narratives and theorizing about their own 
condition. Doing so will clarify the methodology of my thesis. 
In the final section of the chapter (2.3), I will contend that 
narratives and descriptions of the lived experience show how oppression 
is internalized through emotions such as shame, guilt and fear. 
Furthermore, I will contend that feelings of inadequacy, division and 
disorientation can often make resistance to oppression more difficult. 
Feelings of shame resulting in self-loathing and isolation are also an 
                                            
8 In Chapter 3, I specify what kind of emotional phenomena will be the focus of my 
thesis. 
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important feature of alienation, as an extreme form of internalized 
oppression. 
 
2.2 Why listening to the oppressed matters 
 
Why must the voices of the oppressed be the starting point for any 
theorizing about oppression? In the case of oppression, failing to consider 
the narratives of those who experience it may lead to unsatisfactory 
accounts because, as I go on to argue, oppression is in significant ways 
an emotional, embodied experience. The work I present here adopts a 
critical stance to traditional ways of theorizing in philosophy, and in 
analytic philosophy more particularly, and advocates an alternative 
method that aims do greater justice to the experience of oppression. 
 
2.2.1 The nature of the topic 
 
A first argument in favour of theorizing on the basis of narratives 
concerns the nature of the object of our enquiry. To theorize about 
oppression is different from philosophizing about the concept of infinity 
or about the innateness of ideas. Because oppression has, as the 
narratives show, a strong emotional content, failing to engage with this 
dimension of the lived experience of oppression will considerably 
impoverish any theoretical enquiry into it. In analytic philosophy, 
theorizing tends to focus on abstract, sometimes unrealistic, thought 
experiments that typically do not deal with lived experiences9. Without 
implying that such exercises are devoid of usefulness as a means to 
testing philosophical “intuitions” and sharpening conceptual tools, I 
contend that an excessive emphasis on thought experiments carries the 
risk of over-simplifying and mischaracterizing the issue in question10. In 
                                            
9 For a critique to an excessive emphasis on “streamlined hypothetical cases” in 
contemporary analytic philosophy, and a defence of the “philosophical benefits” in 
using of real-world cases, see Furman (2016, pp. 15–47). 
10 See examples like ‘Stanley’ and ‘Larry’ in Haslanger’s account of oppression, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
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fact, by focusing on thought experiments, we risk missing essential 
aspects of oppression, precisely because such experiments do not 
typically engage with the emotional content of oppression. Yet, the ways 
that oppressed groups narrate and theorize their experience shows that 
emotions play a central role. We therefore need a methodology that does 
not systematically exclude the voices of oppressed groups. 
 
2.2.2 A method that reduces the reproduction of oppression 
 
The argument for putting the voices of the oppressed at the centre of our 
philosophical enquiry is coupled with ethical concerns. Insofar as 
oppression is traditionally exercised in ways that reduce the oppressed 
to silence and passivity – for example, by discrediting their capacity to 
think and feel, or by denying them agency11 – any account committed to 
fighting against oppression must be vigilant about the risks of 
reproducing methods of theorizing that may perpetuate these very same 
oppressive practices. Ignoring the accounts that members of oppressed 
groups give of their own experience and of their perception of the 
oppressors may therefore contribute to marginalizing and devaluing 
their experiences. As Patricia Hill Collins (2009) has argued about the 
articulation of Black feminist thought, some narratives and testimonies 
have been traditionally relegated to a status of “subjugated knowledge”: 
                                            
11 As George Yancy has argued, an important aspect of the traumatic experience to 
which Black bodies were subjected during the Middle Passage and upon their arrival in 
America lies in the “spectacularization” of their bodies that the “white gaze” operates. 
But if treating the Black body as an object of spectacle was one of the ways in which 
White domination was settled, Yancy argues, some of the first narratives of the lived 
experience of slavery must therefore be read as a direct challenge to the predominant 
“white epistemic regime”. The treatment of the oppressed bodies as object of spectacle 
is not limited to eighteenth-century America. It continues to be present in the White 
imagination, both in the form of distorted representations that reduce marginalized 
bodies to figures of criminality, passivity, incapacity, which Yancy names the “Black 
imago”, and through projective mechanisms that sustain White’s constructions of their 
self-image. In this sense, more contemporary narratives that present the lived 
experience of anti-Black racism in the United States can also be understood as 
challenging the persistence of the “white epistemic regime” (Yancy, 2017) 
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Because elite White men control Western structures of knowledge 
validation, their interests pervade the themes, paradigms, and 
epistemologies of traditional scholarship. As a result, U.S. Black 
women’s experiences as well as those of women of African descent 
transnationally have been routinely distorted within or excluded from 
what counts as knowledge. (...) In this context, Black feminist thought 
can best be viewed as subjugated knowledge. Traditionally, the 
suppression of Black women’s ideas within White-male-controlled social 
institutions led African-American women to use music, literature, daily 
conversations, and everyday behavior as important locations for 
constructing a Black feminist consciousness (Collins, 2009, pp. 269–270)  
 
Because the epistemic norms that govern what are deemed to be 
legitimate processes and products of knowledge are not neutrally 
constructed, but rather benefit those in positions of power as well as 
reinforcing the norms that legitimize oppressive structures of power, the 
knowledge that oppressed groups have gathered tends to be discredited, 
which leads to their testimonies being disbelieved: 
 
Far from being the apolitical study of truth, epistemology points to the 
ways in which power relations shape who is believed and why. For 
example, various descendants of Sally Hemmings, a Black woman 
owned by Thomas Jefferson, claimed repeatedly that Jefferson fathered 
her children. These accounts forwarded by Jefferson’s African American 
descendants were ignored in favor of accounts advanced by his White 
progeny. Hemmings’s descendants were routinely disbelieved until their 
knowledge claims were validated by DNA testing. (Collins, 2009, p. 270)  
 
One of the criteria for devaluing the knowledge of the oppressed lies in 
the marginal place given to individual narratives and emotions in 
methods for studying the experience of oppressed groups. For example, 
positivist methods of scientific research require by their very structure 
the exclusion of values and emotions in order to attain objective 
generalizations. They require, first, that the researchers distance 
themselves from the “object of study”. Secondly, emotions must be 
absent from the investigation. Such criteria, argues Collins, 
 
ask African-American women to objectify [themselves], devalue [their] 
emotional life, displace [their] motivations for furthering knowledge 
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about Black women, and confront in adversarial relationship those with 
more social, economic, and professional power. (Collins, 2009, p. 270) 
  
This is not, of course, because Collins would claim that the oppressed are 
more emotional than others, or that they’re incapable of attaining 
scientific knowledge. Such claim would reinforce the ways in which 
racially and sexually oppressed groups have been denied a rational 
capacity, by being portrayed as having an animal-like predominant 
emotionality and an underdeveloped intellect. By contrast, Collins’ claim 
consists in noting the epistemic value that emotion plays in how Black 
women produce and validate knowledge, which is connected to their 
lived experience of oppression: “lived experiences as a criterion for 
credibility frequently is invoked by U.S. Black women when making 
knowledge claims.” (Collins, 2009, p. 276) This is also something that 
feminist scholars have analysed as a problem faced by women in 
general: 
 
Some feminist scholars claim that women as a group are more likely 
than men to use lived experiences in assessing knowledge claims. For 
example, a substantial number of the 135 women in a study of women’s 
cognitive development were “connected knowers” and were drawn to the 
sort of knowledge that emerges from firsthand observation (Belenky et 
al., 1986). (Collins, 2009, p. 277) 
 
Moreover, Collins points out how the articulation between personal 
experience and an “alternative epistemology” is often connected to an 
ethic of caring, in which emotions play a central role: 
 
‘Ole white preachers used to talk wid dey tongues widdout sayin’ 
nothin’, but Jesus told us slaves to talk wid our hearts’ (Webber 1978, 
127). These words of an ex-slave suggest that ideas cannot be divorced 
from the individuals who create and share them. This theme of talking 
with the heart taps the ethic of caring, another dimension of an 
alternative epistemology used by African-American women. Just as the 
ex-slave used the wisdom in his heart to reject the ideas of the preachers 
who talked ‘wid dey tongues without sayin’ nothin’,’ the ethic of caring 
suggests that personal expressiveness, emotions, and empathy are 
central to the knowledge validation process. (Collins, 2009, p. 282) 
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According to Collins, an important element of the ethic of caring is to 
consider emotions as appropriate when communicating knowledge: 
“Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an 
argument” (Collins, 2009, p. 282). The greater place given to emotions in 
African-American communities echoes feminist analysis that highlight 
the role of personality in connected knowing which, although not gender 
specific, appears to be more widespread among women: “connected 
knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that 
the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding” 
(Collins, 2009, p. 282). By contrast, separate knowing characterizes 
traditional methods of scientific knowledge where personality is deemed 
a distorting factor that ought to be put aside: “Separate knowers try to 
subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because 
they see personality as biasing those ideas” (Collins, 2009, p. 283). In so 
far as those who are traditionally devoted to labours of care are women, 
and women of colour in particular, connected knowing may be a salient 
feature of their epistemic practice. Thus, the higher value given to 
emotions for constructing and assessing knowledge is not due to a 
pseudo innate or natural intellectual deficiency that would characterize 
women and people of colour in general. It may be that, in virtue of being 
marginalized from mainstream definition and production of knowledge, 
emotions tend to be more freely accepted as part of what counts as 
knowledge than in traditional white and male dominated scientific 
practices. 
An important reason for basing our investigation on oppression on 
what the oppressed say about it finds its justification in the fact that 
such first-person accounts have remarkable epistemic value for members 
of oppressed groups themselves12. Furthermore, if we discard the 
                                            
12 Collins points out the contradictions in which African-American men are situated 
with respect to predominant “unemotional” definitions of masculinity: “White women 
may have access to women’s experiences that encourage emotion and expressiveness, 
but few White-controlled U.S. social institutions except the family validate this way of 
knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an 
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emotional content as inessential to gaining knowledge about how 
oppression works, we may fail to understand some of its key aspects:  
 
Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: 
‘Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and 
totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and 
yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty… I’m trying to change 
the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as distinct faculties’ (Tate 1983, 
156). The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal 
expressiveness heals this binary that separates emotion from intellect. 
For example, in her rendition of ‘Strange Fruit’, Billie Holiday’s lyrics 
blend seamlessly on Southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha 
Franklin’s (1967) cry for ‘respect’ would be eventually meaningless. 
(Collins, 2009, p. 282) 
 
Considering emotions as devoid of epistemic value constitutes therefore 
rather a disadvantage for the knower, a disadvantage to which the 
dominant (White, male) may be more prone. 
The narrative approach is all the more essential, given that the 
epistemic value of first-person narratives does not merely count as 
“theoretical” knowledge. The oppressed have developed knowledge by 
documenting and transmitting interpretations of their oppressors (their 
character, their habits) and by detecting the mechanisms of domination. 
As Collins highlights, the practical dimension of this form of knowledge 
has been crucial for resisting and surviving oppression. This aspect is 
captured through the distinction between “knowledge” and “wisdom”: 
 
Mabel Lincoln eloquently summarizes the distinction between 
knowledge and wisdom: ‘To black people like me, a fool is funny – you 
know, people who love to break bad, people you can’t tell anything to, 
folks that would take a shotgun to a roach’ (Gwaltney 1980, 68). African-
American women need wisdom to know how to deal with the ‘educated 
fools’ who would ‘take a shotgun to a roach’. As members of a 
subordinate group, Black women cannot afford to be fools of any type, 
for our objectification as the Other denies us the protections that White 
                                            
institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and 
encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Black 
cultural tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in 
redefining Black masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity 
imposed on them (Hoch 1979).” (Collins, 2009, pp. 283–284) 
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skin, maleness and wealth confer. This distinction between knowledge 
and wisdom, and the use of experience as the cutting edge in dividing 
them, has been key to Black women’s survival. (Collins, 2009, p. 276) 
 
Therefore, taking the voices of the oppressed as the basis for a 
philosophical investigation of oppression is also crucial if we aim to 
understand how the knowledge gathered by the oppressed about their 
own condition, and about the character of the oppressors, has been a key 
element for developing strategies of resistance and survival.  
 
2.2.3 Some limitations 
 
I have argued so far that narrative testimonies should inform 
philosophical theorizing on oppression because: (1) narratives show that 
oppression has a strong emotional content that analytical accounts tend 
to neglect; (2) narratives and emotions have been part of the theoretical 
arsenal of oppressed groups, on the basis of which they theorize about 
oppression and gather instrumental knowledge for resisting and 
surviving oppression. Refusing to engage with this material therefore 
risks (a) producing an etiolated account of what oppression is; (b) 
reproducing oppressive methods that silence or devalue the voices of the 
oppressed; (c) failing to understand that the key value of this material 
for the oppressed themselves is indicative of an essential feature of 
oppression, namely, its emotional component. 
Insofar as I interpret some of the narratives to show how they 
reveal an emotional content of oppression, I am engaging in a form of 
discourse that involves speaking for and about others. As Linda Alcoff 
(1991) has argued, this entails 
 
engaging in the act of representing the other’s need, goals, situation, 
and in fact, who they are. I am representing them as such and such, or 
in post-structuralist terms, I am participating in the construction of 
their subject positions. This act of representation cannot be understood 
as founded on an act of discovery wherein I discover their true selves 
and then simply relate my discovery. I will take it as a given that such 
representations are in every case mediated and the product of 
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interpretation (which is connected to the claim that a speaker’s location 
has epistemic salience.) (Alcoff, 1992, p. 4) 
 
When I present narrative material as evidence of the role played by 
emotions in oppression, my reading and interpretation of it will, 
inevitably, have its insights and limitations (as would anyone’s). 
Although, as Alcoff argues, some people take these to be reasons for 
rejecting the legitimacy of speaking for others, I, like her, do not consider 
disengaging from speaking about the oppression of others to be a 
defensible position:  
 
We certainly want to encourage a more receptive listening on the part of 
the discursively privileged and discourage presumptuous and oppressive 
practices of speaking for. But a retreat from speaking for will not result 
in an increase in receptive listening in all cases; it may result merely in 
a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person 
takes no responsibility for her society whatsoever. (Alcoff, 1991, p. 17) 
 
This being said, members of a group of oppressors may encounter many 
obstacles when interpreting what the oppressed say, not least because 
they will have internalized multiple prejudices that are not easily 
overcome. As George Yancy argues in the case of racial oppression, to be 
white is to be racist insofar as there is never an “arrival” at a pure, non-
racist state of mind. Yancy “critique[s] the performance metaphor of 
“undoing” whiteness, arguing that this process does not culminate in a 
white person’s having “arrived” to a form of a static anti-racist identity” 
(Yancy, 2017, p. xxxviii). Anti-racism in this sense is not an identity, but 
an always ongoing effort. As an example of the obstacles it faces, Yancy 
shows how some ways of resisting oppression went undetected by 
oppressors, insofar as they were “beyond [their] cognitive range”: 
 
According to Jenkins, ‘Although Blacks showed humble and meek 
behavior in interracial situations historically, the intent of such 
behavior was often quite at variance with such a demeanor. Thus, at 
times Blacks intended in their meekness to act out of a conception of 
personal (Christian) dignity (‘turn the other cheek’) and/or moral 
superiority’. Where whites could only see meek or obsequious forms of 
comportment, Blacks intended the very opposite of such constructions. 
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(...) In short, Black people engaged in acts of resistance from a hidden 
transcript that was beyond the cognitive range of white oppressors. 
(Yancy, 2017, p. 118) 
 
Therefore, even when arguing from a perspective opposed to oppression, 
there may be multiple ways in which our interpretations, our “speaking 
for others”, fail to do justice to their voices. However, the fact that our 
socio-political situations are “epistemically salient”, as Alcoff contends, 
does not entail a complete inability to understand essential aspects of 
the experience of those who live different situations of oppression from 
ours. Following Alcoff, situatedness in a particular social position must 
not be understood in a reductionist and essentialist sense:  
 
To say that location bears on meaning and truth is not the same as 
saying that location determines meaning and truth. And location is not a 
fixed essence absolutely authorizing one’s speech in the way that God’s 
favor absolutely authorized the speech of Moses. Location and 
positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static, but as 
multiple and with varying degrees of mobility. What it means, then, to 
speak from or within a group and/or a location is extremely complex. To 
the extent that location is not a fixed essence, and to the extent that 
there is an uneasy, under-determined, and contested relationship 
between location on the one hand and meaning and truth on the other, 
we cannot reduce evaluation of meaning and truth to a simple 
identification of the speaker’s location. (Alcoff, 1991, p. 17) 
 
The argument against a reductionist and essentialist understanding of 
social location is connected to the claim that we are not grounded in our 
location in isolation from others:  
 
there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one’s words do 
not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there 
a way to decisively demarcate a boundary between one’s location and all 
others. (Alcoff, 1991, p. 20) 
 
In a similar vein, Yancy argues that 
 
Black communities’ perceptions are not in principle inaccessible to those 
not from them. In short, we can communicate the shared experiences, 
conceptual frameworks, and background assumptions to others if they 
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are open to instruction and willing to take the time to listen. (Yancy, 
2017, p. 25) 
 
Insofar as my account draws on the voices of oppressed groups, my hope 
is that some of the problematic practices that may be adopted when 
speaking for/about others are here at least reduced. But this does not 
entail that I will not, in a way, speak for and about them, as my account 
will provide some of my own interpretations.  
I do not pretend to claim with the former remarks that my 
approach fully overcomes the limitations mentioned above by merely 
declaring an awareness of their existence13. My point is precisely to 
argue in favour of speaking for others, despite the risks and limitations 
inherent to this endeavour. I aim to inscribe this work in the continuous 
effort that anti-racist and anti-sexist commitment requires, namely, in 
an effort “to forge new ways of seeing, knowing and being.” (Yancy, 2017, 
xxxviii). I will however make a choice as to which testimonies I’m using 
for my account. These are narratives of particularly skilled writers, who 
are eloquent in the rendition of the emotional dimensions of oppression. 
It may be objected that this choice implies a potential double-silencing of 
the oppressed: those who fail to articulate such powerful narratives do 
not inform my account. I do not deny that this is a problem and that, 
when attending to the voices of the oppressed, we need to bear in mind 
that these limitations exist. Not only is there a problem in not hearing 
those who cannot speak, but also in the fact that those who have spoken 
are in many ways marginalized from mainstream theoretical production. 
Much work needs to be done to avoid a situation where these voices 
                                            
13 As Sara Ahmed has noted, “declarations of whiteness” are non-performative and 
function often to conceal the perpetuation of oppression: “The declarative mode, as a 
way of doing something, involves a fantasy of transcendence in which ‘what’ is 
transcended is the very thing ‘admitted to’ in the declaration: so, to put it simply, if we 
admit to being bad, then we show that we are good (...). So it is in this specific sense 
that I have argued that anti-racism is not performative” (Ahmed, 2004). See also Alcoff: 
“Clearly, the problematic of speaking for has at its center a concern with accountability 
and responsibility. Acknowledging the problem of speaking for others cannot result in 
eliminating a speaker’s accountability”. (Alcoff, 1991, p. 16)  
68 
 
remain unheard. The account I articulate aims to contribute to this 
debate. 
There is, of course, no perfect method for theorizing on this 
matter, and it would be naive to look for one. I here take up the 
challenge of attending to the voices of the oppressed and interpreting 
them as revealing essential emotional components of oppression. Doing 
so, though not without its pitfalls, seems to me as at least one of the best 
ways of reducing practices of “epistemic oppression” (Dotson, 2012) that 
typically silence and objectify the oppressed. Whether I avoid such 
pitfalls or not will be a matter of continuous critical revision and 
rectification. 
 
2.2.4 Remarks about the choice of the narrative material  
 
Before moving on to discussing the narratives that I present as 
evidence for the main claims of my thesis, a few remarks about the 
choice of this material and about the way I read it are in order. 
First, some of the narratives were chosen in virtue of their 
authoritative character within a tradition that has recognised them as a 
referent in the way oppressed people have sought to make sense of the 
experience of oppression. They have acquired, in this sense, a particular 
standing as narratives of oppression. Such is the case of W. E. B. Du 
Bois’s, Frederick Douglass’s and Audre Lorde’s autobiographical 
narratives, which are particularly relevant as accounts of the lived 
experience of oppression. Other texts that also combine first person 
narrative and philosophical analysis, such as Gloria Anzaldúa’s, have 
equally been recognised as a referent within a tradition that seeks to 
understand experiences of uprootedness, racism and sexism, although 
they are less commonly used in the context of Anglo-analytic philosophy. 
Works of fiction are included when they provide particularly 
illuminating accounts of the alienating effects of extreme oppression, as 
is the case with Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye. Morrison’s fiction 
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attempts to make sense of the experience of those “who collapse, silently, 
anonymously, with no voice to express or acknowledge it.” (Morrison, 
1992, p. viii). Her story gives voice to those who cannot express their 
own condition. As she describes it, her fiction is her “attempt to shape a 
silence while breaking it.” (Morrison, 1992, p. xi) 
In highlighting the standing of these narratives, I am not making 
simple “appeal to authority”. Rather, these texts have exceptional 
relevance because they constitute the cultural ground in which a 
tradition of resistance to oppression has anchored its roots. Familiar as 
they may be, these texts are key resources through which oppressed 
people comprehend and articulate their experience. In a future, longer 
work, it would be good to include other less well-known narratives that 
would also offer evidence for the main arguments of this thesis. In the 
present context, however, I will mainly draw on better known narratives 
that clearly reveal the phenomenon with which I am concerned.  
Although these narratives are part of a classical body of literature 
on first person accounts of oppression, the use I make of them is less 
common in Anglo-Analytic philosophy. While I use narrative material to 
illustrate some of the theoretical claims of my thesis, I do not proceed in 
the way philosophers sometimes tend to do it, i.e., by first developing an 
abstract theoretical argument and subsequently illustrating it through 
relevant concrete examples. Rather, in starting by discussing these 
texts, I aim to show how the narratives themselves throw light on the 
problem with which I am concerned. It is not as though we have, on the 
one hand, a body of data or a conceptual analysis about the emotional 
experience of oppression, and on the other hand a series of narrative 
illustrations of it. Rather, as I seek to show, the two are intertwined. 
Works of autobiography, biography and fiction provide some of the most 
important materials on which theorists of oppression base their 
conclusions. We shall see this, for example, in Sara Ahmed’s use of 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, and in my own approach.  
70 
 
The debate about the frontiers between autobiographical 
narrative and fiction, and about their different methods of interpretation 
is an extremely complex one, and its examination is beyond the scope of 
the philosophical work I undertake in this thesis. Similarly complex is 
the question of what distinguishes literary autobiography from fiction 
and from “lived experience”. In a longer work, it would be useful to 
frame the differences between these genres in more detail. However, in 
the context of this thesis, I will treat them homogeneously as one of the 
best ways to get at the phenomena that I intend to shed light upon. I 
shall read these various narratives as revealing key elements of the 
lived experience of oppression, without implying that the multifaceted 
aspects of lived experience are exhausted through these narratives, and 
without contending that lived experience is simply delivered through 
them as a “pure”, unmodified product. Lived experience of oppression is 
always to some extent ‘theorised’, if only through its use of language, 
and attempts to theorise oppression are bound to draw more or less 
heavily on this lived experience. 
In subsequent chapters, some of these narratives will recur, as 
they will allow me to highlight other dimensions of the emotional 
phenomena that, I contend, play a significant role in the reproduction of 
oppression. As I shall argue, the points I have just made are also 
applicable to the situation and understanding of oppressors. Narratives 
of oppression also provide vital insights into their emotions.
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2.3 Oppression is an emotional matter: an illustration 
 
In this section, I move on to present some narratives that illustrate the 
main claims of my thesis, namely that oppression partly shapes the 
emotional lives of oppressed and oppressors14, and that emotions play a 
role in sustaining and reinforcing oppression. More precisely, I aim to 
show that emotions play a crucial role in the internalization of 
oppression; how emotions are involved in alienation; and how, through 
emotional mechanisms, resistance to oppression is made more difficult. 
 
2.3.1 Internalization of oppression through emotions  
 
I begin my exploration of oppression as an emotional phenomenon with 
two narratives that describe early memories of experiencing racism in 
childhood. The first is narrated by the African-American lesbian poet 
Audre Lorde, the second by the nineteenth-century African American 
writer W.E.B. Du Bois. Often, narratives that account for the lived 
experience of oppression identify a particular event as the origin of a 
more acute awareness of oppression, an awareness that is first 
emotional rather than conceptual, but that is decisive for the writer’s 
development. 
 
2.3.1.1 Feeling defective 
 
Lorde’s narrative presents one of her first experiences of being on the 
receiving end of White people’s racial hatred, an experience that she 
presents as preceding any form of linguistic or conceptual grasp of the 
meaning of this violence: 
 
                                            
14 I will focus on the emotional patterns of oppressors in future chapters. 
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The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her 
arms full of shopping bags, christmas-heavy. The wet smell of 
winter clothes, the train’s lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, 
pushes my little snowsuited body down. On one side of me a man 
reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat staring at me. 
Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, 
pulling mine with it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line 
where my new blue snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet. She 
jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible 
thing she is seeing on the seat between us – probably a roach. But 
she has communicated her horror to me. It must be something very 
bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my snowsuit closer to me 
away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me, 
her nose holes and her eyes huge. And suddenly I realize there is 
nothing crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn’t want 
her coat to touch. The fur brushed past my face as she stands with a 
shudder and holds on to strap in the speeding train. Born and bred 
a New York City child, I quickly slide over to make room for my 
mother to sit down. No word has been spoken. I’m afraid to say 
anything to my mother because I don’t know what I’ve done. I look 
at the sides of my snowpants, secretly. Is there something on them? 
Something’s going on here I do not understand, but I will never 
forget it. Her eyes. The flared nostrils. The hate. (Lorde, 2017, pp. 
135–136). 
 
The painful experience is remembered as something that was felt 
before it could be properly understood or named. In this case, first 
memories of the harms of oppression are recognized through their 
strong emotional impact, before they could be even analysed or put 
into words: 
 
I don’t like to talk about hate. I don’t like to remember the 
cancellation and hatred, heavy as my wished-for death, seen in the 
eyes of so many white people from the time I could see. It was 
echoed in newspapers, and movies and holy pictures and comic 
books and Amos ’n Andy radio programs. I had no tools to dissect it, 
no language to name it. (Lorde, 2017, p. 135) 
 
After narrating this early memory of confused feelings of inadequacy 
and fear (“I’m afraid to say anything to my mother because I don’t 
know what I’ve done”), Lorde recounts a series of similar episodes in 
which the hatred and contempt of the white world was communicated 
to her: 
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My three-year-old eyes ache from the machinery used to test them. 
(...) [A] group of white men in white coats discuss my peculiar eyes. 
Only one voice remains in my memory. “From the looks of her she’s 
probably simple, too”. They all laugh. (Lorde, 2017, p. 136) 
 
Further on:   
 
The Story Hour librarian reading Little Black Sambo. Her white 
fingers hold up the little book about a shoebutton-faced little boy 
with big red lips and many pigtails and a hatful of butter. I 
remember the pictures hurting me and my thinking again that 
there must be something wrong with me because everybody else is 
laughing and besides the library downtown has given this little book 
a special prize, the library lady tells us: ‘So what’s wrong with you, 
anyway? Don’t be so sensitive!’  (Lorde, 2017, p. 137. Italics in the 
original) 
 
Lorde’s text shows how quick the step can be between being the 
target of racial hatred and incorporating it so that it comes to be felt 
as belonging to a defective self: “I’m afraid to say anything to my 
mother because I don’t know what I’ve done. I look at the sides of my 
snowpants, secretly. Is there something on them?”; “I remember the 
pictures hurting me and my thinking again that there must be 
something wrong with me” (my italics): through this account of 
painful childhood memories of racial abuse, Lorde points at how 
being the target of racial oppression may lead to internalizing the 
oppressor’s gaze. Her narrative shows therefore how structures of 
oppression are internalized through emotional mechanisms, such as 
shame, guilt, or similar emotional states through which the self 
appears as defective. 
Lorde also expresses how, while hurt by the racial stereotypes 
in the story of Little Black Sambo, she has also internalized the 
White oppressors’ punitive voice, a voice that does not allow her to 
feel the effects of oppression, that de-legitimizes the emotions of those 
who are the target of violence: “So what’s wrong with you, anyway? 
Don’t be so sensitive!” Even justified pain can be immediately 
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perceived as a sign of defectiveness for which the oppressed are to 
blame. This is a first example of how in narrative accounts of 
oppression, emotions have a salient role: the wrongs of racial 
oppression are here recounted as producing a cluster of negative, 
disempowering emotional effects such as shame, fear, and a sense of 
being deficient or inadequate. The wrongs are amplified by the fact 
that the workings of oppression, its mechanisms, come to be 
integrated by the oppressed, who tend to reproduce them, like an 
echo. For the child, racial oppression’s first meaning is emotional, but 
by internally replicating the censoring, self-blaming voice, the 
mechanisms are already in place to work against recognizing these 
wrongs for what they are. Racial oppression is shown here as 
harming in at least a double way: by producing negative 
disempowering emotions, and by denying the oppressed even the 
right to feel such effects. One ought to remain unaffected, not to 
complain, not to resist. Perhaps, then, this is an indication of the fact 
that, because resistance to oppression requires the ability to feel such 
emotions and recognize them as the effect of oppressive structures of 
power, it’s in the interest of these same structures to blame the 
oppressed for the emotions they experience. 
Lorde’s narrative shows how oppression is a strongly 
emotional experience, but her account is of course also testimony of 
her resistance. Her writings reveal how, precisely because power 
circulates through emotions, it takes resolute emotional work to push 
against it. Lorde recounts how anger, one of her mother’s emotional 
legacies, was crucial for pushing against the deleterious effects of 
racial oppression: 
 
My mother taught me to survive from a very early age by her own 
example. Her silences also taught me isolation, fury, mistrust, self-
rejection, and sadness. My survival lay in learning how to use the 
weapons she gave me, also, to fight against those things within 
myself, unnamed.  
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And survival is the greatest gift of love. Sometimes, for Black 
mothers, it is the only gift possible, and tenderness gets lost. My 
mother bore me into life as if etching an angry message into marble. 
Yet I survived the hatred around me because my mother made me 
know, by oblique reference, that no matter what went on at home, 
outside shouldn’t oughta be the way it was. But since it was that 
way outside, I moved in a fen of unexplained anger that encircled 
me and spilled out against whomever was closest that shared those 
hated selves. Of course I did not realise it at the time. The anger lay 
like a pool of acid deep inside me, and whenever I felt deeply, I felt 
it, attaching itself in the strangest places. Upon those powerless as 
I. (Lorde, 2017, pp. 138–139) 
 
Resistance, therefore, required not only anger, but learning to train 
this emotion to make it more effective: “How to train that anger with 
accuracy rather than deny it has been one of the major tasks of my 
life.” (Lorde, 2017, p. 133) 
 
2.3.1.2 Feeling divided and disoriented 
 
A second example of how oppression is internalized through an 
emotional process is narrated by W.E.B. Du Bois in an early memory 
of rejection. Du Bois recounts a shocking event which revealed White 
children’s perception of him:  
 
(...) being a problem is a strange experience, — peculiar even for one 
who has never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in 
Europe. It is in the early days of rollicking boyhood that the 
revelation first bursts upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember 
well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little thing, away up 
in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds 
between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden 
schoolhouse, something put into the boys’ and girls’ heads to buy 
gorgeous visiting-cards – ten cents a package – and exchange. The 
exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card, 
— refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me 
with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or 
like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their 
world by a vast veil. (Du Bois, 1994, p. 2) 
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Although he was structurally oppressed, Du Bois hadn’t experienced 
this dimension of himself as different and as unworthy of the White 
children’s appreciation. This shocking episode is at the origin of what 
he will later theorize as the phenomenon of double-consciousness:  
 
this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, — an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Du Bois, 1994, p. 
2)  
 
The experience of double-consciousness is analysed by Ami Harbin as 
an emotional process, as a form of disorientation constituted by a 
variety of feelings: 
 
Du Bois describes the feelings of double consciousness as 
conflictedness, a lack of effective strength, being weighed down or 
handicapped while needing to run, despair and helpless humiliation. 
Du Bois describes how oppressive identification – the simultaneous 
identification and marginalization as “other” – introduces a tension 
between who one wants to be (someone who “sits with 
Shakespeare”; Du Bois 1996, 90) and who one is allowed to be. 
Seeing oneself through two visions at once makes for a lack of ease 
and a struggle to proceed in making plans and relating to others. In 
other words, double consciousness, as Du Bois identifies it, is a kind 
of disorientation. (Harbin, 2016, p. 72) 
 
In Du Bois’ case, it seems that feelings of shame were counteracted 
by contempt for the White world. Du Bois describes how he didn’t 
seek to tear down the veil that separated him from the other 
children, but “held it all beyond it in common contempt, and lived 
above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows” (Du 
Bois, 1994, p. 2). But the power of contempt fades with the years, 
when the opportunities to which he aspired are eventually out of 
reach. Still, Du Bois tells his determination: 
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But they should not keep these prizes, I said; some, all, I would 
wrest from them. Just how I would do it I could never decide: by 
reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful tales that 
swam in my head, — some way. (Du Bois, 1994, p. 2).  
 
For others, however, “the strife was not so fiercely sunny”. The “dead 
weight of social degradation” burdened the lives of those for whom 
resistance was unavailable: 
 
(…) their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancy or into silent 
hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of 
everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make 
me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house? The shades of the 
prison-house closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to 
the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall and unscalable to sons of 
night who must plod darkly on in resignation, or beat unavailing 
palms against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly, watch the 
streak of blue above. (Du Bois, 1994, p. 2. Italics in original) 
 
In these cases, a cluster of disempowering feelings erode the capacity 
for resistance: the “silent hatred”, we may suspect, is all the more 
corrosive that it remains repressed (“silent”); cynicism (“mocking 
distrust”), hopelessness and bitterness makes them sink deeper into 
impotence.  
Both Lorde and Du Bois recount these transformative 
experiences as ‘structuring shocks’15 which configure the emotional 
topography of their lives. Their strong emotional impact is 
remembered as the way in which racial oppression was early on 
signified to them. The cluster of disempowering emotions (feeling 
defective, painfully divided, hopeless and bitter) reported through 
these accounts suggests that said emotions are significant features of 
oppression. 
The two examples I have offered have to do with experiences 
of violent exclusion and double-consciousness in the context of the 
                                            
15 I borrow this expression, dear to my Literature Professor in hypokhâgne, Mme. 
Andrau.  
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racial oppression that operates along the Black/White binary. But 
there’s also a particular form of emotional phenomenon that 
characterizes the oppression of those who experience the difficulties 
of being in-between cultures, and of not belonging to any culture in 
particular. This is the phenomenon described by Gloria Anzaldúa 
(1999) as the “mestiza consciousness”, which captures the migrant 
experience across the border between the United States and Mexico. 
This experience of oppression has to do with cultural imperialism, 
racism and economic exclusion: 
 
Una lucha de fronteras/ A Struggle of Borders: 
 
Because I, a mestiza, 
continually walk out of one culture 
and into another, 
because I am in all cultures at the same time, 
alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro, 
me zumba la cabeza con lo contradictorio. 
estoy norteada por todas las voces que me hablan 
simultáneamente. 
 
The ambivalence from the clash of voices results in mental 
and emotional states of perplexity. Internal strife results in 
insecurity and indecisiveness. The mestiza’s dual or multiple 
personality is plagued by psychic restlessness.  
In a constant state of mental nepantilism, an Aztec word 
meaning torn between ways, la mestiza is a product of the transfer 
of the cultural and spiritual values of one group to another. Being 
tricultural, monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual, speaking a 
patois, and in a state of perpetual transition, the mestiza faces the 
dilemma of the mixed breed: which collectivity does the daughter of 
a darkskinned mother listen to? (…) 
Within us and within la cultura chicana, commonly held 
beliefs of the white culture attack commonly held beliefs of the 
Mexican culture, and both attack commonly held beliefs of the 
indigenous culture. Subconsciously, we see an attack on ourselves 
and our beliefs as a threat and we attempt to block with a 
counterstance. (Anzaldúa, 1999, pp. 99–100) 
 
This feeling torn is made even more painful by the fact that it is often 
even difficult to identify the composition of this mixed heritage: 
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El camino de la mestiza/ The Mestiza Way 
 
Caught between the sudden contraction, the breath sucked in and 
the endless space, the brown woman stands still, looks at the sky. 
She decides to go down digging her way along the roots of trees. (…) 
Her first step is to take inventory. Despojando, desgranando, 
quitando la paja. Just what did she inherit from her ancestors? This 
weight on her back – which is the baggage from the Indian mother, 
which the baggage from the Spanish father, which the baggage from 
the Anglo? (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 104) 
 
In this context, the experience of exclusion and the shame that it 
produces is expressed through what Anzaldúa calls “linguistic 
terrorism”: “Chicanas who grew up speaking Chicano Spanish have 
internalized the belief that we speak poor Spanish. It is illegitimate, 
a bastard language.” (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 80). Chicanas are therefore 
not recognized by other Spanish-speaking Latinas: “If a person, 
Chicana or Latina, has low estimation of my native tongue, she also 
has a low estimation of me.” (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 80). On the White, 
Anglo-world side, this negation of cultural and linguistic identity is 
seen by Anzaldúa as one of the factors for economic disadvantage: 
“Chicanos and other people of color suffer economically for not 
acculturating. This voluntary (yet forced) alienation makes for 
psychological conflict, a kind of dual identity (…)” (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 
85). This suggests that the experience of economic and racial 
oppression is significantly intertwined with emotional elements. 
 
2.3.1.3 Alienation and self-loathing 
 
The contrast between Lorde’s and Du Bois’ ability to use, 
respectively, anger and contempt to resist the debilitating effects of 
racial violence, and those who sink into hopelessness and despair, 
points in the direction of other possible ways of internalizing 
oppression through emotion. For Lorde and Du Bois, recognizing the 
connection between their feelings of shame, guilt or inadequacy and 
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the political structures that oppress them seems essential for 
developing strategies for resistance. However, in some cases, 
oppression is internalized without filter, as it were, when the self 
becomes unable to affirm itself by defying the series of 
representations and norms that the “white epistemic regime”, as 
Yancy puts it, aims to impose. We may conceptualize such cases, as 
Fanon does, as instances of alienation, in the Marxian sense (Marx, 
1975)16, i.e., as being separated from one’s species-being. The 
alienated subject relates to herself almost exclusively through the 
oppressor’s representational framework, which results in her being 
internally divided and unable to develop a loving relationship with 
herself. 
An example of this form of alienation can be found in Toni 
Morrison’s (2016) novel The Bluest Eye. In this fiction, Morrison 
explores “Not resistance to the contempt of others, ways to deflect it, 
but the far more tragic and disabling consequences of accepting 
rejection as legitimate, as self-evident” (Morrison, 2016, p. VII). 
While most victims of racial contempt are able to “grow beyond it”, 
Morrison notes,  
 
there are some who collapse, silently, anonymously, with no voice to 
express it or acknowledge it. They are invisible. The death of self-
esteem can occur quickly, easily in children, before their ego has 
“legs”, so to speak. Couple the vulnerability of youth with indifferent 
parents, dismissive adults, and a world, which, in its language, 
                                            
16 “Marx distinguishes four results of the ‘national-economic fact’ of alienated labor: 
alienated labor alienates the worker, first, from the product of his labor; second, from 
his own activity; third, from what Marx, following Feuerbach, calls species-being; and 
fourth, from other human beings. Alienation, then, can be understood as a disturbance 
of the relations one has, or should have, to oneself and to the world (whether the social 
or natural world). (…) [As] alienated one does not possess what one has oneself 
produced (…); one has no control over, or power to determine, what one does and is 
therefore powerless and unfree; at the same time, one is unable to realize oneself in 
one’s own activities and is therefore exposed to meaninglessness, impoverishes, and 
instrumental relations with which one cannot identify and in which one experiences 
oneself as internally divided” (Jaeggi, 2014, pp. 11–14) 
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laws, and images, re-enforces despair, and the journey of 
destruction is sealed. (Morrison, 2016, p. VIII) 
 
The Bluest Eye tells the story of a young Black girl, Pecola, who has 
so deeply internalized the “white gaze” that she becomes obsessed by 
her desire to have blue eyes. The story is based on an 
autobiographical event, a conversation that the author had as a child 
with a friend, as they were starting elementary school: “She said she 
wanted blue eyes. I looked around to picture her with them and was 
violently repelled by what I imagined she would look like if she had 
her wish.” (Morrison, 2016, p. VIII). The novel is the author’s attempt 
to make sense of that desire: “Implicit in her desire was racial self-
loathing. And twenty years later, I was still wondering about how 
one learns that. Who told her? Who made her feel that it was better 
to be a freak than what she was?” (Morrison, 2016, p. IX) 
Although Pecola’s story is, according to Morrison, not 
representative of most of the experiences of Black girls, she 
nevertheless posits that “some aspects of [Pecola’s] woundability 
were lodged in all young girls”, in the multiple ways that racial self-
contempt is systematically enforced by racial and sexual standards of 
beauty where whiteness is the desirable norm: 
 
“Please, God,” she whispered into the palm of her hand. 
“Please make me disappear.” She squeezed her eyes shut. Little 
parts of her body faded away. Now slowly, now with a rush. Slowly 
again. Her fingers went, one by one; then her arms disappeared all 
the way to the elbow. Her feet now. Yes, that was good. The legs all 
at once. It was the hardest above the thighs. She had to be real still 
and pull. Her stomach would not go. But finally it, too, went away. 
Then her chest, her neck. The face was hard, too. Almost done, 
almost. Only her tight, tight eyes were left. They were always left.  
Try as she might, she could never get her eyes to disappear. 
So what was the point? They were everything. Everything was 
there, in them. All of those pictures, all of those faces. She had long 
ago given up the idea of running away to see new pictures, new 
faces, as Sammy had so often done. (...) It wouldn’t have worked 
anyway. As long as she looked the way she did, as long as she was 
ugly, she would have to stay with these people. Somehow she 
belonged to them. Long hours she sat, looking in the mirror, trying 
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to discover the secret of the ugliness, the ugliness that made her 
ignored or despised at school, by teachers and classmates alike. She 
was the only member of her class who sat alone at a double desk. 
(...) Her teachers had always treated her this way. They tried never 
to glance at her, and called her only when everyone was required to 
respond. (...) 
It had occurred to Pecola some time ago that if her eyes, 
those eyes that held the pictures, and knew the sights — if those 
eyes of her where different, that is to say, beautiful, she herself 
would be different. Her teeth were good, and at least her nose was 
not big and flat like some of those who were thought so cute. If she 
looked different, beautiful, maybe Cholly would be different, and 
Mrs. Breedlove too. Maybe they’d say, “Why, look at pretty-eyed 
Pecola. We mustn’t do bad things in front of those pretty eyes.” 
 
Pretty eyes. Pretty blue eyes. Big pretty blue eyes. 
Run, Jip, run. Jip runs, Alice runs. Alice has blue eyes. 
Jerry has blue eyes. Jerry runs. Alice runs. They run 
with their blue eyes. Four blue eyes. Four pretty 
blue eyes. Blue-sky eyes. Blue-like Mrs. Forrest’s 
blue blouse eyes Morning-glory-blue-eyes. 
Alice-and-Jerry-blue-storybook-eyes. 
 
Each night, without fail, she prayed for blue eyes. Fervently, 
for a year she had prayed. Although somewhat discouraged, she was 
not without hope. To have something as wonderful as that happen 
would take a long, long time. (Morrison, 2016, pp. 43–44) 
 
The Bluest Eye is the story of an eye that not only internalizes the 
white gaze but assimilates it so deeply that it ends up being dazzled 
by it. The kind of double-consciousness that Du Bois presents 
presupposes subjects’ ability to distance themselves from the Black 
imago (Yancy, 2017) that the white world aims to impose on them. 
The white imaginary refuses, for example, the intellectual 
aspirations of a Black man, but this does not inevitably lead subjects 
to renounce imagining themselves in ways that challenge 
reductionist and dehumanizing representations. Therefore, while for 
Du Bois the suffering of double-consciousness stems from feeling 
divided between how the world looks at the subject and how the 
subject sees itself, in Pecola’s case the tragedy consists in the 
impossibility of resisting and challenging the white norm, accepted 
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as an absolute. Pecola does not only suffer because her desire to be 
seen as capable, lovable and beautiful is systematically denied to her. 
Her tragedy is, more radically, that she cannot “invest any 
narcissistic libido in [her] body image” (James S. , Feminism in 
Philosophy of Mind. The Question of Personal Identity., 2000), i.e., 
she cannot see herself as worthy of appreciation and love. 
This idea of alienation from the body, in the form of a radical 
rejection of the self when subjects adhere to the norms of the 
dominant group, is discussed by Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks 
(2008). In the chapter “The Woman of Color and the White Man”, 
Fanon presents the autobiographical text of Mayotte Capécia, Je suis 
Martiniquaise, as an exemplary case of psychic alienation, as a “vast 
delusion”: “Mayotte loves a white man to whom she submits in 
everything. He is her lord. She asks nothing, demands nothing, 
except a bit of whiteness in her life.” (Fanon, 2008, p. 29). Through 
Capécia’s own account, we may see how powerfully the emotion of 
shame can function as the channel of oppressive structures of power 
that disempower the self. Oppression may lead the oppressed to feel 
shame/guilt as if it was something they should feel, as the natural 
response to their inadequacy:  
 
Among André’s colleagues, who like him marooned in the Antilles by 
the war, some had managed to have their wives join them. I 
understood that André could not always hold himself aloof from 
them. I also accepted the fact that I was barred from this society 
because I was a woman of color; but I could not help being jealous. It 
was no good explaining to me that his private life was something 
that belonged to him alone and that his social and military life was 
something else, which was not within his control; I nagged so much 
that one day he took me to Didier. We spent the evening in one of 
those villas that I had admired since my childhood, with two officers 
and their wives. The women kept watching me with a condescension 
that I found unbearable. I felt that I was wearing too much makeup, 
that I was not properly dressed, that I was not doing André credit, 
perhaps simply because of the color of my skin — in short, I spent so 
miserable an evening that I decided I would never again ask André 
to take me with him. (Capécia, M. 1948, p. 150, as cited in Fanon, 
2008, p. 29) 
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Insofar as they radically affect one’s self-image and self-esteem, 
shame and guilt appear here as very effective tools of domination. 
Fanon sees this case as exemplary of how the dominated become 
haunted by feelings of inferiority which “have a compulsive quality” 
(Fanon, 2008, p. 35), and for which they attempt to overcompensate. 
In Capécia’s case, this overcompensation takes the form of a search 
for “lactification” (Fanon, 2008, p. 33) through the blue-eyed French 
White man’s love. We can see the narrative as showing how 
mechanisms of power penetrate the person’s sense of self-worth by 
dictating how they “should” be, and how they should feel, in a world 
that defines them as defective. 
Furthermore, the shame caused by oppression has alienating, 
depersonalizing effects insofar as it deprives the self of a certain set 
of capacities. One of the dimensions of this is the infantilization 
manifest in Capécia’s narrative. Capécia does not display an ability 
to vindicate her rights and assert her self-worth on an equal footing 
with André. Although she expresses her wish to exist in a society 
that excludes her, and resents André for it, she despises her claims 
as those of a capricious child unwilling to understand reasonable 
explanations (“It was no good explaining to me that his private life 
was something that belonged to him”). Instead of righteous anger or 
indignation, Capécia is consumed with jealousy. In her protests, she 
does not perceive herself as demanding what is just; rather, she 
disqualifies her insistence as childish “nagging”. 
Capécia mainly blames herself for the humiliation she 
endured at Didier’s. Rather than placing the blame on the way the 
oppressors contemptuously gaze at her, and on the oppressive 
character of the racist society in which she lives, she considers 
herself to be the problem. The shame felt after being the object of the 
contemptuous gaze of White women is assumed as a failure 
attributable to herself (wearing too much makeup; not properly 
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dressed). The passage shows the collaboration between oppressive 
structures and feelings of shame and guilt. It illustrates how, 
because of the shame-inducing structures of power, oppressed 
subjects may come to develop an image of the self as inherently 
defective. 
Moreover, Capécia seems to perceive herself as a sort of 
shame-transmitting agent, as she feels that her mere presence 
negatively taints André’s status (“I felt (…) that I was not doing 
André credit”). Shame may be here combined with a sense of guilt for 
failing to uphold the higher social status of her lover. Finally, the 
conclusion of the episode shows that Capécia moves from the feelings 
of shame and guilt to a resigned acceptance of her inferior position: “I 
decided I would never again ask André to take me with him”. 
The shame that Capécia expresses in her narrative is all the 
more disempowering because it remains unrecognized as the effect of 
racial oppression. This lack of recognition undermines Capécia’s 
capacity to effectively challenge the status quo. Like Morrison’s 
Pecola, Mayotte Capécia’s desire for a form of emancipation takes a 
self-destructive turn. She embraces the terms of a racist ideology by 
seeking to “whiten” her “race” through André17. 
 
 
                                            
17 Fanon also notes how Capécia’s occupation is intertwined with this desire: she works 
as a blanchisseuse, a laundress, which in French is literally a “whitener”. She takes 
pride in being the best blanchisseuse in her town: “From the first this is how the 
problem appears to Mayotte — at the fifth year of her age and the third page of her 
book: ‘She took her inkwell out of the desk and emptied it over his head’. This was her 
own way of turning whites into blacks. But she quite soon recognized the futility of 
such attempts; and then there were Lou-louze and her mother, who told her that life 
was difficult for a woman of color. So, since she could no longer try to blacken, to 
negrify the world, she was going to try, in her own body and in her own mind, to bleach 
it. To start, she would become a laundress: ‘I charged high prices, higher than 
elsewhere, but I worked better, and since people in Fort-de-France like their linens 
clean, they came to me. In the end, they were proud to have their laundry done by 
Mayotte.’” (Fanon, 2008, p. 31) 
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2.3.1.4 Alienation and isolation 
 
So far, I have aimed to show how a cluster of feelings of inadequacy, 
hopelessness, bitterness, fear, shame and guilt disempower 
oppressed subjects by making it difficult – in some cases, impossible 
– for them to challenge and resist the impositions of the white 
imaginary on their self-image, with profound consequences for the 
development of self-esteem and self-confidence. I discussed extreme 
cases of alienation as being radically disaffected from one’s own body, 
and therefore, as being incapable of having a loving and caring 
relationship with oneself. But alienation in the sense of being 
estranged and isolated from others may also be one of the 
debilitating effects of oppression. Disempowering emotions such as 
shame, guilt, or fear may act as eroding forces that weaken people’s 
capacities for challenging power. In a more crucial sense, given that 
long-lasting forms of domination, such as sexism and racism are not 
effectively challenged at an individual level but require collective 
action, the abilities for resisting are even more undermined when 
structures of oppression wear down the possibilities of establishing 
bonds of solidarity with those who face the same or similar situations 
of oppression. 
Capécia’s narrative shows that she becomes incapable of 
developing a sense of solidarity and love for other Black people. 
When learning in her youth that her grandmother was Canadian and 
White, her opinion of her own mother grows. Realizing that her 
mother was a métisse (mixed-race), she finds her even more 
beautiful, more “refined” and “distinguished”: 
 
So my mother, then, was a mixture? I should have guessed it when I 
looked at her light color. I found her prettier than ever, and 
cleverer, and more refined. If she had married a white man, do you 
suppose I should have been completely white? And life might not 
have been so hard for me? (Capécia, p.59, as cited in Fanon, 2008, p. 
32)  
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In this same sense, she finds it unconceivable that a White woman 
could ever develop feelings of love for a Black man:  
 
How could a Canadian woman have loved a man of Martinique? I 
could never stop thinking of our priest, and I made up my mind that 
I could never love anyone but a white man, a blue-eyed blonde, a 
Frenchman.” (Capécia, p. 59, cited in Fanon, 2008, p. 32). 
 
Perhaps because oppression often debilitates by isolating the oppressed 
from others, some of the strategies for countering racial and sexual 
oppression involve collective affective work. Consciousness-raising 
groups are a clear example of this. During the Civil Rights Movement in 
the United States, and during the feminist movements of the 1960 and 
1970 in Western societies, consciousness-raising groups often enabled 
people to establish connections that were crucial for their emancipation. 
For example, women have often told how in such groups they were able 
to see their own experiences, which they had thought private and 
idiosyncratic, in a truer light, i.e., as part of the shared experiences faced 
by women in virtue of being oppressed. Ami Harbin discusses the life-
changing consequences of affective work in such groups for (primarily 
White, middle-class) women: 
 
In the consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s, many individuals 
experienced major shifts in their understanding of their social roles and 
relationships. In the context of the women’s movement, consciousness-
raising groups were groups of (primarily) women who gathered to 
discuss their home, relationship, and workplace experiences. 
Consciousness-raising groups were in many cases characterized by 
uncomfortable discussions, during which participants encouraged each 
other to recognize both the ways they were experiencing oppression and 
the ways they had benefited from privilege. Groups made efforts to 
address interpersonal conflicts and experiences of anger. Experiences of 
unease, discomfort, and fear were thus not merely accidental features of 
participation in such groups, but expected, meaningful components of 
efforts to confront internalized oppression. Participation in the groups 
also sometimes triggered major shifts in women’s lives. (Harbin, 2016, 
pp. 78–79) 
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In the case of Chicanos in the United States, the organization of a 
collective movement of resistance and the affirmation of a collective 
identity, in which the articulation of a narrative had a powerful role, is 
highlighted by Anzaldúa: 
 
Chicanos did not know we were a people until 1965 when Cesar Chavez 
and the farmworkers united and I am Joaquín was published and la 
Raza Unida party was formed in Texas. With that recognition, we 
became a distinct people. Something momentous happened to the 
Chicano soul –we became aware of our reality and acquired a name and 
a language (Chicano Spanish) that reflected that reality. Now that we 
had a name, some of the fragmented pieces began to fall together – who 
we were, what we were, how we had evolved. We began to get glimpses 
of what we might eventually become. (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 85) 
 
In the poem I am Joaquín (Gonzales, 1967), the “I” is a collective one (“I 
am the masses of my people”) that reclaims its identity with pride (“I 
refuse to be absorbed / I am Joaquín. /The odds are great /But my spirit 
is strong”). The fact that a narrative seeking to mobilize resistance 
exploits the discourse of pride is not accidental; it is a further indication 
of how dependent oppression is on the cluster of emotions that we have 
identified.
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this chapter that philosophical discussion of oppression 
can be enriched by giving narrative testimonies a more central role. 
First, from an epistemological perspective, if oppression is a lived 
reality, then taking a “bottom up” approach seems warranted. There are 
good reasons to suspect that narratives of the lived experience of 
oppression might pick on essential features that theories based on 
abstract thought experiments fail to grapple with. In addition, when 
attending to the content of these narratives, we can see that their 
emotional component is salient. This is a further indication that 
oppression has an emotional nature.  
Second, from an ethical point of view, attending to the voices of 
the oppressed should be a priority if we aim to approach the topic in a 
way that can at least attenuate the reproduction of some of the 
mechanisms through which oppression is reproduced. This need is made 
even more evident by the fact that the narrative accounts we have 
considered, along with their emotional components, play a key role in 
how the oppressed they themselves have historically produced and 
assessed knowledge, including knowledge of how to resist oppression. 
In the last part of the chapter, I offered a series of examples that 
illustrate one of the main claims of my thesis, namely that oppression 
has a strong emotional dimension. Feelings of disorientation, 
inadequacy, shame and guilt are central in testimonies and analyses of 
oppression. These feelings are disempowering insofar as they make 
resistance more difficult. In some extreme cases of alienation, resistance 
becomes practically impossible. Therefore, there seems to be an intricate 
relationship between oppressive structures and affective phenomena. 
Some emotions are not only the effects of oppression; they appear as 
instruments through which oppression is sustained and reinforced. In 
the next chapters I shall explore in more detail the nature of the 
relationship between oppression and particular emotional phenomena. 
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Although I have so far mainly focused on narratives of racial oppression, 
I shall also go on to analyse the emotional components of gender 
oppression, as well as some of the intersections between race, gender, 
and to a lesser degree, other categories of oppression, such as sexual 
orientation and class. 
In this chapter I have offered evidence in support of my contention 
that, if we want to understand what oppression is, we should pay 
attention to what oppression does. The emotional workings of oppression 
provide that explanation. 
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3. How to understand emotions? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the two preceding chapters I gave a preliminary defence of the 
importance of attending to emotions in order to understand how 
structures of oppression are enforced and sustained. But how should 
these emotions be conceptualised? In this chapter I develop an answer to 
this question, which I shall use to support the main claims of my thesis. 
I take issue with some traditional approaches to emotions. I contend 
that they are unsatisfactory, because they offer too simplified a view of 
our affective life. As I shall show, some accounts tend to reduce emotions 
to disruptive, short-lived episodes that disturb an affective equilibrium 
or neutral state. Moreover, some of the same approaches also fail to 
capture the entanglements between emotions and structures of 
oppression. I focus on Gabrielle Taylor’s (1985) account of shame as an 
example of such an account. 
In the second part of the chapter, I argue that Sandra Bartky’s 
(1990) notion of “emotional attunement” and Peter Goldie’s (2012) 
conception of “emotional patterns” allow us to account for the ways that 
emotions endure over time. These notions offer an alternative and more 
fruitful way of thinking about the interconnections between affects and 
structures of power.  
Finally, I argue that Sara Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) account of 
emotions as “relational” is helpful for understanding their collective 
dimension. Arguing that emotions are neither primarily internal to the 
individual mind nor fundamentally “external” features of the social 
world, Ahmed’s model allows us to see how emotions mediate and at the 
same time reveal relations of power. It is through emotion that social 
relations – the very distinctions between “I” and “we”; the “us” and 
“them” – are delineated. This perspective opens the possibility of 
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exploring how, in the context of relations between oppressors and 
oppressed, emotions function as channels of power. 
 
3.2 What emotions are: a familiar picture 
 
As I argued in Chapter 2, some of the emotions that occupy a central 
place in many narratives of the lived experience of oppression are 
affections such as shame and guilt, which arise from injuries to a 
subject’s self-esteem. In this section, I will consider how these 
emotions tend to be conceptualized in mainstream philosophical 
psychology by focusing on Gabriele Taylor’s influential account of 
shame as an “emotion of self-assessment”. I shall then point out the 
limitations of this approach, following Sandra Bartky’s critique of 
some of its main assumptions. 
 
3.2.1 The case of shame 
 
According to Taylor, shame is an emotion of self-assessment because 
it requires a self-directed adverse judgement in order to be 
experienced. As such, it is constituted by a set of beliefs. The person 
who experiences shame “feels herself degraded, not the sort of person 
she believed, assumed or hoped she was or anyway should be” 
(Taylor, 1985, p. 68). Taylor takes issue with Sartre’s picture of 
shame as an emotion that is, primarily, felt before the Other. For 
Sartre, whilst shame is a painful emotion in which the self feels 
diminished, the image of an Other who observes the self plays a 
fundamental role in its structure: 
 
A man makes a vulgar gesture. He then realizes that he is being 
observed. This realization makes him look at what he is doing 
through the observer’s eyes. Seeing it from that point of view he 
realizes that what he is doing is vulgar, and he feels shame. (Taylor, 
1985, p. 57)  
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For Taylor, however, the real or imagined presence of an Other is not 
a necessary feature of shame. Against Sartre’s view, Taylor imagines 
the case of a craftsman who is ashamed of the quality of his work 
and/or of himself. She contends that in this case shame does not 
require the presence of a real or imagined audience. The adverse self-
directed judgement that is needed in order to feel shame just 
requires a shift in the individual’s viewpoint on himself, “a 
sophisticated type of self-consciousness” through which the agent 
becomes dramatically self-aware of being defective: 
 
It is certainly true that to feel shame a craftsman need not think i.e. 
either believe or imagine, that there is another craftsman looking at 
his work. He need not imagine an actual observer, and that there is 
such an observer need not be part of the content of his thought. All 
that seems necessary is that he shift his viewpoint from that of the 
creator of the work to that of the critical assessor, and he himself 
can fulfil both these functions. (...) The shift is not only in the view 
the craftsman takes of his work, it is also in the view he takes of 
himself. (Taylor, 1985, p. 58) 
 
An additional characteristic of shame, according to Taylor, is that it 
involves “an element of drama” (Taylor, 1985, p. 67). The person who 
feels shame sees herself as defective and degraded 
 
because she is presented with a contrast, where the contrast is 
between her unselfconscious state, what she thought or hoped or 
unthinkingly assumed she was, or was doing, and what she has now 
under the observer-description turned out to be (Taylor, 1985, p. 66).  
 
The shock that this contrast or discrepancy produces in the self is the 
effect of the “sudden realization of one’s changed position”, a 
realization that comes as a “revelation”. In Taylor’s view, this 
dramatic element of shock is one of the features that distinguish 
shame from simple embarrassment. 
In Taylor’s example, feeling shame depends on a change of 
position, from “creator” to “critical assessor”. While carving a wooden 
table, the creator-craftsman may not always be critically assessing 
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his work. The business of creating it may require some kind of 
suspension of critical assessment. But at some point, he pauses, 
takes a look at the product of his labour and at the skill at producing 
it. This shift whereby he becomes a critical spectator of his skills and 
work, is, according to Taylor, a necessary condition for feeling shame: 
“the person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from 
some norm and that in doing so, she has altered her standing in the 
world” (Taylor, 1985, p. 1, as cited in Bartky, 1990, p. 93). Ridding 
oneself of shame therefore requires either modifying one’s standards 
of judgement or changing one’s behaviour. The craftsman may for 
example realize that his standards of judgement are too demanding. 
Lowering his expectations may be a way of ridding himself of shame. 
Or he may keep the standard and decide to take an intensive 
workshop that will allow him to perfect his craft and therefore feel 
satisfied with himself. 
We can however imagine a case where the craftsman notices 
that the work isn’t as good as he thought, and concludes, without 
feeling shame, that he just needs to keep working in order to achieve 
a better result. Noticing that the table is not as good as he initially 
believed may not affect his sense of self-worth or self-esteem. In other 
words, noticing that one has deviated from some norm does not 
necessarily lead to believing that one’s standing in the world has 
changed. Therefore, shame does not necessarily result from such 
changes in beliefs. If shame is to result from critical self-assessment, 
a negative critical analysis must insert the dagger deeply enough to 
wound the craftsman’s self-esteem. We may thus think that the 
craftsman will only feel shame if his sense of self-esteem is closely 
tied to the exercise of his skill.  
To use an image, feeling shame requires that the craftsman's 
self-esteem and the perception of his talent be linked like two 
muscles attached to the same nerves; to negatively touch the 
perception of talent is to simultaneously hurt his self-esteem. If we 
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endorse Taylor’s assumption that shame can be analysed in terms of 
belief, the core belief would have to be that one’s self-worth is 
essentially attached to not deviating from a particular norm. Not 
deviating from this norm would be part of what makes us feel 
worthy, or of what we think are essential capacities for our personal 
flourishing. Without this core belief, merely noticing deviations from 
a norm may not result in shame.  
 
3.2.2 Shame, self-esteem and the Other 
 
3.2.2.1 Bodily and psychic manifestations of shame 
 
However, if we think that shame is constituted by the core belief that 
one has deviated from a norm connected to self-worth, we may ask if 
this reflects our experience of shame. Even if such belief were 
constitutive of shame, Taylor’s cognitivist view seems overly 
individualistic. She may be right to point out that not every single 
discrete episode of shame requires consciously imagining an 
audience, but this does not mean that shame is not felt as if there 
were an imaginary audience witnessing our failures, whether one 
actually imagines an audience or not. The bodily and psychic 
manifestations of shame are indicative of this: when we feel shame, 
our bodily gestures signal a desire to hide or disappear. We may 
avoid eye-contact, cover our face with our hands, or fantasize about 
being swallowed by the Earth. Even in the case of the solipsistic 
craftsman, who feels shame only through his negative self-directed 
judgement, this emotion may manifest in a desire to avoid contact 
with others. The craftsman may only need his own judgement to feel 
shame, but the experience of shame makes him want to hide as if 
some Other were witnessing his failure. 
Moreover, even if we concede that one does not need to 
consciously imagine an Other to feel unworthy in every single 
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instance of shame, the Other is always already partly involved in our 
sense of worthiness. In order to understand this, let’s try to make 
sense of what goes on in the craftsman’s mind when he feels shame, 
i.e., when his sense of self-worth is wounded. If to be hurt in one’s 
self-esteem is to feel unworthy, the sense of worthiness is 
experienced as connected to others: one may feel unworthy of other 
people’s respect, admiration, or affection. Feeling worthy or valuable 
cannot be easily separated from what is socially valued. Our sense of 
self-worth is based on an image of ourselves that has been partly 
informed by the perspectives of others.  
These thoughts direct us to the limitations of approaches such 
as Taylor’s. The wound that shame inflicts on our self-esteem is 
never purely a matter of individual critical self-assessment. What 
seems essential in shame is not – or not only – the belief that our 
self-worth is tied to a particular abstract norm, but the sense that we 
have lost other people’s respect, appreciation or love. Even in 
Taylor’s cases, though the craftsman does not need to imagine an 
Other to feel shame, if he feels that he has lost his standing in the 
world this is likely experienced as if he had lost his standing in the 
eyes of others. To rid oneself of shame can therefore be more difficult 
than Taylor implies, insofar as it involves untangling a complicated 
knot which ties our self-esteem to what others disapprove of, 
appreciate or disdain, encourage or discourage in us. Taylor’s 
individualistic picture does not seem to do fully justice to the role 
played by real or imagined Others in the experience of this emotion. 
 
3.2.2.3 Shame and power 
 
Furthermore, the tendency to feel shame and the capacity to rid 
oneself of shame may depend on the kind of power or authority that 
certain others possess. Consider children and parental figures: 
children may be more vulnerable to feeling shame in a context where 
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they are surrounded by parental figures who play an important role 
in their sense of self-worth, than adults surrounded by a group of 
children. In the case of young children, parental figures play a 
decisive role in the structuring of a child’s self-image and self-
esteem. While this has enabling effects, insofar as it is one of the 
bases of the development of personality, the child initially lacks the 
resources to clearly distance themself from some of the parental 
narratives that build their sense of self. Such resources will be 
developed throughout childhood, and personality probably involves a 
never-ending interplay between integrating, rejecting and/or 
readapting the image of ourselves that we find reflected in others. 
But if, from a very early age, a child is surrounded by figures of 
authority who send them back a devalued self-image, they will likely 
struggle to challenge this image in later life. 
We may think here of the character of Pecola in Morrison’s 
novel, discussed in Chapter 2. The adults and peers who surround 
her make her feel ugly and invisible. As a result, Pecola is haunted 
by shame. The violence of the world in which she is immersed is such 
that she becomes unable to develop the resources that would allow 
her to build a more positive and empowering self-image18. As we 
noted in chapter 2, although Pecola’s case is exceptional, Morrison 
presents her struggle and her difficulties in resisting as common to 
all of those who are oppressed. This indicates that social power plays 
                                            
18 This contrasts with the case of the narrator, Claudia, who, as a child, feels the 
violence that the white norms of beauty inflict on her. As a strategy to challenge the 
violence of this racist imaginary, Claudia dismembers the blue-eyed Baby Dolls given 
to her as a gift: “‘Here,’ they said, ‘this is beautiful, and if you are on this day worthy 
you may have it.’ I fingered the face, wondering at the single-stroke eyebrows; picked at 
the pearly teeth stuck like two piano keys between red bowline lips. Traced the turned-
up nose, poked the glassy blue eyeballs, twisted the yellow hair. I could not love it. But 
I could examine it to see what it was that all the world said was lovable.” (Morrison, 
2016, p. 19).  Dismembering blue-eyed Baby Dolls is Claudia’s attempt to make sense 
to the mystery behind the adult’s loving fascination for little white girls, a fascination 
that is denied to her: “To discover what eluded me: the secret of the magic they weaved 
on others. What made people look at them and say ‘Awwwww’, but not for me?” 
(Morrison, 2016, p. 20). 
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an important role, not only in one’s vulnerability to feel shame, but in 
one’s capacity to rid oneself of this emotion. Taylor’s exploration of 
shame does not seem to take these elements enough into 
consideration. 
 
3.2.3 The young girl’s shame 
 
To develop our understanding of shame in relation to power, it may 
be helpful to take two other examples, the first drawn from Simone 
de Beauvoir’s analysis of the young girl who “does not accept the 
destiny assigned to her by nature and by society; and yet she does not 
repudiate it completely”. Her early experiences of pleasure at 
arousing sexual desire in men are conflicted: 
 
With the coming of puberty she has become acquainted with shame; 
and the shame lingers on, mingled with her coquetry and her 
vanity. Men's stares flatter and hurt her simultaneously; she wants 
only what she shows to be seen: eyes are always too penetrating. 
(…) [S]he displays her décolleté, her legs, and when they are looked 
at she blushes, feels vexation. She enjoys inflaming the male, but if 
she sees that she has aroused his desire, she recoils in disgust. 
Masculine desire is as much an offence as it is a compliment; in so 
far as she feels herself responsible for her charm, or feels she is 
exerting it of her own accord, she is much pleased with her 
conquests, but to the extent that her face, her figure, her flesh are 
facts she must bear with, she wants to hide them from this 
independent stranger who lusts after them. (Beauvoir, 1956, pp. 
347–348) 
 
Beauvoir’s vignette illustrates how the shame women suffer as a 
result of being reduced to sexual objects by the male gaze is 
importantly connected to a feeling of powerlessness. Pleasure in 
being desired is present when there is a sense of agency (“in so far as 
she feels herself responsible for her charm”); but as soon as the young 
girl is reduced to a prey or an object, and feels that her body is under 
the controlling gaze of the man who chooses to see what she does not 
want to be seen, she is overwhelmed by shame. 
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Or take a second case explored by Beauvoir, this time relating 
to menstruation: 
 
In his tale Old Mortality, C. A. Porter relates how young American 
girls in the South, about 1900, made themselves sick eating 
mixtures of salt and lemon to halt menstruation when they were 
going to a ball; they were afraid that the young men might discover 
their condition from the appearance of their eyes, contact with their 
hands, or possibly an odour, and this idea horrified them. It is not 
easy to play the idol, the fairy, the faraway princess, when one feels 
a bloody cloth between one's legs; and, more generally, when one is 
conscious of the primitive misery of being a body. The modesty that 
is spontaneous refusal to admit one's carnal nature verges on 
hypocrisy. (Beauvoir, 1956, p. 354) 
 
Beauvoir’s examples indicate how the gendered experience of shame 
is grounded on the power-relations between men and women. For 
women, ridding themselves of shame is therefore more than a matter 
of changing their individual beliefs or behaviour. Beauvoir’s young 
woman cannot simply rid herself of shame as of a momentary 
episode through the modification of her behaviour or judgement. As 
long as the imbalance of power between men and women has 
implications for women’s self-esteem, shame will be a part of 
women’s emotional repertoire. 
 
3.3 Bartky’s critique 
 
Through these examples, we can see that for an oppressed person, – 
in this case, for women – even realizing the unfairness of the social 
stigma associated with female sexuality and menstruation, and even 
modifying one’s standards of judgement, may be insufficient to rid 
oneself of shame. In many cases, the oppressed may reject the 
standards of judgement that are being imposed upon them, and 
nevertheless be affected by persistent patterns of shame. This is one 
of the critiques that Sandra Bartky levels against accounts such as 
Taylor’s. Taylor’s approach to shame, Bartky contends, presents a 
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common set of assumptions that tend to inform philosophical 
theorizing about emotions, which prove to be insufficient for 
understanding the emotional lives of the oppressed.  
 
3.3.1 An insufficient model 
 
A first common assumption is that, as just sketched, the subject 
experiencing shame tends to be thought of as an abstract individual, 
whose situation with respect to social power is not taken into 
consideration:  
 
The moral agent who is standardly the focus of moral psychology is 
everyone and anyone, no one in particular, i.e., an abstract 
individual. The fact that certain sorts of agents find themselves 
routinely in specific social locations, e.g., in relationships of 
subordination to other persons, is not regarded as germane to the 
analysis of moral emotion per se. (Bartky, 1990, p. 95)  
 
As a result, an emotion such as shame tends to be thought almost 
exclusively “in its relationship to individual failure and wrongdoing, 
never in its relationship to oppression.” (Bartky, 1990, p. 97)  
Furthermore, the individual agent who typically feels shame 
in the cases examined by moral psychologists seems to occupy a 
sovereign position: 
 
This agent feels shame or judges himself guilty when he perceives 
that his behaviour has fallen short of standards that are 
importantly his own. This agent is lucid; he knows what he has done 
and why it is wrong. Moreover, insofar as he sits in judgement upon 
himself, gives the law unto himself, as it were, he is autonomous. 
Because his guilt or shame mark his investment in moral norms, 
these painful emotions are occasions for moral reaffirmation. 
(Bartky, 1990, pp. 95–96) 
 
For this abstract individual, shame is thought as a discrete episode 
that marks a disruption in his “moral equilibrium”: if the agent X 
has acted in a wrongful way, his feeling shame is therefore seen as 
warranted and useful for improving his moral behaviour. Once the 
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agent acknowledges his fault, feels shame and corrects his 
behaviour, he returns to his usual “moral commitments” (Bartky, 
1990, p. 96). Shame is thus “typically construed as a specific episode 
in the agent’s history, an intrusion in daily life that brings in its 
wake an altered understanding of the self” (Bartky, 1990, p. 96) 
In consequence, accounts such as Taylor’s privilege cases in 
which the emotion in question is short-lived. An instance of shame 
will be analysed as a single, discrete episode happening within 
distinct temporal limits and fading away once the circumstances that 
produced it have changed – as in the case of the craftsman, once his 
relevant beliefs or behaviour have been modified. 
This picture, Bartky argues, seems very reductive as it cannot 
account for cases in which shame seems to be more regular, 
continuous and long-lived, rather than episodic, disruptive and 
short-lived. Such is the case of people who are oppressed and who 
therefore do not fit the ideal abstract individual discussed by moral 
psychologists. For the oppressed, Bartky contends, shame “is not a 
blip across the face of an otherwise undisturbed consciousness”. 
Rather, it is “the pervasive affective taste of a life” (Bartky, 1990, p. 
96).  
 
3.3.2. Not episodes: “attunements” or patterns 
 
Bartky uses the Heideggerian metaphor of “emotional attunement” to 
account for important features in the emotional experience of the 
oppressed. If, Bartky contends, oppressed people are already affected 
by the harms of oppression, their experience of negative emotions 
such as shame and guilt will likely be different from that of an 
abstract, universal agent. For oppressed people, shame, guilt, fear, 
low self-esteem, etc., are not short-lived, discrete episodes that burst 
in on an empty mental scene like the characters in a theatre, dashing 
behind the stage once the play is over. Rather, such emotions are 
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characterised by their pervasiveness; they “may color a person’s 
entire emotional life” (Bartky, 1990, p. 97)  
To continue the musical metaphor, being emotionally attuned 
is to experience life in a particular emotional key. Bartky argues that 
the emotional life of the oppressed is not played out against a neutral 
ground but is already informed by the ways in which they inhabit the 
world. Bartky’s elaboration of the metaphor stresses the role that 
socio-political structures play in how emotions take shape. 
To illustrate how shame is not just an isolated, ephemeral 
episode for the oppressed but, to use Matthew Ratcliffe’s expression, 
an “existential feeling” (2016), Bartky presents some examples drawn 
from her experience as a professor at a suburban school for High-
School teachers. She describes how women were often quieter than 
men in class discussions; their way of speaking was in most cases 
hesitant, marked by self-denigrating comments. Women’s speech and 
body language would also frequently signal shame: 
 
They would offer heartfelt apologies and copious expressions of regret for the 
poor quality of their work – work which turned out, most of the time, to be quite 
good. While apologizing, a student would often press the edges of her 
manuscript together so as to make it literally smaller, holding the paper 
uncertainly somewhere in the air as if unsure whether she wanted to relinquish 
it at all. Typically, she would deliver the apology with head bowed, chest 
hollowed, and shoulders hunched slightly forward. The male students would 
stride over to the desk and put down their papers without comment (Bartky, 
1990, p. 89)  
 
As members of an oppressed group, this emotional attunement to shame 
in the case of the female students is, according to Bartky, partly the 
result of receiving contradictory messages under an oppressive system. 
Whilst being given the formal right to education, arguably as the equals 
of men, women are often the target of demeaning treatments, often 
insidious ones such as tones of voice, lack of eye contact, sexist humour, 
omission of perspectives of women in academic curricula, etc. This 
ambivalence produces in women a disempowering internal division that, 
according to Bartky, has dehumanizing effects: 
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An ambiguous situation, affirming women in some ways and 
diminishing them in others, holding itself out as fair while oftentimes 
violating its own standards of fairness, tends to produce in women a 
confused and divided consciousness: Believing themselves to be fully the 
competitive equals of men, many women yet feel somehow diminished 
and inadequate, this in the absence of any actual evidence of the failure.  
(Bartky, 1990, p. 94) 
 
This points in the direction of another limitation of cognitivist 
accounts such as Taylor’s. Whilst the latter contends that shame is 
constituted by a set of fundamental beliefs, Bartky argues that the 
kind of shame experienced by her female students cannot be properly 
understood in terms of propositional beliefs: 
 
Because the sexist messages of the classroom are transmitted in a 
disguised fashion or else both sent and received below the level of 
explicit awareness, what gets communicated to women does not take 
the form of propositional meaning and what they take away from 
the situation is not so much a belief as a feeling of inferiority or a 
sense of inadequacy. (Bartky, 1990, p. 94). 
 
For Bartky, the feelings of inadequacy and shame that are part of 
women’s emotional attunement do not attain the status of “fully 
formed beliefs”. These feelings remain in contradiction with some 
beliefs, “for example, that, like men, they enjoy ‘equality of 
opportunity’” (Bartky, 1990, p. 95). Could this tension between beliefs 
and feelings of shame be explained as a case of “false shame”, i.e. 
“when a person evaluates her behavior in line with commitments 
which are not really her own” (Bartky, 1990, p. 94)? Bartky rules out 
this possibility as well: if false shame presupposes a cognitive error, 
then the female students in her example would have to constantly 
judge themselves according to standards that are not their own. This 
explanation does not allow for the possibility of them having 
“genuine standards” of their own:  
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To be falsely shame-prone or shame-ridden, on Taylor’s analysis, 
would be to employ alien standards consistently. But if people were 
to employ alien standards consistently, how could they be said to 
have genuine standards at all? (Bartky, 1990, p. 95) 
 
More importantly, thinking this kind of shame merely in terms of a 
mistake made by individuals distracts us from the main problem, 
namely, that these feelings reveal “women’s subordinate status in a 
hierarchy of gender” (Bartky, 1990, p. 95). In other words, the 
persistent shame that women feel cannot be explained by just 
pointing out that they are wrong or mistaken in their beliefs; it is 
important to attend to how this feeling is connected to structures of 
oppression.  
What the image of “emotional attunement” aims to capture is 
not only the fact that negative emotions such as shame are pervasive 
for the oppressed, but also that they diminish and disempower the 
self. A circular process seems therefore to be in place. Not only is 
shame pervasive in virtue of oppression, but oppression is sustained 
and reinforced by the shame it produces. 
Bartky also uses the notion of “pattern” as an analogue of 
“attunement”. The same notion is also used by Peter Goldie, who 
echoes aspects of Bartky’s critique by signalling the inadequacy of 
reducing emotions to disruptive episodes. I will briefly present 
Goldie’s objections to the episodic model, in order to show how 
conceiving emotions as patterns may be helpful for my account. 
 
3.4 Goldie: emotional patterns 
 
In The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion and the Mind (2012), Peter 
Goldie identifies three influential accounts of emotion: the feeling 
theories; the judgement-based cognitive theories; and the perception-
based cognitive theories. Whilst holding different views regarding the 
cognitive or non-cognitive nature of emotions, all these theories share 
two main presuppositions:  
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• Emotions are mental states or events  
• Emotions are short-lived and situated, occurring at a 
particular time  
 
Goldie argues, however, that some emotional phenomena are more 
adequately conceived as processes extended over time than as short-
lived states or events with distinct temporal limits. Such is grief. As 
an emotional process, and unlike episodes and mental states, grief 
unfolds according to characteristic patterns:  
 
Grief is a process, and is experienced as a process. It is a kind of 
process which, borrowing again from Wittgenstein (1958: 174) I will 
call a pattern; he said, ‘“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, 
with different variations, in the weave of our life’. The pattern has 
certain features. It includes characteristic thoughts, judgements, 
feelings, memories, imaginings, actions, expressive actions, habitual 
actions, and much else besides, unfolding over time, but none of 
which is essential at any particular time. It involves emotional 
dispositions as well as particular experiences, and there will be 
characteristic interactions between these. (...) The pattern is 
understandable as grief because it follows a characteristic shape, 
although it will be individual and particular to the person, and will 
no doubt be significantly shaped by cultural as well as biological 
influences. (Goldie, 2012, p. 62) 
 
In this account, the pattern of an emotion is understood in a dynamic 
way as the particular shape of an unfolding process. The salient 
feature of a pattern is that it involves both repetition and change of a 
sequence. The way in which the sequence is repeated and altered is 
what gives the pattern its particular configuration. To experience 
emotional patterns means that certain kinds of affects will be 
recurrent, as Wittgenstein puts it, “with different variations” 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 174, as cited by Goldie, 2012, p. 62). However, 
an emotional pattern does not merely consist in a succession of 
events or episodes. The pattern describes a particular repetition, but 
its singularity lies in the fashions the repetition takes.  
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In order to understand the functioning of an emotional 
pattern, let’s take a closer look at Goldie’s characterization of grief. 
Grief is not an emotion that we can adequately describe as a single 
event; it’s not identifiable as a mere disruptive moment. The 
emotions that take place during grieving are not isolated episodes 
but come to be understood as the stages of a process that unfolds over 
time in a characteristic way.  
Goldie also points out that processes and events differ in that 
we don’t use the same explanatory models to account for them. In the 
case of an event, we look for the trigger that caused it. In the case of 
processes, we also try to find out what sustains them over time. For 
Goldie, since grief is a complex process which unfolds over time and 
demands a more complex explanation than a simple triggering cause, 
it is best accounted for through a narrative. A narrative gives a 
better account of that “blend of activity and passivity” (Goldie, 2012, 
p. 64) that characterizes an emotional process such as grief. Through 
a narrative, the causal relations at play in emotional reactions are 
revealed, but so are other elements that allow us to understand 
emotions: multiple perspectives can be included, thus revealing the 
existence of different emotional elements within a wider pattern. A 
particular emotional stage of grief cannot be adequately understood 
by merely citing its cause (what triggered it?). A more complex 
narrative account is needed. One may ask, for example, not only 
what triggered an emotion, but why it takes this particular shape in 
relation to other elements, relating, for example, to the history of the 
subject who experiences it, or the nature of the bond that united the 
subject to the object of grief. 
According to Goldie, in grief, the emotional process is 
“ontologically and epistemologically prior” to the different episodes or 
stages that are part of it. This means that the intelligibility of each 
episode or stage is dependent upon the broader context in which it 
takes place. Only by clarifying the relation between the single 
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emotional event and the larger pattern will it become comprehensible 
as an instance of grief. Causal accounts may also show the causal 
continuity of an emotional process, but Goldie contends that 
narrative accounts are better suited to capturing its unfolding: 
 
(...) narratives have much in common with causal accounts. Like a 
causal account, a narrative is idiographic: it is concerned with 
particular facts, events, and individuals. Like a causal account, a 
narrative cannot be concerned with just a single simple event or 
state; it must be about one thing happening after another, and the 
notion of coherence is concerned with how these things happening 
after another hold together in some way. Narratives, like causal 
accounts, are interest-relative. And causal relations play a central 
part in the coherence of a narrative. However, in addition (…), 
relations other than causal ones can constitute part of a narrative. 
First, narratives can exploit multiple perspectives in a way that 
gives them evaluative and emotional import of a kind that causal 
accounts lack. This import is revealed, or expressed, in the narrative 
in two kinds of perspective: internal perspectives, which are the 
perspectives of those individuals who are internal to the narrative; 
and external, which are the perspectives of the narrator, and also of 
the author where those two individuals are different. Secondly, 
narratives are better places to explain general events, by locating 
them within part of a larger pattern (Goldie, 2012, pp. 64–65)  
 
The notion of an emotional process therefore allows us to grasp 
something that the episodic model of emotions does not, namely the 
fact that some emotional phenomena are sustained over time, and 
that emotions can be part of a process which has a particular way of 
unfolding. 
Whilst Goldie is concerned with the case of grief, and his 
argument regarding the limitations of the episodic model aims at 
privileging explanatory models that are better fitted to do justice to 
this emotional process, we can extend some of his critical insights to 
the kind of phenomena with which we are concerned. Following 
Goldie’s critique, I contend that the predominant philosophical view 
of emotions as primarily episodic, disruptive, and triggered by 
discrete events that can be relatively clearly situated in time and 
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space, also has important limitations for the kind of emotional 
experience involved in oppression19.  
We now have two alternative ways of conceiving emotions 
against their reduction to disruptive episodes. Bartky’s and Goldie’s 
accounts of emotions in terms of attunement, and as processes 
unfolding in characteristic patterns are better suited to showing how 
oppression can shape people’s emotional experiences and character. 
By focusing on emotional attunements or patterns, we may be able to 
explain how emotions are connected to structures of power. 
 
3.5 Relational aspect of emotions  
 
So far I have argued that, in order to understand the emotional 
experience connected to oppression, we need to think of emotions in a 
less reductive way than approaches such as Taylor’s allow. This is 
not to say that emotions are never experienced as discrete episodes. 
Oppressed or privileged individuals may often experience episodes of 
shame, guilt, or fear that correspond to the picture drawn by Taylor. 
However, my claim is that the kind of affective experience that 
oppression involves cannot be reduced to isolated episodes; rather, 
we need alternative models such as the ones previously presented in 
order to understand how affects such as shame and guilt and the 
very phenomenon of oppression are significantly connected. 
Continuing Bartky’s critique of the individualistic picture of 
emotion, Sara Ahmed (2004a) offers a further challenge to the views I 
have been criticizing. Bartky argued that an individualistic model is 
insufficient because it presupposes an agent who seems disconnected 
from structures of oppression. It presents as universal what seems to 
correspond to a privileged individual who is autonomous, rational, 
and not otherwise burdened by structures of power. Sara Ahmed’s 
                                            
19 Insofar as Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) account of shame privileges this episodic and 
cognitivist model, Goldie’s and Bartky’s critique apply to her view as well. 
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account of the relational nature of emotions highlights their 
connection with structures of power.  
 
3.5.1 The “inside out” and “outside in” models of emotion 
 
The individualistic picture often presents emotions as states that 
“happen” to an individual or that an individual mind “possesses”, and 
which become “shared” in the social domain through expression. This is 
what Sara Ahmed has named “the inside out” or “psychological model” of 
emotions:  
 
In a psychological model, I have feelings, and they are mine. I may 
express my feelings: I may laugh, cry, or shake my head. Once what is 
inside has got out, when I have expressed my feelings in this way, then 
my feelings also become yours, and you may respond to them. (Ahmed, 
2004a, p. 8).   
 
This picture suffers from some of the limitations we have sketched 
earlier. It presents emotions as primarily belonging to the individual 
private sphere in a way that depoliticizes them and marginalizes their 
collective dimension. Insofar as Taylor’s account thinks of emotions as 
deriving from the set of beliefs that an individual has in their mind, she 
fits the “inside out” picture critiqued by Ahmed. 
An alternative way of thinking about the relationship between 
individual and collective affects consists in understanding emotions as 
living in the social and becoming absorbed, as it were, by individuals. As 
Ahmed points out, a rich tradition of anthropologists and sociologists has 
contended that “emotions should not be regarded as psychological states 
but as social and cultural practices”. One of the main representatives of 
this view is Émile Durkheim: “Most of our ideas and our tendencies are 
not developed by ourselves but come to us from without. How can they 
become part of us except by imposing themselves upon us?” (Durkheim, 
1966, p. 4, as cited in Ahmed, 2004a, p. 9) However, this tradition gives 
rise to a problem symmetrical with the one that plagues the 
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psychological model: “The ‘inside out’ model has become an ‘outside in’ 
model. Both assume the objectivity of the very distinction between inside 
and outside, the individual and the social, and the ‘me’ and ‘we’.” 
(Ahmed, 2004a, p. 9)   
In order to challenge both the “inside out” psychological account 
and the “outside in” sociological one, Ahmed offers an alternative “model 
of the sociality of the emotions” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 10). Emotions are not 
simply something “I” or “we” have. Rather, it is through emotions, or 
how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are 
made: “the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ are shaped by, and even take the shape of, 
contact with others.” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 10)  
By attempting to think about the “outside” and the “inside” 
Ahmed aims to overcome the deficiencies of theories that privilege one 
over the other. In the following sections, I will show how, through her 
analysis of one of Lorde’s passages (discussed in Chapter 2), Ahmed’s 
account of “collective feelings” (Ahmed, 2004b) can capture the emotional 
experience of oppression. In her analysis of collective affects, Ahmed 
argues that emotions have a mediating role. It is through emotions that 
social relations are delineated.  
 
3.5.2 The sociality of emotions 
 
In Ahmed’s analysis, emotions are not merely located “inside” the mind 
of the individual, nor do they live “outside”, in the social world. Rather, 
emotions are that which “‘mediates’ the relationship between internal 
and external, or inside and outside.” (Ahmed, 2004b, p.29) Ahmed’s 
account of collective emotions aims to show “how feelings make ‘the 
collective’ appear as if it were a body in the first place.” (Ahmed, 2004b, 
p. 27) 
 
Rather than locating emotion in the individual or the social, we can see 
that emotionality – as a responsiveness to and openness towards the 
worlds of others – involves an interweaving of the personal with the 
social, and the affective with the mediated (...): it is through the 
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movement of emotions that the very distinction between inside and 
outside, or the individual and social, is effected in the first place. 
(Ahmed, 2004b, p. 28) 
 
Emotions have, on this account, not only a mediating character, but also 
a revelatory one: they make visible, or palpable, what connects us to 
others. It’s as if emotions acted as the chemical solution of the 
photographic developer that brings a latent image into salience. Ahmed 
uses Butler’s (1993) distinction between “materialization” and 
“intensification” to develop this idea: “It is through the intensification of 
feeling that bodies and worlds materialize and take shape, or that the 
effect of boundary, fixity and surface is produced” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 29). 
In other words, if it weren’t for the intensification of feeling, the effects 
of “boundary, fixity and surface” (Butler, 1993, p. 9, as cited in Ahmed, 
2004b, p. 29) would not be felt, and thus, would not be known.  
To illustrate this last point, Ahmed argues that the bodily skin is 
felt as a surface – and so as that which signals at the same time a 
separation and a connection to others – “only in the event of being 
‘impressed upon’ in the encounters we have with others.” (Ahmed, 
2004b, p.29) From a rudimentary sensation (such as walking barefoot 
and feeling the difference between the sand and the grass) to more 
elaborate emotions loaded with evaluative judgments and 
interpretations (when, for example, someone signals to us that they 
dislike something we have done and we feel discomfort, shame or 
resentment), we become aware of our bodies and of others through the 
way we are affected by, or, as Ahmed puts it, impressed upon by others. 
Ahmed locates her perspective in the tradition of Descartes and 
Spinoza in that “we don’t have feelings for objects because of the nature 
of the objects. Feelings instead take the ‘shape’ of the contact we have 
with objects.” (Ahmed, 2004b, p.29) Objects affect us not only in virtue of 
their intrinsic features, but because we have particular ways of reacting 
to them. And in these ways of reacting, the environment, and more 
precisely what Ahmed calls “histories of contact”, play a crucial role. We 
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have ways of reacting to others, and others react in particular ways to 
us, in virtue of past histories of contact that follow particular scripts. In 
this sense, racism can be understood as “a particular form of 
intercorporeal encounter” that has been shaped by past histories:  
 
A white racist subject who encounters a racial other may experience an 
intensity of emotions (fear, hate, disgust, pain). That intensification 
involves moving away from the body of the other, or moving towards 
that body in an act of violence, and then moving away. The ‘moment of 
contact’ is shaped by past histories of contact, which allows the 
proximity of a racial other to be perceived as threatening, at the same 
time as it reshapes the bodies in the contact zone of the encounter. 
(Ahmed, 2004b, p. 31) 
 
Insofar as past histories of contact contribute to the shaping of our 
emotions, our ways of reacting emotionally follow particular patterns of 
repetition and change; they are habitual in that they follow particular 
paths that have been opened and practiced by these past histories of 
contact: 
 
The perception of others as the origin of danger is shaped by histories of 
racism (in which the presence of others is already read as an invasion of 
bodily territory as well as the territory of the nation). The repetition of 
signs is what allows others to be attributed with emotional value: as 
being hateful in the first place (see Fanon, 1986). Hence the contact both 
depends on histories of association, at the same time as it generates its 
object: the mixed-race couple, the immigrant, etc. In this way, emotions 
can be theorized as performative: they both repeat past associations as 
well as generating their object (Butler, 1993) (...) Hate may generate the 
other as the object of hate insofar as it repeats associations that already 
read the bodies of others as being hateful. (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 32) 
 
We see here how emotions are thought as inscribed in long-lived 
patterns. In Ahmed’s account, the pattern is not only about the 
repetition of emotions themselves (as, throughout one’s life, one may 
experience recurrent patterns of shame, fear, guilt, etc.) but also about 
the reiteration of a history that has contributed to their formation. In 
their pervasive recurrence, emotions also repeat something of the history 
that initially generated them. To continue Bartky’s musical metaphor of 
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“emotional attunement”: if we picture emotions as waves of sound, we 
could say that in their echo, they replicate past histories that have given 
them their particular tonality or frequency. For example, in the context 
of racism, there are certain emotional patterns that White subjects 
display in reaction to non-White others, just as non-White others develop 
some emotional ways of reacting to being affected by White oppressors, 
in virtue of these past histories of contact. These emotional patterns are 
not, if we follow Ahmed, simply internal to the oppressed and to the 
oppressors. Rather, they help constitute a sort of web (or, if we stay in 
the musical domain, a sort of sonorous field) through which the social 
distinctions between “I” and “we”, “us” and “them”, are delineated. 
 Ahmed’s model of the sociality of emotions shows how the latter 
have a relational character. Whilst her analysis shows that relations of 
oppression such as sexism and racism are inscribed in what we had 
characterized as long-lived patterns of emotion, we now see this is not 
only true in the sense that these patterns are dispositions that “belong” 
to the subjects affected by them. It is also that the patterns of emotion 
mediate relations of power, which have a long history. 
 
3.5.3 An example 
 
Ahmed argues that the relational aspect of emotions is visible in 
narratives of an imaginary that conveys a particular “emotional reading 
of others”. Emotional patterns or attunements are therefore not things 
that merely “belong” to individuals but can be understood as indicative 
of, and expressing structures of power. This aspect of emotion is not only 
visible in narratives of oppression produced by the oppressed, but also in 
the narratives that oppressors produce in order to sustain their power. 
We can see how this plays out in the following example of white 
supremacist propaganda, extracted from the Aryan Nation’s Website 
and quoted by Ahmed: 
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The depths of Love are rooted and very deep in a real White 
Nationalist’s soul and spirit, no form of ‘hate’ could even begin to 
compare. At least not a hate motivated by ungrounded reasoning. It is 
not hate that makes the average White man look upon a mixed race 
couple with a scowl on his face and loathing in his heart. It is not hate 
that makes the White housewife throw down the daily jewspaper in 
repulsion and anger after reading of yet another child-molester or rapist 
sentenced by corrupt courts to a couple of short years in prison or parole. 
It is not hate that makes the White workingman curse about the latest 
boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be given job preferences over 
the White citizen who built this land. It is not hate that brings rage into 
the heart of a White Christian farmer when he reads of billions loaned 
or given away as ‘aid’ to foreigners when he can’t get the smallest break 
from an unmerciful government to save his failing farm. No, it’s not 
hate, It is Love (Aryan Nation’s Website, as quoted in Ahmed, 2004b, p. 
25) 
 
This narrative, as Ahmed analyses it, works to sustain a collective 
identity (the one that embodies the “White Nationalist’s soul and spirit”) 
through the vilification of the Other, using emotions that unite a group 
against other people. Through a simplistic dichotomy of hate and love, 
hatred is justified as the natural and legitimate response to the 
perceived threat of the non-White other. It is a hatred redeemed by the 
“love of White”. As Ahmed notes: 
 
It is the emotional reading of hate that works to stick or to bind the 
imagined white subject and nation together. The ‘average White man’ 
feels ‘fear and loathing’; the ‘White housewife’, ‘repulsion and anger’; the 
‘White workingman’ ‘curses’; the ‘White Christian farmer’ feels ‘rage’. 
The passion of these negative attachments to others is redefined 
simultaneously as a positive attachment to the imagined subjects 
brought together through the capitalization of the signifier, ‘White’. It is 
the love of ‘White’, or those that are recognizable as ‘White’, which 
supposedly explains this shared ‘communal’ visceral response of hate. 
Together we hate and this hate is what makes us together. (...) The 
ordinary white subject is a fantasy that comes into being through the 
mobilization of hate, as a passionate attachment tied closely to love. (...) 
Hate is distributed in such narratives across various figures (...) all of 
whom come to embody the danger of impurity, or the mixing or taking of 
blood. They threaten to violate the pure bodies; indeed, such bodies can 
only be imagined as pure by the perpetual re-staging of the fantasy of 
violation. (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 26. Italics in original) 
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By these means, emotions function as the mechanisms through which 
relations of power are enforced and sustained, so that they act as 
prostheses for power structures and at the same time as that which 
makes visible the relations of power that support our relations to others. 
Relations of power are mediated and revealed through the anger, hatred, 
repulsion and fear that negatively attach White subjects to Others. 
Ahmed notes that this negative emotional attachment to others (“them”) 
is at the same time redefined as an emotional positive attachment (Love) 
towards those imagined as White (“us”). There is therefore an inter-
dependence between two emotional attachments: the picture of the 
menacing Other (the “brown invader”, the “foreign rapist”) that 
threatens to destroy “us” is indispensable for the love of the imagined 
White Nation, a love that is often presented in nationalist narratives as 
“protection”. Without the picture of a menacing Other, there would be no 
“us” to “love”, i.e., to protect and defend. Hate, anger and repulsion 
become justified as legitimate defensive reactions as if they were derived 
from the love of White (“we hate because we love”), when instead, in 
Ahmed’s view, they simultaneously generate each other and their 
objects. 
Moving on from the narrative of the White nationalist website to 
one that is instead articulated from the perspective of those oppressed 
by white supremacy, Ahmed finds in one of Audre Lorde’s essays 
another example of how emotions are not simply “inside” the individual 
or “outside”, in the social, but are instead mediations that make an 
“inside” and an “outside” visible. Ahmed stresses the role played by hate 
“in the redefinition of social as well as bodily integrity” in Audre Lorde’s 
narrative, quoted in Chapter 2 (Lorde, 2017, p. 135): 
 
The emotion of hate aligns the particular white body with the bodily 
form of the community – the emotion functions to substantiate the 
threat of invasion and contamination in the body of a particular other 
who comes to stand for, and stand in for, the other as such. In other 
words, the hate encounter aligns not only the ‘I’ with the ‘we’ (the white 
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body, the white nation), but the ‘you’ with the ‘them’ (the black body, 
Black people). (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 33) 
 
Ahmed’s analysis bears directly on my argument about the emotional 
character of oppression. If, as I have argued, the narratives that 
highlight the lived experiences of oppression reveal emotional patterns 
that become part of the character of the oppressed, they also reveal some 
of the emotional features of the oppressors. Through these narratives we 
come to understand how the emotional patterns of oppressors and 
oppressed exist in relation to one another. For example, internalized 
oppression, or the image that the oppressed form of themselves as 
shameful (dirty, ugly, inadequate, incapable), is an effect of the 
deployment of fantasies whereby the privileged build a self-image that 
allows them to assert their domination (White people as a cleaner, more 
beautiful, virtuous, capable “race”). In other words, the pervasive 
patterns of shame that are part of the lived experience of the oppressed 
are a function of the fears and anxieties that the privileged attempt to 
eject from themselves20. The former cannot be adequately understood 
without the latter, and vice versa.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have challenged five central presuppositions that 
underlie many of the most influential theories of emotions found in 
contemporary moral psychology. I have proposed a richer and more 
fruitful way of conceiving emotions which makes it easier to see how 
they are integral to structural oppression. Drawing on Bartky, I have 
shown that emotions need not be episodic and short-lived; cannot always 
be tidily analysed in terms of conscious beliefs; do not necessarily disrupt 
a state of moral “balance”, and must be understood in connection with 
political structures. I have argued that we need to think about emotions 
                                            
20 This point will be the focus of a more detailed analysis in chapters 5 and 6. 
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as “attunements” and long-lasting “patterns” to show how structures of 
power contribute to their formation, and how they in turn play a role in 
enforcing and sustaining these structures. Finally, I have begun to 
sketch an account of how an emotion might be a relational thing, both 
fed by and feeding a social structure. Having a given preliminary sketch 
of the relations between emotions and social structures, I shall now 
examine this connection in greater detail. 
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4. How are some emotions connected to oppression? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
I have contended that definitional approaches to oppression do not offer 
a rich enough account of what oppression is (Chapter 1). As we have 
seen, narratives and phenomenological descriptions of the lived 
experience of oppression provide compelling evidence of the strong 
emotional component of oppression; but definitional accounts fail to 
engage with it in a satisfactory fashion (Chapter 2). My aim is therefore 
to give a richer explanatory account of the relationship between 
oppression and emotion. The narrative evidence indicates that emotions 
play an essential role in oppression, and my inquiry aims to make sense 
of this fact. To do so, as I have argued, we need a model of emotions that 
is capable of capturing their entanglements with structures of 
oppression (Chapter 3). Taylor’s account of shame is an example of a 
model of emotions that is unequal to this task. The kind of phenomena 
that I aim to explain are better grasped through concepts that highlight 
the longevity of emotions and their connection to socio-political 
structures, such as Bartky’s notion of “emotional attunement” and 
Goldie’s account of “emotional patterns”. Moreover, against the 
individualistic assumptions of some traditional models in moral 
psychology, I have followed Ahmed in suggesting that emotions must be 
conceived as having a relational dimension. 
Throughout these chapters, I have shown that there is a 
significant connection between emotions and oppression, worthy of 
greater exploration. I have argued, first, that people who are subject to 
oppression experience particular emotional patterns. Secondly, I have 
argued that the emotional patterns experienced by members of 
oppressed groups, and by their oppressors, are shaped by structures of 
oppression, so that there seems to be a significant causal connection 
between forms of structural oppression, forms of structural privilege and 
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affective configurations. Thirdly, I have argued that the patterns of 
emotion at issue become instrumental to the reproduction of the 
structures of power involved in their formation. Oppression is therefore 
sustained and reinforced via emotional mechanisms.  
In this chapter I address these claims more directly by exploring 
the nature of the connection between structures of oppression and the 
emotional patterns of the oppressed. 
 
4.2 Are some emotions “constitutive” of oppression? 
 
In this section I shall elaborate and analyse the claim that oppression is 
first and foremost an embodied emotional experience. I will do so by 
considering the precise nature of the connection between oppression and 
the patterns of emotion I have been discussing. How exactly are these 
patterns related to oppression? I shall begin by considering the view that 
the relation between them can be spelled out in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Let me start by setting out these two conditions. 
If certain patterns of emotion are necessary for oppression, the 
relation between the two will take the following form: 
 
Necessary Condition (NC): Fs are oppressed as Fs iff they 
experience a cluster of disempowering emotions such as shame, 
guilt and fear. 
 
For example, we might incorporate this condition into Haslanger’s 
definition as follows: 
 
Fs are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in context C iffdf in(∃R) 
(being an F nonaccidentally correlates with being disadvantaged by 
standing in an unjust relation R to others) and I creates, perpetuates, or 
reinforces R), [and Fs experience negative emotions such as shame, guilt, 
and fear as a result of being oppressed] 
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But what would this commit us to? There seem to be two main ways of 
interpreting the claim that a certain pattern of emotion is a necessary 
condition of oppression: 
 
NC.1 In order to be oppressed, Fs must consciously experience 
emotions that belong to a pattern characteristic of people who are 
oppressed. Conversely, those who do not subjectively recognize 
that they feel these emotions are not oppressed. 
 
NC. 2 In order to be oppressed, Fs must experience, consciously or 
unconsciously, relevant patterns of emotion. Conversely, those 
who do not experience (consciously or unconsciously) these 
emotions are not oppressed. 
 
A further possible relation between the phenomena we are considering is 
one of sufficiency: 
 
Sufficient Condition (SC): It is enough for Fs to experience a 
cluster of disempowering emotions such as shame, guilt and fear to 
be oppressed. 
 
This relation, too, can be interpreted in two ways: 
 
SC1: It is enough for Fs to be oppressed if they are subjectively 
aware of having emotions that belong to a pattern characteristic 
of people who are oppressed.  
 
SC1: In order to be oppressed it is enough for Fs to experience 
relevant patterns of emotion, even if Fs are not aware of 
experiencing these emotions.
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4.2.1 The Necessity Condition 
 
4.2.1.1 A too demanding condition 
 
As it stands, the Necessity Condition seems too demanding and highly 
counterintuitive. One difficulty is that, if the NC1 is fulfilled, it does not 
allow to account for cases where these emotional patterns are not 
consciously felt but could nevertheless be present unconsciously. We 
could take here as an example the case of women trapped in an abusive 
relationship. Some women may suffer forms of gender oppression, and 
yet they may think of themselves as not experiencing these 
disempowering emotions. They might struggle to be aware of the 
emotional harms that this relationship produces. This suggests that 
consciously experiencing a certain pattern of emotion is not after all a 
necessary condition of oppression. 
In this sense, the NC 2 seems a more plausible option, insofar as 
it includes the possibility of unconscious or repressed emotions. The NC2 
states that if F is materially systematically disadvantaged (in line with 
Haslanger’s definition) but does not consciously or unconsciously 
experience any of the emotional patterns that tend to accompany 
oppression, F will not count as oppressed. However, the NC2 runs into 
another problem. It runs the risk of trivialising the seriousness of 
important and systematic forms of disadvantage that are normally 
considered to be oppressive in their own right. For example, in a 
hypothetical scenario where a group of materially disadvantaged people 
do not feel ashamed in the manner we have described, it seems highly 
counterintuitive to deny that they are oppressed. In order to be 
oppressed it is enough to be materially or politically disadvantaged, for 
instance in the fashion specified by Haslanger. The presence of certain 
patterns of emotion is not invariably a feature of oppression. 
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As indicated above, it is not uncommon for oppressed people to fail 
to recognise the link between their patterns of emotion and their 
oppression. Think back, for example, to the childhood experiences of 
Lorde and Du Bois. But this is not enough to show that patterns of 
emotion (whether recognised or not) are necessary for oppression. We do 
not so far have a satisfactory argument for this claim.  
 
4.2.1.2 Further difficulties 
 
The suggestion that certain patterns of emotions (whether recognised or 
not) are necessary for oppression runs into further difficulties. For one 
thing, NC implies that if certain patterns of emotion cannot be detected, 
there is no oppression. If, for example, people appear to be happy, it 
follows that they are not oppressed. The claim that certain emotional 
patterns are necessary conditions for oppression – and the correlative 
claim that when these emotions are absent so too is oppression – can 
help the powerful to deny the existence of oppression. 
A common ideological subterfuge of structures of domination is to 
substitute a positive picture for the wrongs and sufferings of oppression 
by associating obedience with emotional wellbeing. The image of the 
“happy American housewife”, which Betty Friedan analysed as an 
example of the mystique that sustained (White, middle-class) women’s 
oppression21, and the image of the “happy slave”, so prominent in 
nineteenth-century narratives of slavery in the United States, are clear 
examples of this. In these cases, the view that certain emotional 
patterns are necessary conditions of oppression is implicitly used to 
                                            
21 “In 1960, the problem that has no name burst like a boil through the image of the 
happy American housewife. In the television commercials the pretty housewives still 
beamed over their foaming dishpans… But the actual unhappiness of the American 
housewife was suddenly being reported… although almost everybody who talked about 
it found some superficial reason to dismiss it” (Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 
in Ahmed, 2010, p. 50). 
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mask systematic forms of harm by giving them an appearance of 
legitimacy. Here, then, we have one risk associated with the NC. 
A more complex strategy for justifying oppression also rests on the 
assumption that certain emotional patterns are NC of oppression. 
Historically, systems of oppression have sometimes relied on the 
assumption that oppressed groups have different emotional dispositions 
and capacities from their oppressors, and that their allegedly “bestial” 
nature makes them unable to access the full range of human emotions. 
The denial that the oppressed have the capacity to feel has been an 
important tool for enforcing domination. As George Yancy argues, for 
example, it played a role the treatment of captured African peoples 
during their infamous Middle Passage to slavery: “In the eyes of the 
enslaver, the captured African became a tool devoid of reason, human 
feeling and will. The ‘will of the captured’ was the will of the white 
captor” (Yancy, 2016, p. 131). Or to take a related example, Joanna 
Bourke argues that the interpretation of the non-White body as 
incapable of feeling had a strong influence on medical practice with 
respect to the recognition and alleviation of patients’ pain. 22 As Bourke 
writes,  
 
The need to insist on the physical insensitivity of slaves did not 
diminish with the end of slavery. Quite the contrary. If hierarchies of 
labour and citizenship were to be retained, belief in the insensitivity of 
Black bodies was more necessary than ever. A year after Abraham’s 
Lincoln Emancipation Proclamation (...) anthropologist Karl Christoph 
Vogt provided a physiological justification for their continued abuse. 
Vogt’s Lectures on Man (1864) informed readers that ‘the Negro stands 
far below the white race’ in terms of the ‘acuteness of the senses’. (...) As 
one Howard University surgeon claimed in 1894, the ‘Negro’ possessed a 
‘lessened sensibility of his nervous system’ or, in the words of a 
gynaecologist in 1928, forceps were rarely needed when ‘colored women’ 
were giving birth because ‘their lessened sensibility to pain makes them 
slower to demand relief than white women’” (Bourke, 2014, p. 194) 
 
                                            
22 “It took until the 1980 for the routine underestimation of the sufferings of certain 
groups of people to be deemed scandalous and, even today, the under-medicalization of 
certain categories of patients continues to harm people in pain” (Bourke, 2014, p. 192) 
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In all these examples, the NC is at work. If certain patterns of emotion 
are a necessary condition of oppression, and if certain groups who might 
be considered oppressed fail to display them, it follows that they are not 
oppressed after all. They fail to exhibit one of the defining conditions of 
oppression. 
Summing up, the NC does not appear to be a plausible way of 
thinking about the connection between certain emotional patterns and 
oppression. The NC would force us to accept its corollary, that if these 
emotional patterns are absent there is no oppression. This seems 
unwarranted for two main reasons. Firstly, we would have to rule out 
what we ordinarily regard as cases of economic and political oppression, 
thus denying that they constitute serious harms in their own right. 
Secondly, appeals to the NC can be used to legitimate domination – as it 
has in fact happened. Therefore, it seems that we should reject the claim 
that certain emotional patters are a necessary condition of oppression.  
 
4.2.2 The Sufficiency Condition 
 
As for the SC, it seems at face value to be false. The main objection to it 
is that it does not allow us to distinguish real cases of oppression from 
false ones. A group of people could experience an emotional pattern, feel 
oppressed, and nevertheless be wrong in thinking that they are 
oppressed. 
Let’s take the example of Men’s Rights Activists (MRA), who 
consider themselves oppressed by women and by feminists in particular. 
Members of MRA groups could feel persistently humiliated and ashamed 
of losing power in a society that they perceive as favouring women. 
However, even if they were to suffer such emotional harms, it would be 
wrong to conclude that they are oppressed by feminists. A loss of social 
status may diminish people’s self-esteem in cases where they are not 
oppressed. 
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We seem, then, to have good grounds for rejecting both the view 
that certain patterns of emotion are sufficient for oppression, and the 
claim that they are necessary for it. The patterns of emotion we have 
identified are therefore not constitutive of oppression in the sense of 
being necessary or sufficient conditions for it. 
 
4.3 An explanatory account 
 
The difficulty in characterizing the connection between particular 
emotional attunements and oppression via necessary and sufficient 
conditions suggests that this may not be the best way to account for the 
link. Perhaps, then, we can make sense of the connection in some other 
way.  
While we cannot give a plausible account of a necessary 
connection between oppression and particular patterns of emotion, and 
while the existence of a pattern of emotion is clearly insufficient for 
oppression, we nevertheless have strong grounds for thinking that the 
link is not fortuitous. If the emotional patterns we have identified were 
merely accidental, we should not expect them to occupy such a persistent 
and central place in narratives of oppression. Nor should we expect 
oppressors to take the trouble to deny or misrepresent them. 
The attempt to give a logically oriented account of the link 
between patterns of emotion and oppression in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions therefore proves unfruitful. Instead, a bottom-up 
approach, based on the evidence offered by narratives of oppression, is 
arguably more illuminating. I propose the following hypothesis: the 
emotional patterns that are salient in narratives of oppression are non-
accidentally connected to oppression. Rather than trying to build my 
hypothesis into a formal definition, I will aim to provide an explanatory 
account of the non-accidental link between oppression and certain 
patterns of emotion.  
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Before I move on to show in more detail how certain patterns of 
emotions are non-accidentally connected to structures of oppression, I 
need to add a further remark about this non-accidental link. Since 
oppression is a complex phenomenon, since it intersects with other social 
categories such as religion and language, and since patterns of emotion 
are also far from simple, one might object that non-accidental links 
between patterns of emotion and oppression are too multifaceted to 
capture. This may be partly true, but it should not deter us from trying 
to analyse the connection, even if we are constrained to approach it in 
relatively general terms. Inevitably, I shall have to focus on the broad 
brush-strokes that organise the picture and will not be able to take 
account of its finer details. The account I am going to offer should be 
understood as an attempt to identify certain general features of the link 
between a pattern of emotion and oppression. It comes with the kind of 
warning that Lisa Tessman (2005) offers when introducing her 
investigation of oppression and systemic luck: 
 
Because social positioning is complicated and very few people can be 
described as fully occupying a position of dominance or alternatively as 
being subordinated in every possible way, analysis of how systemic luck 
affects any given person will be complex (...). Groups of people will be 
composed of individuals who differ from each other in socially significant 
ways, and generalizations about the group’s luck will be like any other 
generalizations about a social group, namely, they will probably fail to 
accurately apply to many group members. (...) However, that there is 
complexity to a society structured by multiple oppressions does not 
suggest that there is any randomness or lack of pattern to people’s 
experiences in the society. Thus, without necessarily being able to name 
the features of the patterns except through over generalizing, one can 
still assume the presence of patterns or systemic sources for experiences 
that have formative effects on the characters of people whose social 
positions are hard to capture by broad labels such as “working class”, 
“Asian-American”, “gay”, “able-bodied”, and so on (...). (Tessman, 2005, 
p. 5. My italics) 
 
The same point applies to my account. Whilst it is true that the 
emotional experiences I am concerned with are extraordinarily complex, 
I nevertheless contend that it is possible to use narratives and 
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phenomenological accounts to identify salient patterns of emotion that 
are non-accidentally connected to oppression. This non-accidental 
correlation should be understood in a flexible, non-deterministic way, 
allowing not only for exceptions, but also for variations in the way 
patterns of shame, guilt, fear, etc. are felt. 
By claiming that some emotions are non-accidentally connected to 
structures of oppression, I do not mean that all oppressed people 
experience them, without exception and in identical ways, or that if some 
oppressed people do not experience these emotions it follows that they 
are not oppressed (as the attempt to define necessary and sufficient 
conditions suggests). Rather, the notion of a non-accidental connection 
can be used to account for a general, non-deterministic tendency, which 
takes as a starting point the evidence presented in Chapter 2. If 
narratives of oppression have such a strong emotional content, and if, 
when accounting for the harm of oppression, its emotional element is so 
salient, we have reasons to conclude that these emotions are a 
characteristic feature of oppression, and that people who are oppressed 
tend to be emotionally attuned in particular ways. This non-
deterministic understanding of the link is closely tied to the nature of our 
object of study: if relations of oppression are historically changeable, the 
non-accidental correlations between oppression and emotion are likely to 
reflect those changes. 
 
4.3.1 Difficult cases: when emotions are thwarted 
 
As I have shown, the attempt to specify the relation between patterns of 
emotion and oppression in terms of necessary conditions runs into 
difficulty when faced with cases where emotional responses to oppression 
are impeded or blocked. To sustain the claim that an apparently absent 
pattern of emotion is a necessary condition of oppression, the theorist is 
forced to argue that, despite appearances, the pattern is present, 
although the subject is unable to recognise it. There may of course be 
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instances where this is true; but the claim that the concealed pattern of 
emotion must be present in all cases of oppression is, as I have argued, 
implausibly strong. The absence of the relevant pattern of emotion is not 
enough to rule out a case of oppression. 
The view that the connection between patterns of emotion and 
oppression is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is nevertheless non-
accidental, offers a more flexible way to understand the link, capable of 
accommodating exceptions and variations. As we shall see, there are 
undoubtedly exceptional cases that pose problems for any account. In the 
remainder of this chapter, however, I aim to show that these cases are 
less widespread than one might think. Some apparently exceptional 
cases are susceptible to explanation in the terms I am proposing, and 
illustrate the presence of a non-accidental connection between certain 
patterns of emotion or emotional attunements, and oppression.  
The difficult cases where a pattern of emotion is not acknowledged 
as such, or is unrecognised as contributing to a harm, can be spelled out 
as follows. A person may:  
 
● feel X and not recognise that she is feeling is X, as when someone 
is unaware of their shame, fear, guilt 
● feel X, recognise X, but not know why she feels X 
● feel X, recognise X, and know some, but not all of the salient 
reasons why she feels X 
 
I aim to show that my explanatory account provides the means to 
analyse these cases. Rather than constituting objections that might 
invalidate my claim, or random cases that fall outside its explanatory 
scope, cases such as these provide further evidence for it. 
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4.3.1.1 A reduced awareness 
 
When oppression involves harm, it is extremely difficult, as we have 
seen, to understand how the harm can remain completely unfelt. But it 
can be relatively unfelt in various ways. For example, the feeling that 
one is being harmed may be made less painful by a compensating 
circumstance, such as the fact that the oppressive situation intersects 
with a privileged one that brings with it a range of benefits. Or the 
feelings associated with being harmed may be impeded, or too confused 
to recognise, as when they are denied, repressed, or ideologically 
redescribed. In such cases, theorists are sometimes inclined to say that 
agents lack emotional awareness of their own oppression. 
The apparently paradoxical condition of being oppressed and not 
being aware of one’s oppression has been accounted for in several ways 
throughout the history of political thought. In the Early Modern period 
and during the eighteenth century, oppressed people’s ignorance of their 
own condition was sometimes attributed to “prejudice” (for instance by 
Mary Wollstonecraft, Gabrielle Suchon and Poullain de la Barre). In the 
Marxian tradition, this lack of awareness is explained as an alienating 
effect of the ideology that sustains relations of domination in capitalism, 
and one aspect of this alienation is accounted for through the notion of 
“false consciousness”. (When presenting the case of Mayotte Capécia, 
Franz Fanon characterises it as a case of alienation and mystification.) 
Feminist and Critical Race theories have also paid attention to 
mechanisms of internalisation – the process through which the 
oppressed internalise the oppressors’ norms and beliefs (for example the 
male gaze and/or the White gaze).  
Where some theorists argue that members of oppressed groups 
are not really oppressed because they do not think of themselves as 
oppressed, theories of domination have shown that one characteristic of 
oppression is precisely that it is often cognitively unavailable to those 
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who suffer it. In other words, what seems a paradox of oppression is 
entailed by the very logic of domination. The same is true, I shall argue, 
of the emotional aspects of oppression. Just as members of oppressed 
groups may have a reduced cognitive awareness of their oppression, so 
they may also exhibit forms of emotional unawareness or insensitivity. 
In the next section I shall examine cases where oppressed people can be 
described as partly unattuned to some of the emotional patterns that we 
have identified as typical of oppression. I shall show how these failures 
of attunement can be shaped and reinforced by ideological constructs 
that operate at the service of oppression. 
 
4.3.1.2 Compensatory mechanisms 
 
The failure of oppressed people to experience the patterns of emotion 
typical of oppression may sometimes be a strategy, consciously or 
unconsciously adopted in order to survive an oppressive situation, or in 
order to cope with it while preserving some degree of psychic integrity. 
The paradigmatic example of this kind of case is Stockholm syndrome, 
where the victim appears neither to hate or fear the aggressor, but 
instead develops feelings of love and gratitude towards them. It would be 
wrong, surely, to argue that since the victim feels love she is not really 
oppressed. Instead, love can be seen as a coping strategy for 
guaranteeing the victim’s mental and physical preservation. 
Stockholm syndrome is a relatively temporary compensatory 
strategy adopted in extreme situations involving an aggressor and a 
victim. It aims to explain an interpersonal dynamic between two 
individuals rather than the more extensive social and political forms of 
oppression with which I am concerned. However, in these latter cases, 
we also find shared coping strategies involving the denial, repression, or 
even transmutation of painful emotions in order to preserve the subject’s 
psychological balance. More radically, these strategies may serve to 
make a person’s material conditions endurable. For example, a woman 
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who lacks economic autonomy may repress some of her emotions in order 
to endure a marriage on which her physical survival depends.  
In her essay “Feeding Egos and Tending Wounds”, Bartky (1990) 
analyses the dynamic of unequal heterosexual relationships through 
Arlie Hochschild’s (2012) notion of “emotional labour”. Within the 
heterosexual couple, women are typically placed in the role of caregiver: 
they provide their male partners with emotional support and care that is 
usually not reciprocated. By contrast, men absorb and use women’s care 
in order to devote themselves to socially and economically rewarding 
activities. Such unreciprocated emotional work typically has 
disempowering effects for women23. Bartky, however, describes some of 
the strategies through which “women’s provision of emotional 
sustenance to men may feel empowering and hence contradict, on a 
purely phenomenal level, what may be its objectively disempowering 
character” (Bartky, 1990, p. 114).  
These strategies are not entirely unlike Stockholm syndrome, 
insofar as many women live their situation in a mystified way by 
adhering to “the world according to him”: 
 
To support and succour a person is, typically, to enter feelingly into that 
person’s world; it is to see things from his point of view, to enter 
imaginatively into what he takes to be real and true (Bartky, 1990, p. 
111)  
 
Thus, some women may find satisfaction in feeling pride for their male 
partner’s achievements, to which they have contributed through 
caregiving and self-sacrifice:  
 
Women have responded in a number of ways to men’s refusal of 
recognition. A woman may merge with her man psychologically to such 
an extent that she just claims as her own the joys and sorrows he 
narrates on occasions of caretaking. She now no longer needs to resent 
                                            
23 We may think here of the cases of now well documented depression and alcoholism 
that many housewives suffered during the 1950, whose experience Betty Friedan picks 
up in The Feminine Mystique (1963). 
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his indifference to her doings, for his doings have just become her 
doings. (Bartky, 1990, p. 110) 
 
Or again, 
 
(...) it is worth asking to what extent the merging of the consciousness of 
the woman with the object of her emotional care may be a strategy 
adopted in adult life to avoid anger and the disruption of a relationship 
(...) (Bartky, 1990, p. 110) 
 
Living in “the world according to him” may have been a particularly 
pervasive compensatory mechanism among White, middle-class women 
during the 1950 and 1960s, when the imperative to be a “good happy 
housewife” became particularly strong. It is part of the phenomenon that 
Betty Friedan described as “the feminine mystique”. Looking back at the 
years and experiences that motivated her famous study, Betty Friedan 
(1998) gives some examples of how the image of the “happy housewife” 
was used to repress expression of sadness and other negative, 
disempowering emotions, to which this way of life “condemned” women: 
 
In March 1949, the Ladies’ Home Journal printed the prototype of the 
innumerable paeans to “Occupation: Housewife” that were to flood the 
women’s magazines into the sixties. It began with a woman complaining 
that when she has to write ‘housewife’ on the census blank, she gets an 
inferiority complex. (“When I write it I realize that here I am, a middle-
aged woman, with a university education, and I’ve never made anything 
out of my life. I’m just a housewife”). Then the author of the reply, who 
somehow never is a housewife (in this case Dorothy Thompson, 
newspaperwoman, foreign correspondent, famous columnist), roars with 
laughter. The trouble with you, she scolds, is that you don’t realize that 
you are an expert in a dozen careers, simultaneously. (...) But still, the 
housewife complains, I’m nearly fifty and I’ve never done what I hoped 
to do in my youth -music. I’ve wasted my college education.  
 Ho-ho, laughs Miss Thompson, aren’t your children musical 
because of you, and all those struggling years while your husband was 
finishing his great work, didn’t you keep a charming house on $3,000 a 
year and paper the living room yourself, and watch the market like a 
hawk for bargains? (...) “But all that’s vicarious living-through others” 
the housewife sighs. “As vicarious as Napoleon Bonaparte”, Miss 
Thompson scoffs, “or a queen. I simply refuse to share your self-pity. 
You are one of the most successful women I know” (Friedan, 1998, p. 10) 
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Miss Thompson’s way of dismissing the housewife’s feelings of low self-
esteem is one of the many instruments serving gender oppression. On 
this note, Friedan narrates another example of hostile or angry reactions 
to her Feminine Mystique (1963). In a television program called Girl 
Talk, the hostess of the program, Virginia Graham, encouraged women 
to keep fulfilling the role of wives and mothers without aspiring to more: 
“What better things can we do with our lives than to do the dishes for 
those we love?” (Friedan, 1998, p. 20) Friedan describes Graham as 
invested in enforcing a form of sexism from which she does not suffer 
insofar as she is not a housewife, and from reaping certain benefits by 
sustaining oppression. Participating in the program, Friedan turns to 
the camera and challenges Graham’s message: “Women, don’t listen to 
her. She needs you out there doing the dishes, or she wouldn’t have the 
captive audience for this television program”. As she adds in her essay, 
“I realized then that this kind of ‘career woman’ didn’t really identify 
with other women at all. For her, there were three kinds of people in the 
world – men, other women, and herself.” (Friedan, 1998, p. 20)  
Whilst her critique of the disempowering myth of the happy 
housewife was recognised and joyfully received by a vast number of 
women, there were also people who perceived it as a threat. It prompted 
anger and defensiveness in women who had – exceptionally – escaped 
the “mystique”, and in housewives who denied being burdened by their 
social roles.  
 
The emotions that book stirred up in women were not simple. In 
addition to the dozens, then hundreds, by now thousands of letters of 
relief, I received many angry letters from women. In fact, I would hear 
of cocktail parties being broken up by women arguing over my book who 
hadn’t even read it, who in fact seemed afraid to read it. I would hear 
later that such a woman, attacking me as a destroyer-of-the-family, an 
enemy-of-motherhood, a betrayer-of-femininity, would finally be driven 
by her own problems that she hadn’t dare face before to go back to 
school, or to look for a job – and she would be passing my book around to 
her neighbors. I decided that women were sitting on such painful 
feelings that they didn’t dare open the lid unless they knew that they 
were going to be able to do something about them. (Friedan, It Changed 
My Life: Writings on the Women's Movement, 1998, p. 20)  
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The kind of cases that exemplify Bartky’s analysis of living in “the world 
according to him”, and those described by Friedan as part of the 
“feminine mystique” may therefore involve explicitly denying that one 
feels emotionally disempowered by oppression. Disempowering emotions 
may be blocked through compensating mechanisms such as taking pride 
and satisfaction in the success and happiness of others. The mobilization 
of figures within the social imaginary (such as the “happy housewife” or 
the “happy slave”) may function as a screen that prevents the oppressed 
from recognizing their own social and emotional malaise.  
Systems of oppression are also sustained by mechanisms of 
punishment and reward designed to obtain voluntary obedience. In his 
autobiographical narrative, Frederick Douglass analyses how this way of 
distributing privileges among the oppressed may alter the quality of 
their emotional experience of oppression:  
 
Few privileges were esteemed higher, by the slaves of the out-farms, 
than that of being selected to do errands at the Great House Farm. It 
was associated in their minds with greatness. A representative could 
not be prouder of his election to a seat in the American Congress, than a 
slave on one of the out-farms would be of his election to do errands at 
the Great House Farm. They regarded it as evidence of great confidence 
reposed in them by their overseers; and it was on this account, as well 
as a constant desire to be out of the field from under the driver’s lash, 
that they esteemed it a high privilege, one worth careful living for. (...) 
The slaves selected to go to the Great Farm House, for the monthly 
allowance for themselves and their fellow slaves, were peculiarly 
enthusiastic. While on their way, they would make the dense old woods, 
for miles around, reverberate with their wild songs, revealing at once 
the highest joy and the deepest sadness. They would compose and sing 
as they went along, consulting neither time nor tune. (...) Into all of 
their songs they would manage to weave something of the Great House 
Farm. Especially would they do this, when leaving home. They would 
then sing most exultingly the following words: 
 
“I am going away to the Great House Farm! 
O, yea! O, yea! O!” (Douglass, 2016, p. 12)  
 
As Douglass shows, a slaveholder or someone interested in maintaining 
slavery could take those songs and their expressions of pride, joy and 
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enthusiasm as evidence that the oppressed are happy, that they are not 
burdened by sad and disempowering emotions such as shame, fear, guilt, 
or hopelessness. Douglass is well aware that this is how the oppressors 
instrumentalize slaves’ expressions of emotion:  
 
I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find 
persons who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of 
their contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a 
greater mistake. Slaves sing most when they are most unhappy. The 
songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved 
by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears. At least such is 
my experience. I have often sung to drown my sorrow, but seldom to 
express my happiness. Crying for joy, and singing for joy. Were alike 
uncommon to me while in the jaws of slavery. The singing of a man cast 
away upon a desolate island might be as appropriately considered as 
evidence of contentment and happiness, as the singing of a slave; the 
songs of the one and of the other are prompted by the same emotion. 
(Douglass, 2016, p. 13)  
 
If, as these examples suggest, the oppressed repress or compensate for 
their negative emotions – by taking pride in the joy of others, for 
instance, or in the crumbs of privilege handed out to them – their own 
shame and fear may remain in important ways unconscious or 
unacknowledged. The extent to which such patterns of emotion are 
repressed may vary depending on the circumstances. In some cases, they 
may be buried deeply in the psyche, in others they may lie near the 
surface. In either case, they can be suppressed by the mechanisms we’ve 
discussed.  
 
4.3.1.3 Raising awareness and the intensification of emotions 
 
The image of bringing patterns of emotion to the surface offers a familiar 
way to think about resistance to oppression. One of the practices that 
relies on it is consciousness-raising, which aims to enhance a groups’ 
collective awareness of their oppression. Consciousness-raising groups, 
which were an important part of anti-sexist and anti-racist struggles 
during the 1960, were not only about becoming “cognitively aware” of 
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oppression. Gaining knowledge of oppression also meant learning to 
recognize the emotional experience it involved and learning to resist it 
through “affective work”.  
The forms of emotional unawareness we have discussed help to 
explain why oppression is not always felt as an emotional burden. As a 
result, gaining consciousness of one’s oppression may be initially felt as 
an intensification of the feeling of oppression. One may experience an 
increasing sense of shame or fear, for example, and thus of sadness: 
 
We could describe consciousness raising as raising consciousness of 
unhappiness. As Gayle Greene argues, “For though education raised 
women’s expectations, it also made them unhappy, creating ambitions 
that were frustrated by the rigid domestic ideology that urged them 
back into the home” (1991: 9; emphasis added). Indeed, you have to 
experience limitations as limitations; the act of noticing limitations can 
actually make life seem more rather than less limited. If the world does 
not allow you to embrace the possibilities that are opened up by 
education, then you become even more aware of the injustice of such 
limitations. (...) There can be sadness simply in the realization of what 
one has given up. Feminist archives are thus full of housewives 
becoming conscious of unhappiness as a mood that seems to surround 
them: think of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway. (Ahmed, The Promise of 
Happiness, 2010, p. 70) 
 
Gaining awareness of oppression may be gaining awareness of sad, 
disempowering emotions. Up to that point, the person concerned need 
not have thought of herself as “happy”; but she will also not have 
thought of herself as “unhappy”, “sad”, “ashamed”, “fearful” or 
“hopeless”. Rather, the disempowering feelings of oppression may 
“surround” the subject before she is able to recognize her suffering. 
Consider the case of Mrs Dalloway as it is analysed by Sara Ahmed: 
 
The feeling [of unhappiness] is certainly around, almost as a thickness 
in the air. We sense the unhappiness seeping through the tasks of the 
everyday. There she is, about to get flowers, enjoying her walk in 
London. (...) For Clarissa this rather uncanny sensation of becoming 
Mrs Dalloway as a loss of possibility, as an unbecoming, or becoming 
“nothing at all” does not enter her consciousness in the form of sadness 
about something. The sadness of the book (...) is not one expressed as a 
point of view. Instead, each sentence of the book takes thoughts and 
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feelings as if they are objects in a shared world: the streets of London, 
the very oddness of the occasion of passing others by, a feeling of that 
oddness. (Ahmed, 2010, p. 71)  
 
Mrs Dalloway is unaware of her sadness, busily distracted with 
preparing a party. But it is during that party that she becomes 
dramatically aware of her own unhappiness. The death of Septimus, a 
man unknown to her, irrupts into her life as a revelation of her own 
suffering: 
 
What is striking about Mrs Dalloway is how suffering has to enter her 
consciousness from the edges, through the arrival of another, another 
who is an intruder, who has not been invited to the party. It is the 
suffering of an intruder that exposes the emptiness of life’s chatter. 
Suffering enters not as self-consciousness – as a consciousness of one’s 
own suffering – but as a heightening of consciousness, a world 
consciousness in which the suffering of those who do not belong is 
allowed to disturb an atmosphere. Even when unhappiness is a familiar 
feeling, it can arrive like a stranger, to disturb the familiar or to reveal 
what is disturbing in the familiar. (Ahmed, 2010, p. 75) 
 
Perhaps if one could have asked Mrs Dalloway if she felt oppressed, sad, 
unhappy, or limited by the constraints of her life before that revelatory 
moment, she would have denied this. The way in which her unhappiness 
is revealed to her through the death of a stranger, notes Ahmed,  
 
might teach us about the difficulty of becoming conscious of suffering or 
teach us about our own resistances to recognizing those seemingly ‘little’ 
uneasy feelings of loss or dissatisfaction as unhappiness with one’s life. 
(Ahmed, 2010, p. 75) 
 
Therefore, there are many cases in which those who are oppressed may 
be unaware of the emotional impact that oppression has. One may 
repress, deny, participate in forms of reproduction of oppression by 
policing how other peers should accept their lot, use compensatory 
mechanisms, or busily distract oneself from life’s dissatisfactions, as Mrs 
Dalloway does. These may all be instances by which people have a 
reduced subjective experience of oppression in its emotional aspects. So, 
it is not because people deny having these negative emotional 
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experiences, or seem to be “happy”, that the latter are merely “absent”, 
or that they are not emotionally harmed by oppression. 
 
4.3.1.4 Difficulties connecting the dots 
 
A final case of a variety of “emotional unawareness” has to do more 
directly with the difficulties of “connecting the dots” between 
experiencing some of the characteristic emotional aspects of oppression 
and political structures. The oppressed person may feel fear, shame, or 
guilt because the oppressive structure provokes those feelings; they may 
nevertheless be unaware of the relationship between the oppressive 
structure and those emotions. For example, someone may judge that her 
feelings are merely private phenomena, independent of political 
relations and structures of power. We can see this sort of mystification in 
the way some women narrate how they once perceived their own 
experiences as something shameful or inadequate, believing their shame 
was a natural consequence of their personal inadequacy. Once they 
joined feminist movements that involved consciousness-raising groups, 
and acquired a fuller sense of the meaning of their experience, the 
feelings they thought of as merely personal came to be seen as a 
collective phenomenon, as the product of systematic sexist oppression.  
For example, in the documentary She’s Beautiful When She’s 
Angry (Dore, 2014), some of the women involved in the feminist 
movement of the 1960 and 1970 explain how important it was for them 
to recognize their feelings through collective sharing of experiences: “We 
don’t even realize what goes on until we sit and compare with other 
women”, says an unidentified woman during one of those meetings. In 
the same documentary, the poet Susan Griffin recounts how, in those 
sessions, listening and telling where emotionally charged: “And we 
heard each other. We heard each other into speech. You could sense it, 
you could feel it. You could cut it with a knife, as they say. The room was 
electric with whatever was going to be shared”. In another part of the 
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documentary, journalist Susan Brownmiller tells how collective sharing 
was important to “connect the dots” between her experience, her feelings 
and socio-political structures: “So I said… I’ve had three abortions. And 
the last one was within the last year. And I started to cry, because I 
suddenly understood that I wasn’t alone, [and] that what I had 
considered personal embarrassment was something that was part of this 
whole larger experience”.  
These testimonies suggest that the unawareness among oppressed 
people of the meaning of their emotional patterns is often related to 
their isolation – to not being part of a community that is aware of 
common experiences of oppression. In consciousness-raising groups, we 
also see how gaining awareness of oppression is inseparably cognitive 
and affective: by relating an experience that was emotionally loaded, by 
sharing the emotional contents and recognizing that others share one’s 
experiences and feelings, consciousness of the harms of oppression is 
raised. 
The difficulty in connecting the dots – between one’s emotional 
experience and political structures – may also be due to a lack of 
conceptual tools. The concepts and ideas that enable individuals to make 
sense of their experiences in moral and political terms may be socially 
unavailable. Often, the oppressed have had to create the concepts that 
name the harms they felt, before they were able to conceptualise them. 
(Friedan famously referred to the mystique as “the problem that has no 
name”). Well-known examples of such concepts are “sex discrimination” 
and “sexual harassment”. Before these concepts became socially current, 
before they captured the collective experiences of abuse suffered by 
women in the workplace and other areas24, the emotional consequences 
of these particular forms of oppression were lived with a mix of denial 
and confusion. Women would tell themselves, for example, that “boys 
will be boys”, that one ought not to “make a fuss” about it, that it must 
                                            
24 This is what Fricker (2007) conceptualises as “hermeneutic injustice”.  
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be somehow their fault as women. In other words, the emotions 
remained personalised and individualised in a way that was 
disempowering: 
 
Shortly after 1949, I was fired from my job because I was pregnant 
again. They weren’t about to put up with the inconvenience of another 
year’s maternity leave, even though I was entitled to it under my union 
contract. It was unfair, wrong somehow to fire me just because I was 
pregnant, and to hire a man instead. I even tried calling a meeting of 
the people in the union where I worked. It was the first personal stirring 
of my own feminism, I guess. But the other women were just 
embarrassed, and the men uncomprehending. It was my own fault, 
getting pregnant again, a personal matter, not something you should 
take to the union. There was no word in 1949 for “sex discrimination”. 
(Friedan, 1998, p. 17)  
 
Sara Ahmed notes how consciousness-raising also involves “passing 
books around”. In feminist consciousness-raising groups that were, as 
noted, primarily White and middle-class, gaining awareness of gender 
oppression entailed acknowledging the arbitrariness of restrictions of 
possibility: recognizing oppression, for White middle-class women, often 
meant recognizing what they could have done or been if they had been 
men. For Black women, however, recognizing oppression did not merely 
amount to acknowledging these restrictions. As Ahmed notes, middle-
class White women expressed their frustration as women “who should be 
happy because they have what promises happiness”, but Black women 
were “already imagined as being unhappy, as lacking the very qualities 
and attributes that would make a life good” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 80). 
Repression, denial might take here other possible forms, as we have seen 
with Toni Morrison’s character Pecola, which Ahmed also analyses:  
 
Pecola, in wanting happiness, wants what is attributed as the cause of 
happiness: the bluest eyes. (...) To be conscious of unhappiness is to be 
conscious of being ‘not’, or of being ‘un’, as lacking the qualities or 
attributes of happiness. (Ahmed, 2010, p. 82) 
 
Even in the cases above, which appear to give clear evidence that 
oppression at least partly shapes the emotional life of the oppressed, we 
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can see that recognition of these emotions is not necessarily transparent 
from the beginning. These testimonies also show how the oppressed 
sometimes struggle to make sense of these emotions, and that there are 
social mechanisms internalised by the subjects, as well as forms of self-
doubt, which may impede or make recognition of emotions otherwise 
difficult. 
The denial of these emotional aspects, and the fact of gaining 
awareness of it, is a common feature of the experience of oppression. 
Even though there may be “sadness in becoming conscious not only of 
gender as the restriction of possibility, but also of how this restriction is 
not necessary” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 75), this is not the only emotional 
outcome of gaining awareness of oppression: the oppressed may feel 
relief and a joy in knowing that the possibilities of one’s world need not 
be restricted. 
These are examples of situations in which the apparent absence of 
certain emotions, which we take to be typically part of oppression, is to 
be viewed with suspicion. Rather than presenting an obstacle to my 
hypothesis, such cases stand as further evidence that oppression 
requires coping mechanisms, precisely because it involves particularly 
painful emotional experiences. Emotional dynamics can be very complex; 
consequently, we should be attentive to the risks of producing 
caricatures or stereotypical accounts of the ways in which oppression is 
emotionally constituted. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the connection between patterns of 
emotion and oppression is not to be understood in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. We can conceive of an individual or a group as 
materially oppressed without feeling the emotional burdens of 
oppression. Similarly, it is possible to imagine that some people may feel 
emotionally burdened without actually being oppressed. 
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However, from the fact that it is possible to conceive oppression 
without its corresponding emotional aspects, we should not conclude 
that these emotional aspects are irrelevant. In fact, if we rely on the 
narratives presented in Chapter 2, we may conclude that the emotional 
component is a key aspect of oppression. There is, I think, a non-
accidental correlation between being oppressed and experiencing 
particular kinds of affective phenomena, where these phenomena are 
prevalent features of oppression. I have given special attention to the 
complexities of the affective mechanisms at play, where some emotions 
may be repressed or counterbalanced by others, or are not experienced in 
a transparent, straightforward way. The phenomenality of emotions 
requires complex reading. I have aimed to show how these complex cases 
offer further evidence of the fact that oppression tends to involve 
negative, disempowering emotions, and that people may therefore 
develop strategies such as denial, repression, and misrecognition to cope 
with them.
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5. The emotional patterns of whiteness 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on the emotional patterns of the oppressed. 
However, as I argued in Chapter 1, structural oppression cannot be fully 
understood without its essential counterpart, structural privilege. Just 
as structures of oppression partly shape the emotional patterns of the 
oppressed, structures of privilege configure the emotional character of 
oppressors. In addition to analysing the complicity of the oppressed in 
perpetuating their oppression, it is therefore necessary, as Barbara 
Applebaum has argued, to shed light on the processes through which the 
privileged sustain oppressive structures25. Before Applebaum, Toni 
Morrison (1992) detected an imbalance in the degree of attention given 
to those who reproduce racism in comparison to those who suffer it:  
 
A good deal of time and intelligence has been invested in the exposure of 
racism and the horrific results on its objects. (...) But that well-
established study should be joined with another, equally important one: 
the impact of racism in those who perpetuate it. It seems both poignant 
and striking how avoided and unanalyzed is the effect of racist inflection 
on the subject. (...) The scholarship that looks into the mind, 
imagination, and behavior of slaves is valuable. But equally valuable is 
a serious intellectual effort to see what racial ideology does to the mind, 
imagination, and behavior of masters. (Morrison, 1992, pp. 11–12)  
 
Recent work in Critical Philosophy of Race aims to unveil the impact of 
structural oppression and privilege on patterns of thought and 
behaviour related to whiteness. Under the heading of white ignorance 
                                            
25 “In the last several years, the notion of complicity has also been a recurrent theme in 
critical theories of race and racism, as well as in feminist theory. Questions about 
complicity have arisen in discussions around ‘internalized racism’ and, especially, in 
debates about whether victims of racism can be implicated in their own oppressions. 
Feminist theorists who have tried to understand how women can perpetuate their own 
oppression have also turned their attention to questions of complicity. Recently, 
however, another type of complicity has appeared in the scholarship that focuses on the 
ways that the systematically privileged, rather than the marginalized, are complicit in 
the perpetuation of systemic injustice”. (Applebaum, 2010, p. 2) 
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(Mills, 1998), epistemologies of ignorance have made an important 
contribution to identifying the cognitive, conscious and unconscious 
beliefs of those who are racialized and self-identify as White. However, 
as Shannon Sullivan (2006) and José Medina (2013a) argue, white 
ignorance also has affective and embodied dimensions that deserve 
greater attention. In other words, the ways in which the privileged 
sustain oppression also has emotional aspects. In this chapter I examine 
the emotional patterns non-accidentally connected to white privilege.  
 
5.2 Questions of method 
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that narratives and descriptions of experiences of 
oppression provide substantial evidence for the claim that pervasive 
patterns of disempowering emotions such as shame, guilt and fear are 
non-accidentally connected to being oppressed. However, turning to 
those in positions of privilege, we may also ask ourselves how we are to 
examine their emotional patterns. While the oppressed have profusely 
documented their experience through written narratives and other forms 
of expression (music, dance, visual arts), it seems that those in dominant 
positions do not produce such a rich array of narratives. In general, 
living a privileged life does not seem to compel the privileged to make 
sense of their experience in their writings and other cultural creations. 
As we found in chapters 2 and 3, there are narratives that seek to justify 
and legitimize domination, such as those produced by white nationalist 
and masculinist groups. These narratives tell a particular story about 
the “White Nation”, for example, and which bodies are included within, 
and which deemed to pose a threat. But these narratives do not of course 
present structures of white and male domination as unfair, or as 
“privilege”. Rather, the narratives produced by white nationalist and 
masculinist groups often use the language of victimhood and claim that 
White men are oppressed by those who are actually systematically 
disadvantaged. Some supremacist groups claim to be oppressed by 
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affirmative action and political correctness; white masculinist groups see 
themselves as oppressed by feminism and advances in women’s rights. 
Such people take themselves to be oppressed although objectively they 
are not. In some cases they may be oppressed, but not by the groups they 
blame for their oppression. These narratives are, therefore, reactionary, 
in the traditional sense of the word; they are articulated in reaction to 
political and social progress. In Sara Ahmed’s terms, they are the 
expression of a “worrying whiteness”, or, we could add, a “worrying 
heteronormative masculinity”, which fears that “‘others’ may threaten 
[their] existence” (Ahmed, 2004c) 
Apart from these reactionary narratives, it seems that the 
privileged are, broadly speaking, less compelled to explore the ways 
their life is shaped by privilege, presumably because this recognition 
would entail a commitment to dismantling the very system from which 
they reap benefits. Recognition of this is, of course, not impossible for 
members of privileged groups, but there may be powerful cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms that inhibit them from acknowledging, for 
example, how many positive aspects of their lives are parasitic upon the 
oppression of others. One of the characteristics of privilege is that it is in 
many ways invisible to those who benefit from it. 
 
5.2.1 What the oppressed tell us about the emotions of oppressors 
 
When the privileged (men or White subjects in general) have produced 
critical accounts of their own condition, their analyses are often indebted 
to the critique and resistance articulated by oppressed groups. Sara 
Ahmed notes that one may trace different genealogies of the relatively 
recent scholarship on whiteness studies. Noting the narcissistic gesture 
of recentering whiteness in some streams in whiteness studies, as well 
as in Whites’ anti-racist projects, Ahmed insists on the importance of 
framing whiteness studies as preceded by the critique of whiteness as 
articulated, for example, by Black feminists:  
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Any critical genealogy of whiteness studies, for me, must begin with the 
direct political address of Black feminists such as Lorde, rather than 
later work by white academics on representations of whiteness or on 
how white people experience their whiteness (Frankenburg, 1993; Dyer. 
1997). This is not to say that such work is not important. But such work 
needs to be framed as following from the earlier critique. Whiteness 
studies, that is, if it is to be more than ‘about’ whiteness, begins with the 
Black critique of how whiteness works as a form of racial privilege, as 
well as the effects of that privilege on the bodies of those who are 
recognised as black. As Lorde shows us, the production of whiteness 
works precisely by assigning race to others: to study whiteness, as a 
racialised position, is hence already to contest its dominance, how it 
functions as a ‘mythical norm’ (Ahmed, 2004c, p. 1) 
 
The same observation could be applied to studies of masculinity. 
Without the feminist and Queer critiques and struggles, the 
problematization of male privilege and of masculinity as an identity 
would probably not have been articulated and taken up by a sector of cis-
gender, heterosexual men. This points in the direction of what theorists 
in critical philosophy of race have identified as certain cognitive and 
affective limitations related to positions of social privilege. In general 
terms, privileged groups tend to lack lucidity and insight regarding, for 
example, who the oppressed are; how they, the privileged, are perceived 
by the oppressed; and what effect their ways of being and behaving tend 
to have on the oppressed. On the whole, there is therefore a reduced 
awareness and self-awareness that may be common to privileged groups. 
While the oppressed are forced to develop a double-consciousness 
because of the circumstances in which they are placed, the oppressors 
are liable to have a limited and more distorted perspective on 
themselves as a result of their privileged position. Charles Mills (2017) 
has called this “epistemic asymmetry”: 
 
In his introduction to a collection of black writers’ perspectives on 
whiteness, David Roediger (1998) underlines the fundamental epistemic 
asymmetry between typical white views of blacks and typical black 
views of whites: these are not cognizers linked by a reciprocal ignorance 
but rather groups whose respective privilege and subordination tend to 
produce self-deception, bad faith, evasion, and misrepresentation, on the 
one hand, and more veridical perceptions, on the other hand. Thus he 
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cites James Weldon Johnson’s remark ‘colored people of this country 
know and understand the white people better than the white people 
know and understand them’. Often for their very survival, blacks have 
been forced to become lay anthropologists, studying the strange culture, 
customs, and mind-set of the ‘white tribe’ that has such frightening 
power over them, that in certain time periods can even determine their 
life or death on a whim. (Mills, 2017, p. 53) 
 
In a similar vein, as discussed in Chapter 2, feminist standpoint 
epistemology and Black feminist theories have theorized the “epistemic 
advantage” that the oppressed possess in virtue of their social location26, 
compared with the relatively impoverished insight of the oppressors, 
who are less well placed to understand not only the concrete situations 
faced by the oppressed, but also their world: 
 
The practices of the dominant groups (for instance, men) govern a 
society; the dominated group (for instance, women) must acquire some 
fluency with these practices in order to survive in that society. There is 
no similar pressure on members of the dominant group to acquire 
knowledge of the practices of the dominated groups. For instance, 
colonized people had to learn the language and culture of their 
colonizers. The colonizers seldom found it necessary to have more than a 
sketchy acquaintance with the language and culture of the ‘natives’. 
Thus, the oppressed are seen as having an ‘epistemic advantage’ 
because they can operate with two sets of practices and in two different 
contexts. This advantage is thought to lead to critical insights because 
each framework provides a critical perspective on the other. (Narayan, 
1989, pp. 265–266) 
 
However, as Uma Narayan (1989)convincingly points out, claims about 
the relative epistemic advantages of the oppressed need to be nuanced, 
and, as I have discussed in previous chapters, there are forms of 
alienation and mystification in the experience of oppression. She 
contends that the “double vision” of the oppressed is not a guarantee for 
lucidity. It may have its downsides and, therefore, claims about 
                                            
26 For a nuanced discussion of the notion of ‘epistemic privilege’, see (Narayan, 1989): 
“Our commitment to the contextual nature of knowledge does not require us to claim 
that those who do not inhabit these contexts can never have any knowledge of them. 
But this commitment does permit us to argue that it is easier and more likely for the 
oppressed to have critical insights into the conditions of their own oppression than it is 
for those who live outside these structures” (p. 264)  
148 
 
epistemic privilege should be tempered in order not to reify or fetishize 
the perspective of the oppressed:  
 
Feminist theory must be temperate in the use it makes of this doctrine 
of ‘double vision’ – the claim that oppressed groups have an epistemic 
advantage and access to greater critical conceptual space. Certain types 
and contexts of oppression certainly may bear out the truth of this 
claim. Others certainly do not seem to do so; and even if they do provide 
space for critical insights, they may also rule out the possibility of 
actions subversive of the oppressive state of affairs (...). The thesis that 
oppression may bestow an epistemic advantage should not tempt us in 
the direction of idealizing or romanticizing oppression and blind us to its 
real material and psychic deprivations. (Narayan, 1989, pp. 267–268) 
 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that the oppressed have 
greater insight into the emotional patterns of their oppressors than the 
oppressors have of their own complicity in sustaining oppression. I shall 
take the critical perspective of the oppressed as the basis for my analysis 
of the emotional patterns that are non-accidentally connected to 
privilege. This material allows us to identify how structural privilege 
partly shapes the emotional lives of oppressors, and how the emotional 
investments of the privileged sustain oppressive structures. 
 
5.3 Whiteness and white ignorance 
 
5.3.1 Whiteness 
 
Before I examine the emotional patterns that are non-accidentally 
linked to white privilege, it is important to specify what I mean by 
“whiteness”. I shall use this term to refer to aspects of racial white 
privilege. Whiteness does not stand for an essence based on physio-
biological phenomena, nor is it a rigid category of identity merely based 
on skin colour. Although some aspects of whiteness are the object of 
empirical study “with an approximate date of emergence, a set of ethnic 
correlations, a history, and various economic and political correlations” 
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(Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness, 2015, p. 76), I shall focus on imaginary 
whiteness and subjective whiteness, drawing on Linda Alcoff’s (2015) 
discussion of these distinctions. Paying attention to imaginary and 
subjective aspects of whiteness may help us understanding how subjects 
who are racialized as White – and who therefore have white privilege – 
are emotionally invested in sustaining oppressive racist structures. 
Alcoff uses the notion of imaginary whiteness to refer to “the 
realm of mythic imagery and the relatively unconscious ways in which 
people have affective and dispositional attitudes about whiteness” 
(Alcoff, 2015, p. 78). Distancing herself from the Freudian tradition, she 
draws on the inflexion that feminist philosophers have given this notion:  
 
I prefer the way that feminist philosophers Michele Le Doeuff (1990) 
and Moira Gatens (1995) have used the imaginary to denote a collective 
rather than individual background layer of understandings and 
dispositions that both enables and constrains our ability to produce new 
ideas and responses. (Alcoff, 2015, pp. 78–79)  
 
The white imaginary is for example evoked by the US flag: 
 
To understand the meanings and effects of the stars and stripes, it will 
never be sufficient merely to detail its history or its current institutional 
uses; we need also to consider the visual and ideational connotations 
and affective elements that the flag engenders for diverse groups and 
individuals. When we see the flag, do we imagine George Washington, 
or Fort Sumter (the site of the start of the US Civil War), soldiers in 
World War II or in Iraq, or the flag that flies over various colonial sites, 
from Guam to Panama to the Virgin Islands? (Alcoff, 2015, p. 79) 
 
Another way that whiteness operates in the cultural imaginary is 
through notions that contribute to the production of a distorted history, 
such as the notion of “discovery” when referring to the violent European 
colonization of America: “What actually occurred was less a discovery 
than an encounter between several cultures followed rather quickly by 
invasion, genocide, enslavement, and the annexation of lands” (Alcoff, 
2015, p. 82).  
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Further examples of the white imaginary can be found in 
aesthetic and commercial productions (advertising for beauty products, 
cleaning products and skin whitening products27) in which whiteness 
has positive connotations (cleanliness, beauty, moral purity) opposed to 
negative connotations of blackness28. In the literary world, Toni 
Morrison has analysed how the white imaginary is active, for example, 
in metaphors and unconscious associations that tie blackness to chaos, 
and whiteness to order and peace. One of the examples Morrison 
analyses is Marie Cardinal’s description of a panic attack suffered while 
attending a jazz concert in which Louis Armstrong was performing:  
 
My first anxiety attack occurred during a Louis Armstrong concert. I 
was nineteen or twenty. Armstrong was going to improvise with his 
trumpet, to build a whole composition in which each note would be 
important and would contain within itself the essence of the whole. I 
was not disappointed: the atmosphere warmed up very fast. The 
scaffolding and flying buttresses of the jazz instruments supported 
Armstrong’s trumpet, creating spaces which were adequate enough for 
it to climb higher, establish itself, and take off again. The sounds of the 
trumpet sometimes piled up together, fusing a new musical base, a sort 
of matrix which gave birth to one precise, unique note, tracing a sound 
whose path was almost painful, so absolutely necessary had its 
equilibrium and duration become; it tore at the nerves of those who 
followed it. 
My heart began to accelerate, becoming more important than the 
music, shaking the bars of my rib cage, compressing my lungs so the air 
could no longer enter them. Gripped by panic at the idea of dying there 
in the middle of spasms, stomping feet, and the crowd howling, I ran 
                                            
27 The practice of “skin-bleaching”, however, calls for complex readings, according to the 
sociologist Shirley A. Tate. Tate argues that the practice of skin 
bleaching/lightening/toning has “complex meanings” among Black women in the Black 
Atlantic region. The practice has been “racially performative for Black, white and 
Black-white ‘mixed raced’ women in a number of sites and historical periods” (Tate, 
2016, pp. 6–7). Therefore, its meanings shouldn’t always be reduced to forms of self-
hatred and low self-esteem. In Tate’s analysis, skin-bleaching can be a “race 
performative decolonizing practice”: “libidinal economies of skin transmutation within 
the Black Atlantic can also be seen as racially positive, as philic rather than phobic. 
First, bleaching/lightening/toning can be read as oppositional to white supremacy and 
colourism, and second, as ‘post-race’, self-affirming aesthetic enhancement and choice, 
which has nothing to do with a desire to be white or whiteness as an aesthetic ideal.” 
(Tate, 2016, p. 6) 
28 For a condensed historical overview of practices of skin whitening in Europe and 
“colonial race regimes” see also Tate (2016), Ch. 1. 
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into the street like someone possessed. (Marie Cardinal, in Morrison, 
1992, vi–vii Preface) 
 
Morrison uses Marie Cardinal’s description to trace the white imaginary 
in literature. What interests Morrison is less the question of whether a 
non-Black musician could have prompted the same effects (in fact, she 
hypothesizes that they could), than is listening to the particular 
evocations elicited by encounters with Black people:  
 
In Cardinal’s narrative, black or colored people and symbolic figurations 
of blackness are markers for the benevolent and the wicked; the 
spiritual (...) and the voluptuous; of ‘sinful’ but delicious sensuality 
coupled with demands for purity and restraint. (Morrison, 1992, ix, 
Preface)  
 
As part of a complex ideological construction, the white imaginary may 
also influence people who are not White – as Alcoff indicates. We can see 
this in the cases of internalized oppression discussed in previous 
chapters, exemplified dramatically by Pecola, the leading character of 
The Bluest Eye. Morrison notes, however, how her own position as a 
Black writer plays a role in the fact that she does not spontaneously 
have the same cultural associations as White writers in her way of 
conceiving Black characters: 
 
The principal reason these matters loom large for me is that I do not 
have quite the same access to these traditionally useful constructs of 
blackness. Neither blackness nor “people of color” stimulates in me 
notions of excessive, limitless love, anarchy, or routine dread. I cannot 
rely on these metaphorical shortcuts because I am a black writer 
struggling with and through a language that can powerfully evoke and 
enforce hidden signs of racial superiority, cultural hegemony, and 
dismissive “othering” of people and language which are by no means 
marginal or already and completely known and knowable in my work. 
My vulnerability would lie in romanticizing blackness rather than 
demonizing it; vilifying whiteness rather than reifying it. The kind of 
work I have always wanted to do requires me to learn how to maneuver 
ways to free up the language from its sometimes sinister, frequently 
lazy, almost always predictable employment of racially informed and 
determined chains. (Morrison, 1992, xii–xiii, Preface) 
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We can see from these examples that the white imaginary, as part of the 
ideological apparatus of whiteness, constitutes a set of racially coded 
images that operate at many different levels (history, politics, political 
history, philosophy, aesthetics…). These images are affective in that 
they mobilize desires and emotions, and play an important role in how 
people – mainly those who are racialized as White – construct their 
identities. As Alcoff points out, the white imaginary plays a decisive role 
in “who we can imagine ‘our own kind’ to be” (Alcoff, 2015, p. 80). It 
helps to account for the desire of Whites to be among Whites in spaces 
dominated by Whites (neighbourhoods, professional environments, 
nations), even when these desires go against their own rational 
interests: 
 
On the one hand, if one feels so strongly about one’s connection to white 
people and to a white dominant community or nation, then it is rational 
in some sense to make choices that manifest this preference. But, on the 
other hand, truly rational behavior should not simply pursue one’s 
preferences but should consider how those preferences are produced and 
whether they conflict with one’s other needs and commitments. The 
concept of imaginary whiteness can thus help to foreground not the 
empirical or material realities of whiteness, but the falsified grounds for 
white preferences, self-conceptions, and identifications. (Alcoff, 2015, p. 
81) 
 
Although the white imaginary influences Whites and non-Whites in 
general, it plays a particular role in Whites’ subject-formation, and 
produces what Alcoff calls “subjective whiteness”. Those who are 
racialized as White, and benefit from such racialization, have particular 
emotional investments in whiteness that are mediated by imaginary 
whiteness. In other words, attention to the white imaginary also allows 
us to account for “a specifically white way of being in the world”: “Whites 
do tend to have (...) their own peculiar inclinations, affects, practices, 
and modes of perception.” (Alcoff, 2015, pp. 83–84) 
There are different ways of accounting for the formation of a white 
subjectivity, which, again, does not stand for an essential category 
simply defined in terms of skin colour. In some circumstances, non-
153 
 
White people may also develop aspects of a white subjectivity. I will 
focus here, however, on ways of accounting for a particularly “white” way 
of being in the world: that of White people who benefit from white 
privilege. I shall examine two accounts of how whiteness functions in the 
constitution of the self: a trend that focuses on the cognitive aspects of 
white subjectivity through the notion of white ignorance; and an 
analysis that uncovers its embodied and affective aspects. I contend that 
some patterns of emotion are non-accidentally linked to white privilege. 
 
5.3.2 White ignorance 
 
So far, I have discussed how whiteness, as an ideological formation, 
conceals some of the mechanisms through which race-based oppression 
is reproduced. One aspect of this ideological formation is visible in the 
white imaginary, around which some of the desires, emotions, 
identifications and affiliations of White subjects organize. I shall now go 
on to consider one of the cognitive mechanisms through which the White 
self relates to whiteness, which Mills describes as “white ignorance”.  
White ignorance points to an aspect of white subjectivity – the 
distinctive epistemic limitations of Whites. It designates a specific kind 
of “group-based cognitive handicap” (Mills, 2017, p. 51). White ignorance 
is not any kind of ignorance that people who are White may suffer from. 
There are, of course, many instances of ignorance that are not causally 
linked to race. For example, not knowing the exact number of teeth cats 
have, or whether crows are smarter than foxes. Here, race does not play 
a determining role. By contrast, white ignorance is non-accidentally 
linked to white supremacy. It is “an ignorance, a non-knowing, that is 
not contingent, but in which race – white racism and/or white racial 
domination and their ramifications – plays a crucial causal role” (Mills, 
2017, p. 55). 
Just as whiteness, as an ideology, may influence people who are 
not White, white ignorance, despite being a group-based cognitive 
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handicap, is not exclusive to White people, and is not based on physio-
biological characteristics. Mills argues that white ignorance needs to be 
historicized: 
 
I am taking for granted the truth of some variant of social 
constructivism, which denies that race is biological. So the causality in 
the mechanisms for generating and sustaining white ignorance on the 
macro-level is social-structural rather than physio-biological, though it 
will of course operate through the physio-biological. Assuming the 
growing consensus in critical race theory to be correct – that race in 
general, and whiteness in particular, is a product of the modern period 
(Frederickson 2002) – then you could not have had white ignorance in 
this technical, term-of-art sense in, say, the ancient world, because 
whites did not exist then. Certainly people existed who by today’s 
standards would be counted as white, but they would not have been so 
categorized at the time, either by themselves or others, so there would 
have been no whiteness to play a causal role in their knowing or non-
knowing. (Mills, 2017, p. 56) 
 
Non-Whites may also be prone to white ignorance when adhering, for 
example, to claims that in post-racial, colour-blind meritocratic Western 
societies, race does no longer have any social significance. However, as a 
group-based cognitive pattern linked with group interests, white 
ignorance is considered to be more typical of Whites. This is not to say, 
however, that Whites manifest it in a uniform way: 
 
Whites are not a monolith, and if the analysis of white ignorance is to be 
part of a social epistemology, then the obvious needs to be remembered -
that people have other identities beside racial ones, so that whites will 
be divisible by class, gender, nationality, religion, and so forth, and 
these factors will modify, by differential socialization and experience, 
the bodies of belief and the cognitive patterns of the sub-populations 
concerned. But this is, of course, true for all sociological generalizations, 
which has never been a reason for abandoning them, but one for 
employing them cautiously. White ignorance is not indefeasible (even if 
it sometimes feels that way!), and some people who are white will, 
because of their particular histories (and/or the intersection of 
whiteness with other identities), overcome it and have true beliefs on 
what their fellow-whites get wrong. So white ignorance is best thought 
of as a cognitive tendency – an inclination, a doxastic disposition - which 
is not insuperable. (Mills, 2017, pp. 58–59) 
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Mills shows how components of cognitive processes such as perception, 
conception, memory, testimony, and motivational group interest are 
significantly affected by social-structural mechanisms of racialization. 
As Europeans gradually became the dominant force in the world during 
the Modern period, white supremacy as an ideology became hegemonic. 
It involved a particular epistemic principle (“white normativity”), which 
asserted the superiority of the European world. From this normative 
epistemic principle stemmed a series of distorting epistemic practices 
and myths that misrepresented and/or suppressed facts about non-White 
others. For example, the concept of the “Savage” played an instrumental 
role in justifying imperial European expansionism. This grounding 
concept then oriented the representations that Whites formed of non-
Whites: 
 
Even a cognizer with no antipathy or prejudice toward Native 
Americans [would] be cognitively disabled trying to establish truths 
about them insofar as such a category and its associated 
presuppositions [would] tend to force his conclusions in a certain 
direction, will limit what he can objectively see (Mills, 2017, p. 62). 
 
White ignorance therefore encompasses both explicit and implicit racist 
beliefs and attitudes and, as part of a social-structural phenomenon, 
does not always rest on ill intent. It can be part of the cognitive habits of 
Whites even when they consciously reject racism as a form of injustice. 
However, Mills establishes a distinction between two different historical 
contexts where white ignorance has been part of the epistemic 
landscape. In a context of de jure white supremacy (such as under Jim 
Crow legislation in the United States), “racialized causality” will tend to 
be more direct and the general beliefs of the cognizers will tend to be 
more explicitly racist. By contrast, in a context of de facto white 
supremacy, where explicit racist beliefs are socially condemned and in 
which explicit racist laws have been abolished, this racial causality still 
operates indirectly in individuals who do not embrace explicit racist 
beliefs: 
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The racialized causality I am invoking needs to be expansive enough to 
include both straightforward racist motivation and more impersonal 
social-structural causation, which may be operative even if the cognizer 
in question is not racist. (...) [R]acialized causality can give rise to what 
I am calling white ignorance, straightforwardly for a racist cognizer, but 
also indirectly for a nonracist cognizer who may form racist beliefs (e.g., 
that after the abolition of slavery in the United States, blacks generally 
had opportunities equal to whites) because of the social suppression of 
the pertinent knowledge, though without prejudice himself. So white 
ignorance need not always be based on bad faith. Obviously from the 
point of view of a social epistemology, especially after the transition 
from de jure to de facto white supremacy, it is precisely this kind of 
white ignorance that is most important. (Mills, 2017, p. 57). 
 
The kind of white ignorance that is pervasive in a de facto white 
supremacist context is exemplified by “colour-blindness” as an ideology; 
the idea that we live in a world in which race is no longer relevant and 
in which Black, Brown and White subjects are formally equal before the 
Law and have equal opportunities. The belief that Western democracies 
are colour-blind reduces Whites’ ability to perceive social-structural 
injustice for what it is. Instead, they tend to blame the groups who suffer 
racial discrimination for their problems. If we all have equal 
opportunities, and if socio-economic “success” is a matter of individual 
perseverance and personal hard work, they argue, then those who “fail” 
by those standards must do so because they lack the motivation and the 
right set of values.  
In this context of colour-blindness as the hegemonic ideology, 
white ignorance is also manifest in interpersonal relations, through 
utterances such as “When I look at you, I do not see color” (Medina, 
2013, p. 40). These, often well-intentioned, rejections of racism ignore 
the ways that race continues to play an important role in the lives of 
those who are racialized as Black or Brown: 
 
We are certainly better off without such prejudices, but unfortunately 
they do not disappear by fiat. And note that the complete refusal to see 
color in a racist society involves implicitly the refusal to acknowledge 
the force of racist prejudices and their insidious impact on interpersonal 
dynamics: ‘I do not see you as affected by racial prejudices, and my 
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social perceptions and social relations are unaffected by them’. In other 
words, the disavowal of racialized perception involves distancing oneself 
from the social reality of racism and failing to properly acknowledge its 
influence on social cognition. (Medina, 2013, p. 40)  
 
Mills gives other examples of white ignorance sustained by collective 
amnesia, for example by the denial of crimes (such as the Native 
American genocide), or by historiographies that produce a “feel-good 
history for whites”. Here, one may think of “the ‘magnolia-myth’ of 
paternalistic white aristocrats and happy, singing darkies that 
dominated American textbooks as late as the 1950s” (Mills, 2017, p. 65). 
These distorting epistemic practices will produce white ignorance in a 
form that makes it difficult for most White people to recognize their 
identities as indissolubly tied to the histories of oppression that have 
systematically advantaged them. The cognitive processes involved in 
white ignorance, as a practice that has distorting effects on social 
cognition, becomes an inability not only to have adequate knowledge of 
the lived realities of non-Whites, but also, importantly, of White people’s 
own historical and current position of privilege. This entails a form of 
“moral ignorance” that limits White people’s capacity to understand the 
moral wrongs of oppression:  
 
Whites… experience genuine cognitive difficulties in recognizing certain 
behaviour patterns as racist, so that quite apart from questions of 
motivation and bad faith they will be morally handicapped simply from 
the conceptual point of view in seeing and doing the right thing. (Mills, 
The Racial Contract, as cited in Sullivan, 2015, p. 128) 
 
5.3.3 A “recalcitrant” ignorance 
 
The “ignorance” in white ignorance does not imply passivity. It is not 
merely a lack of knowledge. Mills conceives it as  
 
an ignorance that resists, (...) an ignorance that fights back. (...) an 
ignorance militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated, an ignorance that 
stays active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly (...) presenting itself 
unblushingly as knowledge” (Mills, 2017, p. 49).  
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How should we account for the “dynamic”, “militant” nature of white 
ignorance? As one of the mechanisms for reproducing ideological 
formations tied to white domination, which becomes part of white 
subjectivity, white ignorance is difficult to eradicate because it is 
embedded in complex patterns of thinking, perceiving and behaving. 
José Medina also highlights this active dimension of white ignorance, 
which does not merely consist in the absence of belief or in false beliefs: 
“It is a recalcitrant ignorance, hard to eradicate, that is rooted in active 
patterns of cognitive interaction and in habitual ways of perceiving, 
listening, talking, thinking, and acting” (Medina, 2013, p. 39). 
One of the categories of analysis that, according to Mills, plays a 
causal role in white ignorance is “the dynamic role of white group 
interests” (Mills, 2017, p. 70). Mills notes that an analysis of the links 
between group interests and cognition is lacking in the scholarship of 
social epistemology. Whilst in the Marxist tradition it has been broadly 
accepted that “if exploitative socio-economic relations are indeed 
foundational to the social order, then this is likely to have a fundamental 
shaping effect on social ideation”, the same kind of phenomenon needs to 
be recognized with respect of matters of race: “vested white group 
interest in the racial status quo (…) needs to be recognized as a major 
factor in encouraging white cognitive distortions of various kinds” (Mills, 
2017, p. 70). Mills argues that Whites’ perception of their own group 
interests as threatened by Black interests drives their preferences and 
shapes their cognitive practices. Therefore, white group interests may 
play an important role in the recalcitrant aspect of white ignorance, 
along with the other elements identified by Mills, such as “the refusal to 
perceive systemic domination, the convenient amnesia about the past 
and its legacy in the present, and the hostility to black testimony”. 
(Mills, 2017, p. 70)
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5.4 Embodied and emotional aspects of white ignorance 
 
White ignorance is one of the forces that sustain white privilege insofar 
as it allows privilege to remain unacknowledged, and thus unchallenged, 
by those who benefit from it. Mills analyses white ignorance as a 
primarily cognitive phenomenon, but as José Medina and Shannon 
Sullivan argue, white ignorance has important affective and 
physiological dimensions. Medina and Sullivan contend that white 
ignorance does not simply operate at the level of belief. White ignorance 
is not completely explained by the suppression or distortion of facts, by 
collective amnesia and systematic “testimonial injustice” (Fricker, 2007), 
but is also embedded in the emotional and physiological habits that 
characterize whiteness as an embodied experience. In her 
phenomenological analysis of whiteness, Sara Ahmed also highlights 
how the latter is an orienting process of bodies. From these analyses we 
can identify a series of physiological and emotional patterns that are 
non-accidentally correlated with white privilege. 
 
5.4.1 Affective numbness 
 
José Medina characterises the ideology of colour-blindness as carrying a 
particular kind of insensitivity to matters of race: 
 
Racial ignorance involves both cognitive and affective attitudes and 
meta-attitudes with respect to racial others. This is why I think it is 
important to think of this peculiar kind of blindness as a form of 
insensitivity or numbness, for being insensitive or numbed conveys a 
lack of receptivity that is simultaneously both cognitive and affective. 
For example, (...) racial insensitivity may involve the failure to see the 
social relevance of race in one’s interactions, and this failure is not 
simply a cognitive deficit, but an affective failure: it involves the 
inability to feel concerned and to have an entire array of emotions such 
as empathy, sympathy, compassion, etc. This is why those who do not 
see the social relevance of racial aspects of social experience often 
charge those who do as being oversensitive, as having a thin skin or 
feeling too much when racial elements are present in social interactions. 
(Medina, 2013, p. 49)  
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Medina identifies different kinds of affective numbness linked with 
racial insensitivity. A first consists in feeling indifferent or apathetic in 
relation to a particular social group. This may be linked to other 
phenomena in the cognitive realm that Medina identifies as “epistemic 
laziness”, a group-based lack of curiosity (Medina, 2013, p. 33) that 
produces narrow-mindedness and arrogant patterns of behaviour. It is 
the indifference or apathy characteristic of racist ethnocentrism, which 
María Lugones (2003) also links to laziness and arrogance:  
 
(...) the disrespectful, lazy, arrogant indifference to other cultures that 
devalues them through not seeing appreciatively any culture or cultural 
ways except one’s own when one could do otherwise; or the disrespectful, 
lazy, arrogant indifference that devalues other cultures through 
stereotyping them or through non-reflective, self-satisfied acceptance of 
such stereotypes. (Lugones, 2003, p. 44)  
 
A second kind of affective numbness identified by Medina consists not in 
being indifferent, but rather in feeling concerned by issues of racial 
injustice in the abstract, and not knowing how to engage with them, i.e., 
being affectively blocked in one’s concrete responses to racial injustice. 
An example of this may be found in what Lugones calls “infantilization 
of judgement” – the tendency of White people to take refuge in their 
good, innocent intentions when challenged about their participation in 
racism, and their general inability to take responsibility for their actions 
when these display signs of ethnocentrism and racism: 
 
I have encountered this phenomenon so many times and in so many 
people of good judgement in other matters that it is frequently 
disconcerting. (...) They have turned into children, incapable of 
judgement, avoiding all commitment except against racism in the 
abstract, paralyzed as responsible beings, afraid of hostility and hostile 
in their fear, wedded to their ignorance and arrogant in their guilty 
purity of heart. 
Infantilization of judgement is a dulling of the ability to read 
critically, and with maturity of judgement, those texts and situations in 
which race and ethnicity are salient. It appears to me as a flight into a 
state in which one cannot be critical or responsible: a flight into those 
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characteristics of childhood that excuse ignorance and confusion, and 
that appeal to authority. (...) If a child, the white/Angla can be guilty of 
racism and ethnocentrism innocently, unmarked and untouched in her 
goodness, confused with good reason, a passive learner because she 
cannot exercise her judgement with maturity. (...) Infantilization of 
judgement is a form of ethnocentric racism precisely because it is a self-
indulgent denial of one’s understanding of one’s culture and its 
expressing racism. (Lugones, 2003, pp. 48–49. My italics) 
 
What Lugones describes are forms of affective blockage: a paralyzing 
fear of being challenged in one’s racism, an attachment to forms of 
ignorance as a way to deflect responsibility for a particular behaviour 
(“But I did not know!”), and the arrogance implied in claiming that, if 
one’s intentions are good and pure (“I am a good person! I am not 
racist!”), one cannot be challenged for one’s participation in racism. 
Medina’s discussion of the simultaneously cognitive and affective 
aspects of white ignorance highlights the emotional deficiencies that 
privileged subjects may display. White ignorance in the form of a 
reduced sensitivity, such as an atrophied emotional capacity for 
empathy, translates into a diminished moral capacity, insofar as 
insensitive subjects lack the tools for properly understanding how their 
own behaviour, perceptions, and ways of interacting perpetuate forms of 
racial harm. Furthermore, inconsistencies or tensions between some 
forms of knowledge and affective dis/engagement are often at the source 
of “failures in responsible agency”:  
 
(...) the cognitive and the affective are not always congruent elements; 
they can pull apart and fall into tension with each other: one may know 
about a social harm and not care (as it happens in the case of 
knowledgeable insensitivity29), and one may also care (i.e. be affectively 
                                            
29 By knowledgeable insensitivity, Medina refers to cases in which the subject is not 
simply insensitive to particular injustices due to the kind of recalcitrant mechanisms 
involved in white ignorance at a meta level; these are cases where subjects feel explicit 
contempt or resentment for particular issues: “Those who feel contempt or resentment 
for certain problems, concerns, or forms of suffering are not ignorant about them; and I 
don’t think they can be said to be numbed or desensitized to them either (as it happens 
with meta-blindness): they register the problem or harm in question, but they do not 
feel it as a legitimate concern or as an undeserved mistreatment or injustice” (Medina, 
2013, p. 65n7)  
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open) and not know enough to do anything with that sensitivity. 
(Medina, 2013, p. 50) 
 
The cognitive and emotional limitations of privileged subjects may 
translate into moral failings, which is why Medina argues that part of 
addressing racial injustice consists in being attentive to the ways in 
which “cognitive and affective structures work together, or fail to work 
together” (Medina, 2013, p. 50). 
Following Fanon, Medina notes that many aspects of the cognitive 
and affective insensitivities displayed by White subjects are closely 
linked to the particular ways in which, in Western cultures, white is the 
homogenous invisible norm, “the color of the unmarked mainstream 
subject” (Medina, 2013, p. 50). In the white imagination, whiteness is 
experienced by White subjects as absence of colour. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms through which racialized perception is produced also tend 
to be invisible. Therefore, when White persons experience themselves as 
completely free from racial prejudice (“I don’t see race, you are my equal; 
my perception is unaffected by difference of skin colour”), and see 
themselves as unraced, it is not only that many socially relevant aspects 
of race tend to remain unseen/unfelt in the ways that Medina describes. 
More than that, the very processes through which such ways of seeing 
(or unseeing) are structured are made invisible: “Racial seeing as such is 
not open to view; the processes of racialization that come to structure 
our social perceptions are not seen, and yet our perceptual habits and 
our field of vision cannot escape them” (Medina, 2013, p. 54). To take 
Toni Morrison’s image, colour-blindness structures one’s ways of 
(un)knowing, (mis)perceiving and (un)feeling rather as though we were 
looking at a fishbowl: “The glide and flick of the golden scales, the green 
tip, the bolt of white careening back from the gills; the castles at the 
bottom, surrounded by pebbles and tiny, intricate fronds of green; the 
barely disturbed water, the fleck of waste and food, the tranquil bubbles 
traveling to the surface” is made possible by the bowl, “the structure 
that transparently (and invisibly) permits the ordered life it contains to 
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exist in the larger world” (Morrison, 1992, 17). It matters therefore to see 
the bowl, i.e., to make this racial seeing visible, to unmask its hidden 
mechanisms. Alcoff, Sullivan and Medina point out that these 
mechanisms are not only cognitive. They are also “inscribed in the body”: 
“The racial meanings inscribed in the body become part of the 
underlying structure of our perceptual habits, that is, part of the taken-
for-granted background against which our social perceptions take place” 
(Medina, 2013, pp. 54–55). 
I will now turn to examine some of the ways in which white 
ignorance has embodied dimensions that are connected to patterns of 
emotions, such as disgust, contempt and fear. 
 
5.4.2 White privilege as an embodied unconscious habit 
 
Sullivan analyses unconscious habit30 as a structure of white privilege. 
The notion of “habit”, Sullivan contends,  
 
helps explain how white privilege often functions as if invisible. Habits 
are the things that we do and say ‘without thinking.’ They are the 
mental and physical patterns of engagement with the world that 
operate without conscious attention or reflection. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 4)  
 
Habits, Sullivan argues, are “environmentally constituted”. They are 
ways of “transacting with the world” that become constitutive of the self:  
 
                                            
30 Sullivan’s exploration of the notion of ‘unconscious habit’ pursues a path opened by 
W.E.B. Du Bois but which occupied a rather marginal place in his work: “Du Bois’s 
concept of unconscious habit combines a Freudian idea of the unconscious with a 
pragmatist understanding of habit to posit an unconscious formed by socially inherited 
customs and attitudes that resists its transformation. As such, the concept broadens 
Freud’s idea of the unconscious beyond its focus on the Oedipalized nuclear family and 
deepens pragmatism’s concept of habit by connecting it with activities of repression and 
resistance to change that the psyche often employs. For Du Bois, a significant part of 
the constitution of unconscious habits involves active mechanisms and strategies for 
blocking access to them by conscious inquiry. That habits are dynamically constituted 
through transaction with the socio-cultural world rather than fixated by biology or 
psychology does not change the fact that transforming them will take a great deal of 
patience and time, in large part because of habit’s ability to actively undermine its own 
transformation” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 22).  
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If the self can be understood as a complex tapestry of woven fibers, 
habits are the various threads that make up the tapestry itself. Or, to 
stretch the metaphor, habits are the various threads that help 
constitute each other as they also make up the tapestry as a whole 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 2).  
 
This means understanding habit as ontological, where ontology is 
thought as historical – and therefore, capable of transformation – rather 
than as the “eternal, unchanging, and essential characteristics of a 
being” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 3). 
In what sense are habits formed in transactions with the 
environment? Sullivan examines the way the body, the psyche and the 
world have “co-constitutive transactions” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 23). The 
body and the psyche are constituted by the environment and 
simultaneously productive of the environment. In order to understand 
this transactional aspect of the constitution of habits, Sullivan imagines 
habit as a machine:  
 
[H]abit can be thought as a machine: a relatively stable, complex 
process of change that produces certain effects through its transactions 
with other machines. (...) Machines are never isolated; they are always 
being plugged and detached from other machines (for example, printers, 
modems, electric outlets, battery packs, etc.) (Sullivan, 2006, p. 89) 
 
Another example used by Sullivan to capture the transactional nature of 
habits is Deleuze and Guattari’s image of the interaction between the 
tick and its environment. In habit, body, mind and world co-constitute 
one another just like the tick biting a human comes to form a particular 
kind of “machinic alliance” affecting what the tick and the human are:  
 
(...) what the tick is are its connections with the branch on which it 
hangs, the passing human whose sweat it smells, and the skin onto 
which it latches to suck blood. The tick is constituted by what it does 
with and to the world around it, just as the human onto which it drops 
is constituted in part by the tick-world in which it has entered. In the 
becoming-tick of the human and the becoming-human of the tick, there 
is an alliance of tick and human that is machinic in that it involves a 
non-representational, dynamic transformation of each of them. 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 89) 
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We can find another example of the transactional aspect of habit in the 
image of a pair of old, used shoes. If I wear the same pair of shoes for 
years for my daily stroll in the forest, the cadence of my step will be, 
with the passing of time and use, reflected in their shape. The constant 
contact with the path of the forest will smooth their soles, bend their tip, 
and scrape their heels in a particular way. But my steps – along with all 
of those who take the same path – will also leave their trace, and 
contribute to giving to the path its characteristic shape. My body as a 
whole may be modified by this daily stroll as well, including by the shoes 
I wear. If, as it turns out, the shoes were not adapted to walking in the 
forest, I may end up with a chronic tendinitis or back pain. My old shoes 
were constituted by the environment in which they were used (my feet, 
my steps, the forest path), but they were also constituting of the 
environment (they gave me back pain; they helped smooth the path of 
the forest, etc.). 
Habits are “styles” of engaging with the environment, ways of 
being and doing that constitute who we are. They are characterized, to 
some degree, by their stability, but this need not imply rigidity or 
fixedness. Habits can be modified. However, their unconscious31 
dimension is one of the factors that help explain their resistance to 
change: “As unconscious, habits of white privilege do not merely go 
unnoticed. They actively thwart the process of conscious reflection on 
                                            
31 Sullivan prefers to think of habits of white privilege as unconscious, rather than 
simply nonconscious or preconscious, because the latter notions do not fully account for 
habits’ “strong resistance to conscious recognition”: “White privilege goes to great 
length not to be heard. Habits of white privilege are not merely nonconscious or 
preconscious. It is not the case that they just happen not to be the object of conscious 
reflection but could relatively easily become so if only they were drawn to one’s 
attention. This overly optimistic picture implicitly denies the possible existence of 
formidable obstacles to the conscious acknowledgement of certain habits”. (Sullivan, 
2005, p. 6). With respect to how accessible to consciousness the unconscious is, Sullivan 
prefers to remain “agnostic”: “Whether and to what degree unconscious habits can be 
examined and possibly reworked can be found out only in practice.” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 
7)  
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them, which allows them to seem non-existent even as they continue to 
function.” (Sullivan, 2006, pp. 5–6) As a way of capturing both the 
stability and the relative flexibility of habit, Sullivan refers to it as a 
“malleable structure” and as a “structured transformation”. As an 
example of the transactional nature of psychosomatic habits – of how 
they are a complex transaction between body, mind and social 
environment – Sullivan offers the stereotypical case of the under-
confident female student, reminiscent of the women who illustrate 
Bartky’s notion of emotional attunement in shame (described in Chapter 
3): 
 
Functional distinctions can be made between mental habits, such as a 
female’s student’s tendency to present her views in class apologetically, 
and physical or bodily habits such as the same student’s tendency to 
contract her body inward as she sits. (...) As in the case for many 
women, the student in my example has an inhibited style of engaging 
with the academic world that is inseparably psychical and bodily. Her 
transaction with a sexist world creates particular psychosomatic 
predispositions for engaging with it that cannot be chopped up into 
separate realms of body and mind. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 24) 
 
Understanding race as habitual means that “in a raced and racist world, 
human beings will be raced and racist, albeit often in very different ways 
depending upon the particular environments they inhabit” (Sullivan, 
2006, p. 3). Given that habits are constituted in a dynamic transaction 
with the environment, habits of white privilege will naturally differ 
depending on whether the context is marked by more conscious and 
deliberate forms of racism, and more unconscious and implicit 
manifestations of this phenomenon. 
Sullivan’s case study focuses on the United States. In her view, 
transformation from a de jure (“Jim Crow”) to a de facto racism (in 
twenty-first-century United States) goes with a transformation of the 
ways in which white domination operates. In a de jure white 
supremacist context, the patterns of domination are more conscious, 
explicit, visible and deliberate. In a de facto racist context, the forms of 
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white domination tend to be invisible, implicit and unconscious. Whilst 
white domination is always a mixture of white supremacy and white 
privilege, white domination’s current modus operandi is a combination 
in which white privilege is present in higher proportions: 
 
The shift from de jure to de facto racism corresponds with a related shift 
from habits of white supremacy to ones of white privilege. As I use the 
term “white supremacy”, it refers to conscious, deliberate forms of white 
domination, such as those found in the law but also in informal social 
mores. Although racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan 
Nation offer some of the most obvious examples of white supremacy, one 
need not be a member of them to be a white supremacist. All one needs, 
so to speak, is a style of transacting with the world in which white 
domination is consciously embraced and affirmed. White supremacy has 
not disappeared with the shift from de jure to de facto racism. As long as 
white domination endures, there probably always will exist a mix of 
white supremacy and white privilege, on both the micro level of the 
person and the macro level of societies, cultures, and nations. But that 
mix is one with increasingly high proportions of unconscious white 
domination. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 5) 
 
A crucial characteristic of white domination in the context of colour-
blindness is that it operates while, and all the more effectively because, 
it makes itself invisible. This is why, Sullivan contends, unconscious 
habits of white privilege need to be brought to visibility, analysed, 
challenged, so as to be potentially disrupted or modified.  
In order to have a clearer grasp of the difference between 
psychosomatic habits linked to white supremacy and those linked to 
white privilege, Sullivan contrasts what was a common practice in the 
United States under “Jim Crow” legislation with today’s attitudes 
towards race: 
 
In the early twenty-first century, white domination increasingly gains 
power precisely by operating as if nonexistent. This has not always been 
the case. One hundred years ago, for example, when Jim Crow reigned 
in the United States, white domination tended to be fairly easily visible 
to all. Lynchings were well-attended social affairs for white people, who 
openly celebrated the vicious hangings of black people with picnics and 
photographs to proudly send to friends and family. After the civil rights 
movements of the 1960s, the move from de jure to de facto racism meant 
not the end of white domination, but a significant shift in its 
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predominant mode of operation. It was no longer socially acceptable in 
most white circles and institutions to openly proclaim racist beliefs. The 
‘good’ (= nonracist) white person was supposed to treat everyone 
equally, which was taken to mean not noticing a person’s race at all. In 
this atmosphere of alleged colorblindness, racism continued and 
continues to function without the use of race-related terms. Race 
supposedly is not an issue in a society that obsesses over urban 
ghettoes, crime, the resale value of one’s house, welfare queens, the 
drug war, the death penalty, and a massively growing prison industry. 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 5)  
 
Psychosomatic habits and their related emotional phenomena have 
therefore changed. Drawing on the work of Cinthya Willett (2001), 
Sullivan explores the connection between habits of white supremacy32 
and forms of psychological pleasure derived from the humiliations that 
White people inflicted on Black people: 
 
(...) recognition of a slave’s humanity can be used to increase her 
demoralization. Drawing from a scene in Toni Morrison’s Beloved in 
which a slave woman overhears her master’s teachings to white pupils 
about the differences between masters and slaves, Willett explains how 
racial hubris operates precisely by using the division of the African 
person into human and subhuman parts to produce maximal 
psychological pleasure for the white slaveholder. Seeing the slave as 
part human enabled the slaveholder to assault the slave even more 
ferociously than if the slave were assumed to be wholly animal. If the 
slave is part human, then using him or her like a brute is humiliating in 
a way that it could not be if the slave were fully nonhuman. The 
slaveholder in this case recognized a part of the slave that deserved 
dignity and respect only to ensure that the humiliating insult of slavery 
was felt that much more strongly. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 42)  
 
If, as Sullivan argues, in the context of white supremacy, racism is 
consciously and explicitly embraced by most White people (supported 
institutionally, legally, economically and culturally), one may expect 
that White people, in general, will display patent patterns of emotions 
that, by the moral standards of today’s allegedly “colour-blind” U.S. 
                                            
32 Sullivan refers to these as habits of white privilege. However, she uses an example 
that corresponds to the context of nineteenth-century United States, that is, to a de 
jure white supremacist context. I think it would be more consistent to think of these as 
habits of white supremacy, following the meaning she gives to the distinction between 
white supremacy and white privilege. 
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society, would be deemed unacceptable, such as the cited pleasure taken 
in acts of humiliation and cruelty, as well as overt patterns of contempt, 
disgust and hatred. Such patterns of behaviour are described in slave 
narratives, for example in Frederick Douglass’ description of an act of 
torture as “the blood-stained gate, the entrance to the hell of slavery, 
through which [he] was about to pass”33.  
Feelings and expressions of disgust and contempt were common 
currency in a de jure white supremacist context, and the psychosomatic 
habits of White people were importantly shaped by it. The transaction 
between bodily and mental habits and the environment can be 
identified, for example, in widespread unwillingness to eat with Black 
people: 
 
Lillian Smith provides a powerful example of how white racism has a 
deep impact in the body itself. Describing a moment in Southern history 
where a few white women decided to break the taboo against eating 
with Black women, Smith writes, ‘One of these church women told me of 
her first eating experience with colored friends. Though her conscience 
was serene, and her enjoyment of this association was real, yet she was 
seized by an acute nausea which disappeared only when the meal was 
finished. She was too honest to attribute it to anything other than 
                                            
33 Douglass, 2016: “Master, however, was not a humane slaveholder. It required 
extraordinary barbarity on the part of an overseer to affect him. He was a cruel man, 
hardened by a long life of slaveholding. He would at times seem to take great pleasure 
in whipping a slave” (Ch. 1, p. 8); “My new mistress proved to be all she appeared when 
I first met her at the door, -a woman of the kindest heart and finest feelings. She had 
never had a slave under her control previously to myself, and prior to her marriage she 
had been dependent upon her own industry for a living. She was by trade a weaver; 
and by constant application to her business, she had been in a good degree preserved 
from the blighting and dehumanizing effects of slavery. I was utterly astonished at her 
goodness. I scarcely knew how to behave towards her. She was entirely unlike any 
other woman I had ever seen. I could not approach her as I was accustomed to 
approach other white ladies. My early instruction was all out of place. The crouching 
servility, usually so acceptable a quality in a slave, did not answer when manifested 
toward her. Her favor was not gained by it; she seemed to be disturbed by it. (...) Her 
face was made of heavenly smiles and her voice of tranquil music. But, alas! This kind 
heart had but a short time to remain such. The fatal poison of irresponsible power was 
already in her hands, and soon commenced its infernal work. That cheerful eye, under 
the influence of slavery, soon became red with rage; that voice, made all of sweet 
accord, changed to one of harsh and horrid discord; and that angelic face gave place to 
that of a demon.” (Douglass, 2016, ch.4, p. 23). 
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anxiety welling up from the ‘bottom of her personality’, as she expressed 
it, creeping back from her childhood training.’ (Yancy, 2017, p. 48n45) 
 
Such expressions of disgust were not exceptional, isolated incidents. 
George Yancy refers to another example given by Kristina DuRocher 
(2011) in her book Raising Racists: The Socialization of White Children 
in the Jim Crow South: 
 
DuRocher notes that Alice Harris Kester, the wife of Howard Kester, a 
prominent white preacher who was influenced by the Social Gospel 
movement, “confronted one of the southern ‘sins’, at a Negro Baptist 
Publishing House lunch. She tried to eat at the same table as African 
Americans, but could not keep her food down, running home in tears.” 
Both white women appear to be sincere in their efforts at political 
activism. Yet, their bodies responded in ways contrary to their 
intentions. (Yancy, 2017, pp. 245–246)  
 
If the environment plays an important role in the way habits are 
constituted, and if modifications in the environment produce 
transformations in habits, one might think that in today’s alleged colour-
blind “regime”, such psychosomatic phenomena would have disappeared. 
But Sullivan aims to show how, on the contrary, some of these habits 
have become unconscious in the passage from a white supremacist 
context to one dominated by white privilege. Something of the old habits 
remains, despite modification. As mentioned above, it is not that white 
domination has ceased, but that it has transformed its modes of 
operation34. Many of the psychosomatic habits of white privilege have 
become “woven into the fabric of [White people’s] unconscious” (Yancy, 
2017, p. 34). The legacy of the “old-fashioned” Jim Crow era racism still 
acts in White people’s bodies.  
The particular habits of white privilege do not merely take their 
shape from processes of internalization of particular beliefs of the 
                                            
34 The distinction between a white supremacist regime where racist beliefs, behaviour, 
laws etc. are consciously held does not mean, of course, that there are not unconscious 
habits or mechanisms particular to that era. Sullivan’s argument consists in thinking 
the passage from white supremacist (de jure racist regime) to white privileged (de facto 
racism) as involving particular forms of repression through which many of those 
explicit, overt patterns have become unconscious.    
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propositional and representational kind. Rather, Sullivan argues, 
unconscious racial habits are produced through the body. Sullivan gives 
some examples of how embodied racial habits are transmitted through 
bodily actions and reactions in ways that manifest and perpetuate a 
racial and racist imagination. Drawing on Jean Laplanche’s (1989) 
theory of seduction, which she interprets as “a process of unconscious 
habit formation” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 64), Sullivan extends the theory so 
that it does not only focus on sexuality, but also on race and racism. The 
unconscious, she contends, is “initially and continually formed in 
relationship with concrete others in a sociopolitical world.” (Sullivan, 
2006, p. 64) Laplanche’s theory explains the role of adult’s seduction35 in 
the constitution of the infant’s unconscious36: 
                                            
35 As Sullivan notes, the use of the term “seduction” does not characterize an abusive 
sexual act from a parent to a child: “I immediately must clarify the term ‘seduction’ 
since it does not mean that a sexually abusive act takes place between adult and 
infant. This was the central component of the seduction theory that Freud entertained 
early in his career to explain his patients’ hysterical symptoms and then abandoned to 
develop his well-known theory of infant sexuality. Adult seduction of the infant is a 
real event, and in that sense, the early Freud was on to something that unfortunately 
was lost in his move away from the seduction theory. But what Freud did not see is 
that the event of seduction involves the transference of enigmatic messages about 
sexuality from adult to child, not a sexual act in the customary sense of the term.” 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 64) 
36 It may be pertinent to clarify now that the notion of the unconscious that Sullivan 
uses is importantly informed by Laplanche’s theory of seduction, which she views as 
more adequate than a traditional psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious, insofar as it 
helps to account for the process of habit formation as bodily and mental at the same 
time: “It is at this point that the psychoanalytic term ‘the unconscious’ becomes an 
obstacle to understanding the process of seduction. Because it tends to imply something 
psychical separate from, even if in connection with, the body, ‘the unconscious’ 
interferes with an appreciation of seduction as a simultaneously somatic and psychical 
event. More helpful is to think ‘the unconscious’ as unconscious habits that are 
inseparably bodily and psychical. Seduction is the process of the formation of 
unconscious habits involving the transference of enigmatic messages from adult to 
child via the adult’s unconscious modes of transacting with the world, and especially 
the child. A child is not born with unconscious psychosomatic habits; this complexity is 
developed through transactional relationships with adults. Initially, enigmatic 
messages play along the child’s body and become properly unconscious once attempts to 
understand them have failed. Unbeknownst to the child, these failed attempts at 
translation help shape her subsequent responses to the world and, through those 
transactions, constitute her self. Her unconscious habits are the result of the body’s 
development of the psyche.” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 67. My italics) 
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By means of bodily expressions such as gestures or grimaces—and also, 
though rarely for babies, by means of spoken words—the adult implants 
a message about sexuality in the child’s body, at least a portion of which 
child cannot comprehend. The child tries to understand the message, 
and indeed sometimes succeeds in part. The parts that she does not 
understand are repressed. These remainders of the attempted 
translation of the message form the child’s unconscious. The etymology 
of the verb ‘‘to seduce’’ (séduire) helps indicate why the process is 
seductive: in seduction, an adult draws an infant into the adult world in 
an irresistible fashion, captivating the child in way that he or she does 
not know how to respond to. (Sullivan, 2006, pp. 64–65) 
 
Sullivan adapts this view in order to show how children’s unconscious is 
shaped by the adult world through bodily signals, using a passage from 
Morrison’s The Bluest Eye: 
 
Toni Morrison’s novel The Bluest Eye provides a helpful illustration of 
the process of seduction. Morrison demonstrates how the narrator of the 
novel, a nine-year-old black girl named Claudia, and her older sister, 
Frieda, are tuned into the adult world around them, receiving its 
messages even though they do not fully understand them:  
Frieda and I are washing Mason jars. We do not hear their [the 
adults in the other room] words, but with grown-ups we listen to and 
watch out for their voices... The edge, the curl, the thrust of their 
emotions is always clear to Frieda and me. We do not, cannot, know the 
meanings of all their words, for we are nine and ten years old. So we 
watch their faces, their hands, their feet, and listen for truth in timbre.  
Morrison reveals an adult world full of unintended bodily 
gestures and tones that communicates a great deal of enigmatic 
meaning to the children in it. From the sound of parents’ and neighbors’ 
voices, Claudia and Frieda know that something is up, but they do not 
fully understand the edgy mood that filters from the living room into the 
kitchen. The incomprehensible portions of the adults’ message—which, 
in this case, involve the yearning and later angry revulsion generated by 
a newly arrived boarder in Claudia’s home—will become part of each 
girl’s unconscious. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 65) 
 
Sullivan also links some of the passages of the same novel, discussed in 
Chapter 2, to processes of seduction in Laplanche’s sense, which show 
the processes involved in the shaping of the raced unconscious. For 
example, Claudia describes the particular intonations in the voice of 
adults evoking blue-eyed dolls or blue-eyed White girls:  
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What made people look at them and say, ‘Awwwww,’ but not for me? 
The eye slide of black women as they approached them on the street, 
and the possessive gentleness of their touch as they handled them 
(Morrison, 1994, pp. 20–21).  
 
Similarly, the emotion conveyed by adults in reaction to Claudia’s 
dismembering of the doll is part of a similar process of transmission of 
enigmatic signals to the child about the higher aesthetic value placed in 
whiteness: 
 
When Claudia dismembers the doll to try to find inside its beauty, 
which she does not see, the adults are saddened and outraged: ‘Tears 
threatened to erase the aloofness of their authority. The emotion of 
years of unfulfilled longing preened in their voices’. The adults’ tears 
and tone of voice transmit an enigmatic message to Claudia about the 
importance and power of whiteness in the adult world. (Sullivan, 2006, 
p. 72)  
 
Sullivan identifies a particular feature of her own unconscious habits of 
white privilege in the association of the smell of cumin “with the 
(perceived) body odor of Mexicans” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 68). She traces the 
origin of this habit in her grandmother’s particularly contemptuous tone 
of voice: “one of the enigmatic messages sent to me regarding race likely 
originated in the distasteful hiss of my grandmother’s voice as she 
pronounced the word ‘Mexican’” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 69). However, 
Sullivan’s particular racist association between a spice, a perceived body 
odour and an ethnicity was most likely not simply transmitted by her 
grandmother. Unconscious habits such as the one revealed by this kind 
of olfactory and auditory associations are formed, she argues, through a 
“transgenerational crowd”. This shaping of the unconscious and habit 
formation does not only take place within the nuclear family, but is 
effected through a “multiplicitous collectivity that cannot be reduced to a 
single voice” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 69): 
 
My grandmother’s voice speaks through me as I pronounce the word 
‘‘Mexican.’’ She, along with many others, must be considered a coauthor 
of all I write or say regarding Mexican people, life, food, and so on. The 
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transactional multiplicity of unconscious habits reaches far beyond the 
triangle of the Oedipal family, and it involves even more than 
grandparents and other members of one’s extended family. The 
transgenerational crowd that contributes to the formation of 
unconscious habit is as much composed of distant strangers, albeit in 
different ways and perhaps to different degrees, as it is of intimate 
relations that a person knows, loves, and/or hates. (Sullivan, 2006, pp. 
69–70) 
 
Unconscious habits of white privilege, both bodily and psychic (such as 
one’s olfactory or auditory sensations being associated with particular 
images of cleanliness/uncleanliness) seem therefore recalcitrant to 
conscious beliefs or to knowledge that could otherwise counter and 
“correct” the racist associations that they carry:  
 
Even though I now consciously know that the association is racist and I 
sincerely do not want to make it, I am not able to smell cumin without it 
occurring. It is as if behind or alongside my conscious knowledge, a 
much stronger olfactory un(conscious)knowledge exists, undermining 
my attempts to smell cumin as just plain cumin (if there is such a 
thing). (Sullivan, 2006, p. 68) 
 
5.4.3 Recalcitrant habits and white narcissism 
 
The recalcitrance of people’s psychosomatic habits, Sullivan suggests, is 
partly explained by the protective function that the latter play in 
securing White people’s sense of self. The invisibility of white privilege 
to those who benefit from it implies thinking of oneself as race-free, 
colour-free, but also smell-free (and we could think of other bodily 
experiences of privilege such as thinking of oneself as not having a 
particular accent, etc.) while imagining the other (in this case, the 
Mexicans) as coloured, raced, having an accent, having a smell, etc. In a 
racist world, imagining oneself as “neutral”, as “unraced”, has particular 
implications for one’s positive self-perception. If to be smelly is to be 
dirty, and dirtiness is associated with moral deficiencies37, then, by the 
                                            
37 “Non-white people have long been associated with dirt, filth, and pollution by white 
people. On one level, this association speaks of the alleged lack of bodily cleanliness of 
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same token, to be without smell is to be clean, to be clean is to be pure, 
virtuous, etc.: 
 
To capture the phenomenon in question, my olfactory (un)knowledge 
about cumin must be understood as the active, productive partner of my 
unconscious psyche, both of which seek to protect my white privileged 
sense of self. Mexicans are greasy and smelly, while I am clean and 
odor-free: this is what my nose assures me. This sense of self helps 
explain the anxiety I experienced when a former colleague once asked 
me if I ate garlic for breakfast. Apparently I smelled like garlic when I 
came to work each morning. But if this is true, then I am not as clean 
and odor-free as I thought, which means that I might not be fully white 
on the racial hierarchy established by my sense of smell. My reaction to 
cumin involves the racist process of identification through its projective 
disavowal. For my body to give up the olfactory association between 
cumin and (supposed) Mexican body odor would be to challenge the 
oppositional relationship between white and non-white people that 
helps guarantee my whiteness. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 68) 
 
We find here an exploration of the active, recalcitrant aspect of white 
ignorance that Charles Mills partly explained by the existence of “white 
group interests”. As we can now see, white group interests are secured 
not only cognitively, via patterns of thought, but also through affective 
and bodily habits. As I have shown, whilst Mills focuses on the cognitive 
aspects of privilege, Medina identifies affective blockages or numbness 
that partly account for the persistence of white ignorance. Forms of 
insensitivity to matters of race prevent Whites from acknowledging the 
ways in which they may be complicit in racial oppression, which in turn 
allows prejudicial behaviour to remain unchallenged. Racial 
insensitivity, as the affective component of white ignorance, constitutes 
therefore an obstacle for taking responsibility and acting against one’s 
participation in oppression. The fact that these insensitivities remain 
undetected partly accounts for their persistence: what remains 
                                            
those such as Jews, black people, Latino/as, and others. Their skin is dark because 
unwashed, and they are perceived as having a particular ‘racial smell’ that is borne of 
filth. On another related level, their alleged dirtiness is a sign of a more intangible -
though perceived as no less real- uncleanliness. Their inferiority to white people is 
found in their moral, spiritual, and mental impurity.” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 73). 
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undetected remains unchallenged and is therefore more effectively 
reproduced.  
Similarly, Sullivan’s investigation of unconscious habits sheds 
light on how the body is involved in sustaining white group interests. 
Psychic and somatic habits play an active role in securing white 
narcissistic constructions of Whites as clean, race-free, odour-free, etc. 
Some of the body’s operations, and the way White subjects imagine their 
bodies to be, guarantee a particular self-image that is informed by the 
white imagination and its social hierarchies. Psychic and somatic habits 
are recalcitrant in that they thwart conscious efforts of Whites to change 
them. Part of that recalcitrance, in Sullivan’s analysis, is due to their 
unconscious dimension. This does not necessarily entail that psychic and 
somatic racist habits are unchangeable. However, it indicates that any 
attempt to modify them will take more than merely becoming aware of 
one’s non-conscious patterns of thought, and more than consciously 
professing well-intentioned disavowals of racial domination. In order to 
effect individual and collective change, the unconscious processes 
through which psyche, body and the racial imagination are intertwined 
need to be engaged. 
 
I have been arguing that the impact of white domination in the 
formation of white subjectivity has affective and embodied dimensions, 
alongside the cognitive one’s analysed by Charles Mills under the 
heading of white ignorance. I have shown that domination works 
through processes that are not merely cognitive, but also affective and 
physiological, and not simply through the conscious embrace of racist 
views but through unconscious processes that are also shared by Whites 
who think of themselves as opposing racism. Medina and Sullivan’s 
account of affective and embodied aspects of white ignorance suggest 
that certain emotions are non-accidentally connected to it. I now turn to 
develop a more detailed account of the emotional phenomena non-
accidentally connected to white privilege. 
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5.5 Emotional patterns non-accidentally connected to whiteness  
 
Sullivan focuses on habit as a psychosomatic formation. From her 
analysis we can understand habits, in their simultaneously psychic and 
somatic dimension, as having particular emotional expressions. In some 
of the examples above, psychosomatic habits of white privilege relate to 
tasting/digesting, smelling and hearing. The latter are most probably 
linked with patterns of disgust which may have a protective role in 
securing Whites’ sense of self as “clean”, “pure”, etc. But as I have 
argued, the perspective of the oppressed provides special insight into the 
emotional lives of oppressors. 
The emotions non-accidentally connected to the white embodied 
self also have a distinctive phenomenology from the perspective of 
subjects who are targeted by racism, as narratives and 
phenomenological descriptions of oppression show. For example, in 
Lorde’s account of one of her first encounters with racial hatred, 
manifestations of disgust were displayed: the mouth-twitching, the wide-
eyed gazing, the flared nostrils of the White woman on the subway train 
to Harlem. The White woman’s horrified expression signifies to the 
young Audre that there must be something truly disgusting to justify 
her reaction (“I do not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the 
seat between us – probably a roach”). The way the White woman’s body 
moves away from her (“The fur brushes past my face as she stands with 
a shudder”) communicates horror, hatred, disgust in non-verbal ways 
(“No word has been spoken”). Yet all this is felt by the child, even if she 
does not fully understand the meaning: “Something’s going on here I do 
not fully understand, but I will never forget it. Her eyes. The flared 
nostrils. The hate.” (Lorde, 2007, pp. 147–148) 
Lorde’s narrative not only shows what racist abuse does to the 
oppressed, it sheds light on how racism is connected with particular 
emotional configurations in the oppressors. In the next section, I draw 
on Sara Ahmed’s (2007) phenomenological analysis of whiteness viewed 
178 
 
from the perspectives of the oppressed in order to highlight the 
emotional aspects associated with whiteness. I will connect Ahmed’s 
analysis of comfort as the affective component of whiteness for White 
bodies with Sullivan’s notion of “ontological expansiveness”.  
 
5.5.1 White comfort: a relational emotional attunement  
 
Drawing on “experiences of inhabiting a white world as a non-white 
body”, Sara Ahmed reveals the relational character of whiteness in its 
bodily and emotional dimensions. Ahmed takes Fanon’s description of 
what he would have to do if he wanted to smoke next to a White man as 
the starting point for her analysis of whiteness, which appears 
affectively marked by comfort for White bodies: 
 
And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. 
An unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my 
claims. In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the 
development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a 
negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness. The body is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I know that if I 
want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right arm and take the pack 
of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. The matches, however, 
are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back slightly. And 
all these movements are made not out of habit, but out of implicit 
knowledge. (Fanon, 1986, pp. 110–11, as cited in Ahmed, 2007, p. 152). 
 
Ahmed notes how Fanon’s description of how his body is in relation to 
the space, to objects, and to others “takes the form of an argument with 
phenomenology”. While Husserl and Merleau-Ponty only focused on 
describing “the tactile, kinaesthetic and visual character of embodied 
reality” (Ahmed, 2007, p. 153), Fanon introduces “a historic-racial 
schema” (Fanon, 1986, as cited in Ahmed, 2007, p. 153). He captures 
what it means for him to move in a spatial setting that makes things 
familiar and easily available to a White body, but not to a man of colour. 
By merely thinking of the movements his body would have to make in 
order to smoke, he is “burdened” by an “unfamiliar weight”. His body 
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becomes “surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” under 
the gaze of the White man. Whiteness, then, structures what bodies can 
and cannot do, or the easiness with which they can do what they intend 
to do: 
 
Fanon’s example shows the body before it is racialized, or made black by 
becoming the object of the hostile white gaze. In this sense, for Fanon, 
race ‘interrupts’ the corporeal schema. Alternatively, we could say that 
‘the corporeal schema’ is already racialized; in other words, race does 
not just interrupt such a schema, but structures its mode of operation. 
The corporeal schema is of a ‘body-at-home’. If the world is made white, 
then the body-at-home is one that can inhabit whiteness. (Ahmed, 2007, 
p. 153) 
 
Ahmed analyses whiteness as habitual, describing how it allows White 
bodies to be unproblematic, unnoticeable, while marking non-White 
bodies as noticeable, unable to “fit”. Whiteness, as habitual, orientates 
around its orbit what bodies can and cannot do: “Spaces are orientated 
‘around’ whiteness, insofar as whiteness is not seen” (Ahmed, 2007, p. 
157). If whiteness is what allows White bodies to go unnoticed in a white 
world, it is what restricts, by the same token, the privilege of being 
“unproblematic” to non-White bodies. But to go unnoticed, to exist 
unproblematically, has an emotional dimension to it. If, as discussed in 
previous chapters, there are emotional attunements non-accidentally 
connected to being oppressed (shame, guilt, fear; a cluster of 
disempowering feelings in which the self is diminished), there may also 
be emotional attunements non-accidentally connected to whiteness as a 
form of privilege. Ahmed characterizes the emotional attunement of 
whiteness as comfort: 
 
To be orientated, or to be at home in the world, is also to feel a certain 
comfort: we might only notice comfort as an affect when we lose it, when 
we become uncomfortable. The word ‘comfort’ suggests well-being and 
satisfaction, but it can also suggest an ease and easiness. Comfort is 
about an encounter between more than one body, which is the promise 
of a ‘sinking’ feeling. To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s 
environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and 
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the world begins. One fits, and by fitting the surfaces of bodies 
disappears from view. White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit 
spaces that extend their shape. The bodies and spaces ‘point’ towards 
each other, as a ‘point’ that is not seen as it is also ‘the point’ from which 
we see. In other words, whiteness may function as a form of public 
comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken 
their shape. Those spaces are lived as comfortable as they allow bodies 
to fit in; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the 
shape of such bodies. (Ahmed, 2007, p. 158) 
 
Comfort, as Ahmed argues, might only become noticeable as an 
emotional phenomenon once we lose it. This may help to explain why it 
is difficult to acknowledge the emotional aspects that are non-
accidentally connected to occupying locations of privilege. Subjects are 
oblivious to their own privilege. 
Comfort, as an emotional attunement, is felt with less awareness, 
and therefore, perhaps, with less intensity. By contrast, the experience 
of being oppressed may appear as more evidently emotional because the 
cluster of negative, painful and disempowering emotions that we’ve been 
describing are probably more intensely experienced in general than what 
we may describe as the emotional ramifications of comfort: confidence, 
entitlement and overconfidence or arrogance. The non-White body 
experiences whiteness as that which makes it acutely aware of its own 
embodiment. Rather than being allowed to circulate unnoticed38, the 
non-white body experiences whiteness as a restriction, as that which 
stops it from moving, circulating, doing, etc.: “Who are you? Why are you 
here? What are you doing? Each question, when asked, is a kind of 
stopping device (...)” (Ahmed, 2007, p. 161). In this sense, the lived 
                                            
38 There is here a relevant distinction to draw between being allowed to circulate with 
ease, unnoticed, and being made to feel invisible, which is another dimension of racism. 
In many ways, the pain that racism inflicts had to do either with not being seen (e.g. 
Pecola in The Bluest Eye is not seen by the adult white world surrounding her), or with 
being seen as what one is not; being mischaracterized, misrepresented. To be unnoticed 
is a mark of racial privilege insofar as it allows people to circulate and have access to 
spaces without obstacles, without being stopped or being made to feel that their body or 
existence is a problem. By contrast, to be made invisible is being denied recognition as 
a full human being, and therefore, being denied full presence and action in the world. 
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spatiality of non-White bodies is affectively marked by discomfort39. 
Non-Whites being uncomfortable is a function of White bodies’ comfort in 
a world organised in many ways around them. And comfort, as being at 
ease in one’s environment, felt as an extension of one’s bodily shape, 
produces expectations of comfort, which we may also take the form of 
feelings of entitlement to comfort. 
 
5.5.2 “Ontological expansiveness”: feeling entitled to comfort 
 
Feelings of entitlement carry with them an unquestioned assumption 
about the self as capable and rightfully deserving “by default” of 
whatever it desires and undertakes. They may be amongst the emotional 
phenomena that go most undetected by those who experience them, 
precisely because they presuppose these unquestioned assumptions. A 
dimension of white entitlement is visible in what Sullivan calls 
“ontological expansiveness”: “As ontologically expansive, white people 
consider all spaces as rightfully available for [them to inhabit]” 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 144). Sullivan draws on a passage from Patricia 
Williams’ Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991), to highlight the 
connections between race, space, and the different kind of “lived 
spatiality” that White and non-White bodies are allowed to have: 
 
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Williams explains that while 
shopping one Saturday afternoon before Christmas in New York, she 
was denied entrance into a Benetton clothing boutique. As Williams 
recounts, many small stores and boutiques in New York installed 
buzzers in the mid-1980s to reduce the incidence of robbery. 
‘‘Legitimate’’ customers could be admitted into the shop, and those who 
looked undesirable could be prevented from entering the store at all. 
After pressing a buzzer to request that the door be unlocked so that she 
might be admitted, Williams peered into the store to see a white teenage 
                                            
39 Discomfort, however, need not always be negative. As Sara Ahmed points out, some 
ways of not fitting in, of being the outsider, can be productive: “Every experience I have 
had of pleasure and excitement about a world opening up has begun with such ordinary 
feelings of discomfort, of not quite fitting in a chair, of becoming unseated, of being left 
holding the ground.” (Ahmed, 2007, p. 163) 
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employee stare at her a few seconds and then mouth that the store was 
closed, even though several white patrons clearly were shopping inside. 
(Sullivan, 2006, p. 144) 
 
There is a disparity between what is allowed to White and non-White 
bodies in terms of easiness and comfort, and in their sense of 
entitlement to particular settings and situations, although, as Sullivan 
notes, this has different manifestations when race, gender and class 
intersect: 
 
Black and white bodily existence differentially licenses people to inhabit 
space in unequal, non-reciprocal ways. White people may freely transact 
beyond their immediately inhabited spaces. The whiteness of their space 
is expansive and enables, rather than inhibits, their transactions. This 
often is not true in precisely the same ways for white men and white 
women; the former generally live space more expansively than do the 
latter. For example, some young middle- to upper-class white men view 
‘‘slumming’’ in lower-class non-white communities as a rite of passage 
by which they rebel against their parents. In contrast, white middle-to 
upper-class women are more likely to avoid entering those 
neighborhoods out of fear of being sexually attacked—which is not to 
say that such avoidance is less racist than the intrusive attitude of some 
young white men toward non-white communities. But even though 
white women may not transact as freely as do men in some situations, 
qua white both white women and white men tend to live their space as a 
corporeal entitlement to spatiality. While their gender complicates and 
often limits the degree to which they expansively live their spatiality, 
white women’s whiteness provides them a racial license to 
unencumbered spatial existence. Black people, on the other hand, are 
not supposed to transact in such an expansive way. Their existence is 
confined due to the racialization of space. (Sullivan, 2006, p. 148) 
 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah (2014) offers an eloquent 
illustration of whites ontological expansiveness, in White peoples’ 
assumed entitlement to non-White spaces, and in particular, of Whites’ 
sense of entitlement to talk, as a way of occupying the sonic field. The 
scene, described by the narrator and main character of the novel, 
Ifemelu, takes place at Mariama’s hairdressing salon, which is located in 
a mainly Black neighbourhood and has a mainly Black clientele:  
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(...) a young white woman came in, soft-bodied and tanned, her hair held 
back in a loose ponytail.  
“Hi!” she said.  
Mariama [the hairdresser] said “Hi”, and then waited, wiping her 
hands over and over the front of her shorts.  
“I wanted to get my hair braided? You can braid my hair, right?” 
Mariama smiled an overly eager smile. “Yes. We do every kind of 
hair. Do you want braids or cornrows?” She was furiously cleaning the 
chair now. “Please sit”.  
The woman sat down and said she wanted cornrows. “Kind of 
like Bo Derek in the movie? You know that movie 10?”    
“Yes, I know,” Mariama said. Ifemelu doubted that she did. 
“I’m Kelsey,” the woman announced as though to the whole room. 
She was aggressively friendly. She asked where Mariama was from, 
how long she had been in America, if she had children, how her business 
was doing.  
“Business is up and down but we try,” Mariama said.  
“But you couldn’t even have this business back in your country, 
right? Isn’t it wonderful that you get to come to the US and now your 
kids can have a better life?” 
Mariama looked surprised. “Yes.” 
“Are women allowed to vote in your country?” Kelsey asked. 
A longer pause from Mariama. “Yes.” 
“What are you reading?” Kelsey turned to Ifemelu.  
Ifemelu showed her the cover of the novel. She did not want to 
start a conversation. Especially not with Kelsey. She recognized in 
Kelsey the nationalism of liberal Americans who copiously criticized 
America but did not like you to do so; they expected you to be silent and 
grateful, and always reminded you of how much better than wherever 
you had come from America was. (Ngozi Adichie, 2014, pp. 188–189).  
 
Despite manifesting awareness of the fact that she is entering into a 
traditionally non-White space (“You can braid my hair, right?” shows an 
awareness that her kind of hair is not habitual in that space), Kelsey 
manifests her sense of entitlement in the way she takes up space, not 
only physically, by merely entering the room and asking to get her hair 
braided (thus appropriating a cultural practice), but also by the way her 
voice fills the space (“‘I’m Kelsey,’ the woman announced as though to 
the whole room”). Her inquisitive manners could be perceived as 
innocent and polite expressions of curiosity and openness, but through 
Ifemelu’s informed perspective on race relations in the U.S., they are 
laid bare in all their entitlement and condescension. “She was 
aggressively friendly”, that is, her friendliness is a way of asserting her 
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presence and her right to interrogate. The practice of interrogation, in 
this context, is a way of asserting power through an appropriation of the 
space, including of the persons who inhabit it. This is also visible in how 
Kelsey imposes her narrative on Mariama. She is less interested in 
Mariama’s real story, than in echoing, through its fantasized 
reconstruction, a narcissistic confirmation of how “wonderful” her nation 
is (“But you couldn’t have this business back in your country, right? Isn’t 
it wonderful that you get to come to the U.S. and now your kids can have 
a better life?”). Mariama becomes then captive of Kelsey’s imaginary 
constructions. Her fantasies show how her sense of entitlement is tied to 
her sense of belonging to a nation that supposedly gives “a better life” to 
the children of non-White migrants. We can imagine that, in Mariama’s 
expression of surprise, and in her silences, she is attempting to resist 
Kelsey’s intrusive interpretation. 
Ahmed’s phenomenological description of whiteness as an 
embodied habit whose emotional dimension is marked by comfort, and 
Sullivan’s analysis of ontological expansiveness, which I interpret as a 
manifestation of white entitlement to comfort, shed light on the cluster of 
emotional phenomena that are non-accidentally connected to racial 
privilege. Comfort and entitlement to comfort constitute an emotional 
structure that accounts for one of the ways in which white privilege is 
reproduced. Comfort, on the one hand, is an emotional phenomenon, 
characterized by the fact that it remains relatively unperceived by the 
subject. It is one of the elements that allow racial privilege to be in many 
ways invisible to those who benefit from it. Feelings of entitlement, on 
the other hand, stem from comfort as the general emotional structure of 
privilege. Comfort allows privilege to be invisibilized, and therefore 
naturalised. It provides the conditions for subjects to expect that the 
world will be available to them. 
The fact that comfort and feelings of entitlement are the 
emotional structures of white privilege becomes even more evident when 
comfort is withdrawn. When white privilege is challenged, discomfort 
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rises to the surface, and strong emotional defensive mechanisms get 
triggered to maintain power. This is visible in documented white 
emotional reactions to racial discomfort in pedagogical contexts. I now 
go on to show how comfort, as a feature of the emotional structure of 
privilege, is manifested in the display of defensive emotional reactions 
that seek to restore it as a way of recentering power. 
 
5.5.3 Discomfort and reactive emotions 
 
In this section I argue that oppressors tend towards defensive emotional 
reactions in order to deny their participation in oppression and to deflect 
responsibility for it. They can do this by seeking to obtain comfort from 
the oppressed after being challenged about the ways they participate in 
racism. Regaining comfort is, in this sense, restoring privilege, and 
therefore power. Insofar as oppressed subjects are required to provide 
comfort for oppressors, I argue that oppressors’ reactions tend to be 
emotionally exploitative. 
In her article “Comforting Discomfort as Complicity: White 
Fragility and the Pursuit of Invulnerability” (2017), Barbara Applebaum 
introduces her critique of “comforting discomfort” as a pedagogical 
practice with an account of an event that illustrates common reactions 
when the complicity of Whites in racial oppression is raised for 
discussion: 
 
Last year my colleague invited me to visit her class and address the 
topic of “Discourse, Truth, and White Strategies of Denial.” After my 
presentation, a lively conversation ensued around white denials of 
racism and complicity that was led primarily by the students of color in 
the class. These students gave numerous examples demonstrating how 
white denials of racism and complicity manifest themselves in their 
university classrooms, and in fact, they gave ample instances of such 
denials that transpired in the very classroom in which I was invited to 
speak. Most significantly, they poignantly articulated the effects that 
such denials had on them. 
Noticing that the white students in the class were silent, I 
pressed them to engage with what the students of color were saying. A 
white male student, clearly agitated, said he didn’t understand why the 
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students of color were so “angry” and that they seemed to be over-
sensitive and offended by practices that were not ill-intended. Two 
female students of color reacted to his comments with frustration and 
infuriation, one announcing that she was contemplating leaving the 
room, to which the white student protested both with anger and tears 
insisting that he was not racist. 
Given that the very topic of my presentation was white 
discursive practices of denial, the white student’s violent resistance 
could not remain unchallenged. As I critically questioned the white 
student’s discomfort and drew attention to the violence the students of 
color were experiencing, the white colleague who invited me to speak to 
her class interrupted by reproaching me for being too “hard” on her 
white student. Another student put his hand on the white student’s 
shoulder to comfort him. I immediately noticed that no one expressed 
the need to comfort the students of color who were experiencing difficult 
emotions. What just happened? White comfort was recentered, and 
white denials were protected in a class whose purported aim was exactly 
the converse. (Applebaum, 2017, p. 863) 
 
According to Applebaum, this episode is illustrative of what Robin Di 
Angelo (2011) names “white fragility”, “the ubiquitous practice in which 
white people react with a range of defensive moves that compensate for 
even the slightest distress caused by challenges to their racial 
worldviews and/or to their racial innocence” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 866). 
If White people’s privilege is experienced emotionally as comfort, and, 
more than that, as an entitlement to comfort, 
 
When that comfort is disturbed by the challenge of having to confront 
their “unconscious habits of white privilege” (Sullivan, 2006), whites 
have a repertoire of socially sanctioned discursive practices of escape. 
These discursive practices of escape include “the outward display of 
emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behavior such as 
argumentation, silence, and leaving” the scene (Di Angelo 2011, 54). 
Such moves function to restore comfort and, in fact, are manifestations 
of such habits of privilege that leave whites fragile and incapable of 
contemplating their role in racism. (Applebaum, 2017, p. 867) 
 
Applebaum argues that Robin Di Angelo’s account of white fragility can 
help understand the different ways in which power dynamics are at play 
in confrontations around racial issues. From her analysis we may 
identify a strand of the kind of emotionally exploitative practice that 
oppressors engage in at the expense of oppressed subjects. For example, 
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in pedagogical contexts, people of colour are often put under pressure “to 
mollify white discomfort at the sacrifice of their own educational and 
emotional needs.” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 867) While Di Angelo argues 
that this tendency to flee racial discomfort via a range of defensive 
emotions is a manifestation of fragility, i.e., of a kind of weakness and 
low tolerance for discomfort, Applebaum stresses that white fragility is 
not merely passive. It is not as though White subjects are simply ill-
equipped, trapped and incapable. Rather, she argues, white fragility is 
actively performed: “White people actively perform fragility and continue 
to perform it in a way that consolidates white narcissism and white 
arrogance – signs of power and privilege, not weakness.” (Applebaum, 
2017, p. 868) 
Performances of white fragility have been documented in popular 
culture and taken up in sociological scholarship under the heading of 
“white tears” (Srivastava, 2006). Through “white tears”, subjects deflect 
their responsibility for racism by enacting the role of the victim. 
Through performances of victimhood, White people manage to silence 
people of colour, reduce or eliminate their own sense of guilt, recenter 
the dynamic around their emotional needs and obtain comfort and 
sympathy, as the White male student in Applebaum’s example did, at 
the expense of other students of colour. These performances of 
victimhood are not merely an expression of psychological distress; they 
are manifestations of power, of what tends to happen when power is 
challenged, and of how power is reinstated through emotional means. 
Moreover, insofar as they silence the testimonies of people of colour and 
refuse to recognise their pain, “white tears” may constitute a particular 
kind of racial violence: 
 
Educational theorists have similarly noted how white emotions are 
protected in classroom discussions around racism. Zeus Leonardo 
explains that white students’ crying during difficult classroom 
discussions around race changes “the dynamics in those settings by 
redirecting sympathy away from People of Color” (Leonardo 2016, xiv). 
Leonardo also points to white confessions that function to assuage guilt. 
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When white guilt is placated, Leonardo argues, questions of 
accountability are dispelled and continued discussion of complicity 
comes to an end. Comforting white discomfort provides a type of 
absolution that restores the white comfort that was disrupted and is a 
form of violence that allows for the suffering of students of color to go 
unnoticed. (Applebaum, 2017, p. 865) 
 
But the fact that white fragility is actively performed does not imply 
that Whites follow a consciously premeditated script or are aware of 
acting strategically. Their defensive emotional reactions are for the most 
part spontaneous and not consciously calculated. The performance I 
have just described is not to be understood as “performed by a sovereign 
subject who takes on or acts a role.” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 869) Rather, 
drawing on Butler’s (1990/1999) use of the term, white fragility is 
performative in that it is “a form of doing whiteness” (Applebaum, 2017, 
p. 869): 
 
Like gender, whiteness “is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of 
repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over 
time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being” 
(Butler, 1990/1999, 43). Whiteness is thus a doing: less a property of 
skin than an enactment of power reproducing its dominance in both 
explicit and implicit ways” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 868. Italics in original) 
 
White fragility is one of the ways in which privilege can manifest itself. 
Applebaum contends that white fragility is not merely weakness or, as 
di Angelo argues, “lack of stamina”. Rather, it is “a performative 
enactment of invulnerability” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 868). Drawing on 
Erinn Gilson’s (2011) work, Applebaum understands invulnerability as 
an ideal implicitly conveyed by “prevalent definitions of vulnerability”, 
in which the notion of vulnerability has predominantly negative 
connotations: “Being vulnerable implies being weak, not protected, 
susceptible to harm, exposed to or at risk, defenseless and dependent, 
and, significantly, a victim.” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 869) Seeking 
invulnerability is therefore attempting to protect or distance oneself 
from what may be source of pain, unsettlement and discomfort: 
“Invulnerability thus invites closure” (Applebaum, 2017, p. 870). In 
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performing invulnerability, White people are not “weak”, but effectively 
protecting their position of privilege: 
 
If invulnerability functions as closure, then in seeking invulnerability 
we can ignore the ways in which we are vulnerable and dependent on 
our relations with others. Invulnerability is shored up by an ignorance 
or denial of vulnerability and is the basis of other forms of ignorance 
that enable the systematically privileged to maintain a position of 
privilege. (Applebaum, 2017, p. 870) 
 
5.5.4 Projective mechanisms 
 
I have argued that to be privileged has, in general terms, the bodily and 
emotional dimension of comfort, which in turn produces expectations or 
feelings of entitlement to comfort. In the preceding section I added a 
claim about what can happen when racial comfort is challenged. 
Defensive emotions play a role in restoring comfort and re-establishing 
racial power. We may link this process with the forms of epistemic and 
affective insensitivity or numbness described by Medina. To restore 
comfort is a way of restoring the privilege of not feeling distressed by the 
impact of racism in one’s life, and by one’s complicity in relations of 
oppression. 
However, as I have also argued, there is an additional relational 
dimension to white comfort. If the emotional attunement of being a 
White body in a white world is marked by feelings of comfort and 
entitlement, the flipside is that the non-White body is read as that which 
causes discomfort. More radically, George Yancy argues that the 
relational aspect of whiteness means that Whites’ sense of comfort, 
security, and self-esteem, is largely dependent on the construction of 
non-White bodies as dangerous, criminal and defective. In other words, 
it is not only that the status quo of white dominance has the effect of 
producing disempowering emotional attunements in the oppressed. 
Yancy contends that Whites have needed to build their domination on 
the material degradation and imaginative misconstrual of the non-White 
body. 
190 
 
This process, as I go on to show, involves forms of emotional 
parasitism. These are visible in two main mechanisms: forms of 
psychological projection; and demands for emotional labour. 
George Yancy’s description and analysis of “white embodied 
gazing” gives us further insight into the emotional dimensions linked to 
the cognitive and psychosomatic habits described by Mills, Medina, 
Alcoff, Sullivan and Ahmed. Furthermore, Yancy’s analysis highlights 
the parasitic or exploitative dimension of whiteness and helps us see 
how some of the emotional patterns of the oppressed partly originate in 
the particular ways that Whites exercise their power. For example, 
Black shame is a function of White’s self-perception as ‘pure’ and of their 
projection of the abject upon Black bodies. In this sense, Whites need 
Black shame in order to confirm their own ‘purity’. This dialectic, and 
the parasitic dimension of whiteness is all the more insidious in its logic 
and ways of operation in that it produces at the same time an illusory 
image of the White subject as not dependent on the Black body: 
 
The Black body has been historically marked, disciplined, and scripted 
and materially, psychologically, and morally invested in to ensure both 
white supremacy and the illusory construction of the white subject as a 
self-contained substance whose existence does not depend upon the 
construction of the Black qua ‘inferior’. (Yancy, 2017, p. 17) 
 
These “illusions of the self” that populate White people’s imaginary 
constructions operate in everyday social interactions where the Black 
body (but we could also extend some of this analysis to other non-White 
bodies) is, in Yancy’s terms, confiscated, i.e., robbed of its agency, put 
under the control of white supremacist institutions, exploited and 
degraded. Yancy names institutions, practices and cases that exemplify 
the confiscation of the Black body, such as slavery, lynching, or 
unethical scientific experimentations such as the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, and, in today’s society, the disproportionate mass incarceration of 
Black people in North America (Yancy, 2017, p. 18). These ways of 
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confiscating the Black body, Yancy argues, are a crucial function of 
Whites’ own sense and possibility of agency:  
 
whiteness comes replete with its assumptions for what to expect of a 
Black body (or nonwhite body); how dangerous and unruly it is; how 
unlawful, criminal, and hypersexual it is. The discourse and 
comportment of whites are shaped through tacit racist scripts, calcified 
modes of being that enable them to sustain and perpetuate their 
whitely-being-in-the-world. (Yancy, 2017, p. 19). 
 
As a way of showing the relational dimension of the meaning of 
Blackness, Yancy analyses a common, “peculiar experience”, which he 
names “the elevator effect”. Yancy’s description provides further 
evidence for the claim that white privilege is importantly emotionally 
structured as comfort. In his account of “the elevator effect”, Yancy 
describes how, in daily, trivial encounters with White people, his body 
often becomes “confiscated without physically being placed in chains”. 
From his description we can have a sense of how Whites sustain 
oppression by displaying anxiety and fear at the mere sight of a Black 
body. In many instances, the Black body seems to be experienced by the 
White body as that which causes discomfort in the forms of fear and 
anxiety. These emotional responses to the presence of non-White bodies 
are, in Yancy’s view, forms of projection through which Whites sustain 
their sense of self. The image of the non-White as embodying 
criminality, dirtiness, disease etc., insofar as it is placed outside the 
white ego, sustains the imaginary identification of the self as innocent, 
clean, pure, etc. In other words, if Whites continue to be attached to 
their sense of purity, cleanliness and moral integrity, they will need to 
continue placing the non-White as that which brings the threat of 
discomfort (which can be fantasized as the threat of violence):  
 
Well-dressed, I enter an elevator where a white woman waits to reach 
her floor. She ‘sees’ my Black body, though not the same one I have seen 
reflected back to me from the mirror on any number of occasions. 
Buying into the myth that one’s dress says something about the person, 
one might think that the markers of my dress (suit and tie) should erase 
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her tension. What is it that makes the markers of my dress inoperative? 
She sees a Black male body ‘supersaturated with meaning, as they 
[Black bodies] have been relentlessly subjected to [negative] 
characterization by newspapers, newscasters, popular film, television 
programming, public officials, policy pundits and other agents of 
representation’. Her body language signifies, ‘Look, the Black!’ On this 
score, through a sort of performative locution, her body language 
functions as an insult. Over and above how my body is clothed, she ‘sees’ 
a criminal, she sees me as a threat. (Yancy, 2017, pp. 20–21) 
 
We can see from Yancy’s description and analysis that the fear and 
anxiety displayed by the White woman functions as a sort of disciplining 
method that frames the Black body as dangerous and criminal by virtue 
of its very existence. No action by the Black body is needed. The White 
woman’s fear and anxiety condemn it “by default”: “(...) one might say 
that Blackness functions metaphorically as original sin. There is not 
anything as such that a Black body needs to do in order to be found 
blameworthy” (Yancy, 2017, p. 21). Emotions become, in this way, a form 
of discipline. Fear and anxiety signal the disruption of comfort and sense 
of entitlement of the White woman; the Black body poses a problem, 
being perceived as threatening her physical integrity. Yancy highlights 
the parasitic dimension of these common white emotional reactions: 
“[the White woman is] unaware of how the feeling of her white bodily 
upsurge and expansiveness is purchased at the expense of my Black 
body” (Yancy, 2017, p. 21. My emphasis). This is so because, even though 
this encounter with the White woman’s fear “does not shatter [his 
identity]”, it nevertheless produces an acute awareness of his own 
embodied existence: 
 
My movements become and remain stilted. I dare not move suddenly. 
(...) I feel trapped. (...) I now begin to calculate, paying almost neurotic 
attention to my body movements, making sure that this ‘Black object’, 
what now feels like an appendage, a weight, is not too close, not too tall, 
not too threatening. (...) So, I genuflect, but only slightly, a movement 
that somewhat resembles an act of worship. I am reminded of how 
certain postures – “bowing and scraping” - were reenacted over 
generations, sometimes no doubt unconsciously. My lived-body comes 
back to me (...) as something to be dealt with, as a challenge. (Yancy, 
2017, p. 33). 
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The emotions displayed in cases like the White woman in the elevator 
have an exploitative element. Comfort needs to be sustained in the face 
of fear. Therefore, the oppressed are implicitly required to perform 
different kinds of emotional labour, such as adapting their behaviour in 
order to reduce white discomfort: to bow in order to appear less 
threatening, to smile, but not enough to seem menacing, and so on.  
In reply to the objection that the White woman’s intentions may 
have been misinterpreted, Yancy notes that, even if we hypothetically 
concede the possibility of misinterpretation, the elevator example 
condenses a multitude of signals that have become part of a shared 
knowledge among Black people:  
 
My judgement is not whimsical or simply subjective; her gestures are 
interpreted within the context of cumulative cases, where the reasons I 
give are ‘like the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain’, indicative of a 
gestalt-like assessment of the evidence. So, my justifiable belief about 
the white woman’s gesture is interdependent; the evidence for her 
having enacted a racist gesture is a form of commonsense knowledge 
among Black people. (Yancy, 2017, p. 24) 
 
Even granting the possibility of making an error of judgement in reading 
the White woman’s expressions of fear and disgust, this does not 
disprove “the warranted assertability of other claims regarding the 
racist actions of whites” (Yancy, 2017, p. 24) profusely documented by 
non-Whites as part of their common experience or racism. The “elevator 
effect”, Yancy argues, is not an isolated incident, but must be understood 
“as a replicative instance of the larger social macrocosm of problems” 
within a racist society. The projective fear displayed by the White 
woman in the elevator is to be understood in connection with other kinds 
of violence that target Black people at a larger scale. Yancy links his 
“elevator effect” example to the case of the beating of Rodney King, an 
African-American taxi-driver, by police in the United States: 
 
Judith Butler provides an insightful analysis of the Rodney King 
beating and verdict that squares well with my interpretation of the 
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interconnections between what is “seen”, what is “not seen”, racism, and 
the construction of the “Black body”. Butler’s analysis illustrates how 
white fear was projected onto King’s body, as it is projected onto my 
Black body in my elevator example, to the point that his attempts to 
defend himself were seen as a threat. As Butler makes clear, “the video 
shows a man being beaten.” She asks, though, how the jury in Simi 
Valley came to “see” King’s prone body as a dangerous and threatening 
object that the police had to further subdue over and over again with 
their batons? Like in the elevator, a contestation emerges within the 
visual field and a battle takes place over the meaning of the Black 
body’s intentions. According to Butler, King’s Black body was 
schematized through “the inverted projections of white paranoia”. 
(Yancy, 2017, p. 35) 
 
Importantly, the argumentative strategy adopted by the defence 
attorneys of the police officers accused in the Rodney King case played 
on the stereotypical constructions of the Black body as “wild” and 
“dangerous”, whilst the White policemen were presented as “guardians” 
of “civilization”: 
 
After inviting the jurors to see the events from the point of view of the 
police officers, the defense attorneys elicited testimony from King’s 
assailants that depicted King repeatedly as a bear, and as emitting 
bear-like groans. In the eyes of the police, and then again in the eyes of 
the jurors, King’s black body became that of a wild “Hulk-like” and 
“wounded” animal, whose every gesture threatened the existence of 
civilized society. Not surprisingly, the defense attorneys portrayed the 
white bodies which assailed King as guardians against the wild, and as 
embodying a “thin blue line” that separates civil society from the 
dangerous chaos which is the essence of the wild. (Gooding-Williams, 
“Look, a Negro!”, p. 166, in Yancy, 2017, p. 36). 
 
We may ask ourselves how much the construction of the Black body as 
“dangerous” generates a socially acceptable narrative that allows people 
to express the pleasure taken in humiliating and degrading Black bodies 
that, as Sullivan argues, were part of the common habits of white 
supremacy in the U.S. As Yancy adds, “one wonders to what extent 
white racist police officers actually reap satisfaction from the sight of a 
‘whimpering’ Black male” (Yancy, 2017, p. 48n49). Whether or not fear is 
actually felt by policemen in most cases of brutality against Black 
people, fear is used as a common justification for police violence. If this 
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justification is, in most cases, socially accepted, and institutionally 
validated (for example, in prevalent impunity in cases of police violence) 
it is because it “fits” with the predominant ways in which white 
imaginary constructions have already partly legitimized fear as a 
warranted emotion of Whites with respect to Black people and other 
non-White bodies. 
There is therefore a continuum between the White woman in the 
elevator who displays fear and disgust; the woman in the subway train 
to Harlem who manifests disgust and hatred; the hand of the White 
child, recoiled in fear and disgust from touching W.E.B. Du Bois’ 
exchange card; the psychological pleasure that White slave owners 
derived from degrading and torturing slaves, and contemporary forms of 
police violence exercised in overwhelmingly disproportionate ways 
against non-White bodies, particularly against Black bodies in the 
United States. Without claiming that all these instances can be 
amalgamated (they obviously constitute distinct forms of violence, 
varying in shape, degree, and in context), there are nevertheless 
common threads between them. In the cases discussed, what is salient is 
that the emotional patterns exhibited by Whites in their encounters with 
non-White people (overt or covert patterns of disgust, fear, and pleasure 
taken in humiliating Black and non-White bodies), function as projective 
mechanisms through which the non-White bodies become the site of 
White people’s ejecta (Yancy): the “dirty”, “disgusting”, “smelly”, 
“dangerous”, “criminal”, “rapist”, etc. are the non-White Others. 
Importantly, fear and disgust, as projective mechanisms, function in 
ways that sustain and reinforce oppression. The fear of the Black body, 
analysed as a white projection by Yancy and Butler, is not only an 
emotion, but acts as an instrument of power when used as the 
justification for punishment and police violence. Moreover, fear, disgust, 
and other emotions displayed by White people in the contact of non-
White people, not only via their speech and representations, but also 
through their body language, can be part of what is internalised by 
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oppressed subjects as the cluster of disempowering feelings (shame, 
guilt, feeling defective) although, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
in different ways and to different degrees, and not without resistance. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I focused on examining how white subjectivity does not 
only involve distinctive kinds of cognitive patterns, conceptualized by 
Mills as white ignorance, but also how in white ignorance, cognition and 
affectivity are closely linked. White ignorance is also constituted and 
perpetuated through embodied habits that are, in many ways, 
unconscious. Drawing on discussions of these phenomena, and on 
phenomenological descriptions of whiteness as analysed from the 
perspective of the oppressed, I extracted emotional patterns non-
accidentally connected to white privilege. I argued that comfort is the 
salient emotional structure of white privilege, sustained by forms of 
entitlement connected to expectations of comfort. Simultaneously, strong 
defensive emotions are produced when comfort is challenged. Reactive 
emotions such as anger, guilt and shame, and other related behavioural 
phenomena – such as engaging in argumentation, crying or disengaging 
from the challenging situation – seek to restore comfort as a way of 
restoring privilege. I argued that attempts to restore comfort, as a way 
to reinstating power, often come coupled with burdening emotional 
demands placed on non-White subjects. The latter are expected to 
protect white comfort, either by avoiding issues related to racism, or by 
presenting such issues in a way that will protect white feelings. 
Whiteness, then, has strong emotional roots in comfort, expectations of 
comfort and in the different emotional strategies through which White 
subjects seek to maintain power and enforce domination by expecting 
forms of emotional subservience from non-White people.
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6. The emotional patterns of masculinity 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I aim to identify some of the emotional patterns non-
accidentally connected to male privilege, and the role they play in 
sustaining gender oppression. As sociologist R. Connell (2005) contends, 
masculinities became increasingly the focus of social sciences in the 
aftermath of the Women’s Liberation Movement in the Western world. 
In the last five decades, a vast array of studies has identified cognitive 
as well as emotional patterns linked with masculinity. This exploration 
has an earlier precedent in the work of seventeenth and eighteenth-
century philosophers, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, who identified the 
role of social oppression in the formation of female and male character, 
as well as its impact on the moral and intellectual capacities of men and 
women. 
It is an impossible project to capture the great variety and 
diversity of work produced in this area, let alone to give a comprehensive 
account of the emotional patterns of masculinity as a single, unified and 
universal phenomenon. In this chapter, I shall choose Bonnie Mann’s 
(2014) account of masculinity as the main source for conducting my 
argument. First of all, as I’ll go on to argue, Mann’s account of 
masculinity is particularly pertinent for my purposes in that it directly 
addresses the connection between gender and power. Following 
Beauvoir, it focuses on what gender does rather than on the 
metaphysical question of what gender is. Furthermore, as I’ll contend, 
Mann’s analysis offers a particularly illuminating angle from which to 
examine the emotional dimension of masculinity through its connection 
with embodiment and embodied habits. Mann’s account of male 
embodiment is grounded in Iris Young’s Throwing Like a Girl and 
employs Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological lens to analyse bodily style. 
This approach offers a particularly rich way of exploring and extracting 
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the emotional phenomena non-accidentally connected to masculinity as a 
form of domination. Moreover, in starting from the analysis of 
embodiment and bodily style, and moving on to shame as one of the 
grounding emotions in the formation of male subjectivity, Mann’s 
analysis offers interesting overlapping parallels with the way I 
proceeded in chapter 5, when extracting the emotional patterns non-
accidentally connected to white privilege through Sullivan’s account of 
embodied habits. 
Certainly, Mann and Sullivan proceed in rather different ways. As 
I showed in chapter 5, Sullivan draws on Laplanche’s psychoanalytic 
perspective rather than on a phenomenological one. Moreover, her 
notion of habit aims to encompass phenomena that are missing from 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of style (for example, psychosomatic habits 
connected to ingesting and digesting food, and correlated feelings of 
disgust). Despite these differences, Mann’s use of the notion of bodily 
style nevertheless resonates with Sullivan’s appeal to of unconscious 
bodily habits. Both accounts show how structures of racial and gender 
oppression and privilege partly shape people’s bodies (their bodily 
behaviour and their physiological functions). Moreover, this attention to 
embodiment shows in a compelling fashion how a wide range of 
emotional phenomena are connected to these same structures. In giving 
Bonnie Mann’s work a central place in my argument, I do not contend 
that the work of other feminist scholars would not be equally suitable to 
the task. There are, of course, other ways of getting at the phenomena I 
aim to explore. However, as I will show, Mann’s perspective is 
particularly illuminating and compelling for the purposes of my 
argument. 
 
6.2 The centrality of the lived body 
 
Any attempt to analyse the emotional patterns non-accidentally 
connected to “masculinity” requires clarification of this notion. To 
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discuss the diverse debates on the ontology of sex and gender of the last 
five decades is beyond the scope of this chapter. So, rather than entering 
into the details of these debates, I choose a perspective on gender that I 
think is particularly fruitful for identifying the emotional patterns with 
which I am concerned. I will draw on the phenomenological analysis of 
the lived body articulated by Bonnie Mann, who herself draws on the 
phenomenological analysis of Simone de Beauvoir and Iris Marion 
Young, in her book Sovereign Masculinity: Gender Lessons from the War 
on Terror (2014).  
Bonnie Mann highlights the centrality of the lived body for a 
richer understanding of gender and masculine subjectivity. Attention to 
the role played by embodiment in the formation of masculinity allows us 
to conceive of this form of domination as constituted by emotional 
structures which play a fundamental role in sustaining male 
domination, and therefore, women’s oppression. Following Bonnie 
Mann’s analysis, I shall begin by presenting the advantages of using the 
category of the lived body in order to think about masculinity. 
 
6.2.1 An impasse in feminist debates 
 
Feminist debates on the question of “gender” and “sexual difference” 
have reached a kind of “impasse” according to Bonnie Mann: “Feminist 
accounts of nature, whether critical or affirming, tend to be ghettoized 
around the question of sexual difference” (Mann, 2014, p. 37). 
Admittedly, the sex/gender distinction had emancipatory effects for 
women, as it challenged “traditional accounts of sexual difference, which 
justified the subordination of women through appeals to biology, nature 
more broadly, or God” (Mann, 2014, p. 81). Distinguishing female 
physiology (sex) from women’s psychological and intellectual capacities 
(gender) opened a space for thinking the possibility of freedom in 
women’s lives: biology, so the argument went, does not determine social 
reality.  
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However, the sex/gender distinction soon came under scrutiny. 
Rather than thinking “sex” as a natural given, feminist materialists 
argued that “what we understand to be biological sex is itself the product 
of the appropriation of women’s physical, emotional and sexual labor by 
men (Wittig, Guillaumin)” (Mann, 2014, p.82). In this sense, what is 
taken to be “natural” in women’s bodies is actually the product of an 
exploitative political system.  
In line with some of the arguments of materialist feminism, post-
structuralist feminist analysis – of which Judith Butler is perhaps the 
main representative – calls into question the gender-binary maintained 
in the sex-gender distinction. The male/female binary belies an 
underpinning normative heterosexuality that makes evident its political 
character. Not only is “gender” politically and socially constituted, but 
the notion that “sex” is a natural, pre-social “given” is in fact the product 
of an heteronormative logic. As Iris Marion Young puts it, “The 
discursive rules of normative heterosexuality produce gendered 
performances that subjects reiterate and cite; the sexing of bodies 
themselves derives from such performatives.” (Young, Lived Body vs. 
Gender, 2005, p. 15)  
From a different perspective, the advocates of “sexual difference 
feminism” challenge the aforementioned theories for ignoring an 
originary sexual difference which is irreducible to the ways that women 
and men are socially constituted. Symbolic constructions of gender are 
therefore grounded on natural sexual difference. 
While distancing herself from “sexual difference” feminisms, 
failing as they do to sufficiently challenge the historical use of sexual 
difference as a justification of women’s subordination, Bonnie Mann 
articulates a synthetic critique that applies to all the aforementioned 
theories for producing excessively rigid and reductive accounts of the 
distinction between “culture” and “nature”. Whilst materialist and post-
structuralist accounts tend to reduce “nature” to “culture”, sexual 
difference feminisms reduce “culture” to “nature”. Doing so, each of the 
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main strands of feminist thought fail to accept, or engage with, a 
fundamental and irreducible existential ambiguity. In trying to solve the 
tension between nature and culture, feminist discussions of sex and 
gender are symptomatic of “the common human unwillingness or 
incapacity to endure the ambiguity of the human condition” (Mann, 
2014, p. 37), namely, the irreducible tension between body and mind, 
nature and culture, immanence and transcendence. This “paradox of 
immanence and transcendence” is described by Beauvoir as follows: 
  
As long as there have been men who live, they have all experienced this 
tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there have been 
philosophers who think, most of them have tried to mask it. They have 
striven to reduce mind to matter, to absorb matter into mind, or merge 
them together within a single substance. Those who accepted the 
dualism established a hierarchy between the body and the soul that 
allowed the part of oneself that could not be saved to be considered as 
negligible (Beauvoir, 1948, p. 290, as cited in Mann, 2014, p. 35). 
 
Despite the fundamental differences between the feminist accounts 
mentioned so far, Mann considers that they share a desire to foreclose 
this tension, reflected in their conception of the distinction between 
gender and sex: 
  
The temptation is always to flee the ambiguity by reducing it, by 
making nature into consciousness (and I think the critics of sexual 
difference tend to do this by making nature a product of discourse or 
material practices), or by making consciousness into nature (and I think 
the champions of sexual difference tend to do this by claiming that 
women’s way of knowing or women’s way of writing are rooted in an 
originary, bodily difference). (Mann, 2014, p. 37) 
  
In collapsing nature into culture, or culture into nature, these accounts 
“reduce our field of engagement with the question of nature. We 
implicitly accept our confinement within the boundaries of natural 
sexual difference (…)” (Mann, 2014, p. 38).  
By contrast, Mann contends, Beauvoir’s political phenomenology 
offers a more fertile path for understanding gender, as well as notions of 
masculinity and femininity, outside of the confines of the sex/gender 
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debate. Beauvoir’s theory of gender is potentially liberating because it 
leaves the question of our relationship to nature undetermined: 
 
[Beauvoir] initiates a shift in how we think about the phenomenon of 
sexual difference, which maintains the ambiguity between sex as 
“natural” and gender as “cultural” (without, of course, having recourse 
to the notion of “gender” that came later and in another language 
context) by shifting the question from what femininity and masculinity 
are to what they do. (Mann, 2014, p. 11) 
 
For Beauvoir, Mann notes, the metaphysical question of sexual 
difference is a sort of trap. It serves “to mask or mystify a political 
reality” (Mann, 2014, p. 29). Sexual difference, for Beauvoir, is therefore 
not a problem of “substance” but one of “justification” (Mann, 2014, pp. 
29–30).   
 
6.2.2 Gender as justification 
 
Although The Second Sex has mainly been recognized for its analysis of 
femininity and women’s subordination, Mann interprets Beauvoir’s 
ground-breaking work as containing, between the lines, a “sketchy and 
underdeveloped” analysis of masculinity “in its sovereign form” (Mann, 
2014, p. 21). Bonnie Mann aims therefore to expand Beauvoir’s account 
of gender as justification in order to develop her own analysis of 
“sovereign masculinity”, the gendered way in which the nation imagines 
itself.  
What does Mann mean when she says that Beauvoir understands 
gender as an “operation of justification”? What does gender justify, and 
how is this done? Gender legitimises and justifies relations of 
subordination and domination, by an appeal to nature as an explanatory 
causal element accounting for the differential social treatment of men 
and women. At first glance, it could be argued that some of the feminist 
debates previously described also identified these operations of 
justification. However, unlike the debates that have reached an 
“impasse” around the sex/gender question, the originality and fecundity 
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of Beauvoir’s analysis lies in the fact that it does not narrow the relation 
between “nature” and “culture” to a linear and direct causal chain. 
Rather, Mann contends, the strength of Beauvoir’s account resides in 
how it “undoes causality” by showing how the causal relations between 
nature and culture are better thought as interlocking, rather than as 
linear and unidirectional: 
  
While in patriarchal accounts, nature causes social power differences 
between men and women (…) in feminist “denaturalizing” accounts, 
material and political interests or discursive formations act causally on 
material bodies to constrain, shape or constitute them as sexed. In 
feminist “renaturalizing” accounts women’s bodily differences are 
backgrounded causes for symbolic formations that are potentially 
generative of powerful positive meanings for sexual difference. In 
Beauvoir’s phenomenological description of what it means to be a 
woman, on the other hand, the very force and directionality of causality 
is not eliminated but diffracted; we are no longer dealing with linear 
causal chains but with justificatory entanglements. (Mann, 2014, p. 36) 
  
Mann uses the image of an “entanglement” to signify the disruption of 
causal linearity in Beauvoir’s analysis. “Nature” and “culture” are 
continuously feeding upon one another, without this meaning that one is 
reducible to the other. The operation of justification performed by gender 
takes the form of an entanglement between nature and culture, not in 
the simple sense that nature and culture are always interacting, but in 
the more radical sense that their intricate involvement does not allow us 
to draw a neat and tidy distinction between them. Mann finds an 
example of justificatory entanglement in Beauvoir’s account of “the two 
faces of time”, namely, creation and maintenance of life: 
  
(…) Beauvoir (…) takes note of a temporal feature of mammalian 
biological existence that she finds significant in giving an account of 
social hierarchies between women and men. “In higher forms of life, 
reproduction becomes the production of differentiated organisms; it has 
a twofold face: maintenance of the species and creation of new 
individuals; this innovative aspect asserts itself as the singularity of the 
individual is confirmed. It is thus striking that these two moments of 
perpetuation and creation divide. (Beauvoir, 2010, pp. 33–34; Fr. 1:56)” 
(Mann, 2014, p. 36) 
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Beauvoir’s distinction between “creation” and “maintenance” does not 
stand for an essential difference grounded in nature or biology. Rather, 
maintenance and creation acquire their significance existentially. The 
gender difference in the experience of these “two faces of time” cannot be 
reduced to a single, direct causal explanation, either by pointing 
exclusively to biology or to socio-political forces. In this different 
experience of temporality, nature and culture are intrinsically 
enmeshed: 
 
Women disproportionately experience the urgency of maintaining new 
life, as well as nature’s cyclical processes of violence and decay, while 
men disproportionately experience the thrill of creating life (…). Both of 
these faces of time and the tension between them are integral to the 
human condition and to each individual life, whether male or female. 
While the division between them lends itself to a division of interests 
between the sexes, it does not cause such a division determinatively. 
And while a division of interests might become causally entangled with 
a division of power, it is not in a simple causal chain with such divisions. 
(Mann, 2014, pp. 36–37) 
 
An eloquent example of how the maintenance and creation are gendered 
temporal experiences can be found in the practice of care. Care, as Lisa 
Baraitser analyses it, has its temporal dimension in maintenance, which 
“appears to contain two temporal forms”: 
 
In part maintenance is about trying to keep something going – keeping 
things functioning or in a steady state, allowing what already exists to 
continue or persevere, to carry on being. Maintenance is not the time of 
generation or production, or the eruption of the new. (…) Secondly, to 
maintain is also to keep buoyant; to maintain one’s mood could be 
described as buoying oneself up, keeping oneself or someone else afloat 
during difficult times. (Baraitser, 2017, p. 53) 
  
One explanation for the fact that women disproportionately experience 
time as maintenance lies in the unequal gender distribution of the 
labour of care. Returning to Mann and her reading of Beauvoir, this 
social expectation can be thought as parasitic on women’s capacity to be 
pregnant, give birth and breast-feed. What gender does is use women’s 
reproductive capacities as one of the bases for legitimizing women’s 
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subordination. Analysing gender as justification, Beauvoir shows “how 
structures of injustice are parasitically entangled with general features 
of human existence, even those that seem most “natural” (…) without 
being caused by them in any simple way” (Mann, 2014, p. 37). 
Although Bonnie Mann presents Beauvoir’s distinction between 
maintenance and creation as the best illustration of a “justificatory 
entanglement”, an additional example can help us to clarify the intricate 
relation between “nature” and “culture” in gender understood as a 
justificatory process. The following is an account offered by Connell in 
her sociological study of masculinities. A man (Hugh) recounts his first 
sexual experience: 
 
(…) I must have come in about five or six strokes, and I thought the 
feeling was outrageous because I thought I was going to die… And then 
during that week I had a whole new sense of myself. I expected – I don’t 
know what I expected, to start growing more pubic hair, or expected my 
dick to get bigger. (Connell, 2005, p. 53) 
 
As Connell notes, Hugh’s telling of his first sexual encounter shows “the 
intricate interplay of the body with social process”: 
 
the physical feeling of climax is immediately an interpretation (‘I 
thought I was going to die’). It triggers off a familiar sequence – death, 
rebirth, new growth. Conversely, the social transition Hugh has 
accomplished, entering into sexual adulthood, immediately translates as 
bodily fantasy (‘more pubic hair’, ‘dick to get bigger’). (Connell, 2005, p. 
53) 
 
The anecdote reveals how social meanings and bodily feelings circulate 
and nurture one another. This first sexual experience is interpreted in 
terms that symbolize power and domination, which Hugh expected to 
manifest in his body. The fantasy of gaining a new form of social power 
is simultaneously a fantasy of gaining bodily power: becoming “bigger”. 
Here, we can recognize a common way in which bodily and cultural 
signifiers are entangled in justifications of domination. Men are expected 
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to “naturally” derive sexual pleasure from domination, and to exercise 
domination through sexuality. 
We can understand Mann’s claim that for Beauvoir linear 
causality is “diffracted” through an account of gender as “justification” 
insofar as, for Beauvoir, the facts of nature lack meaning in themselves: 
“if the body is not a thing, it is a situation” (Beauvoir, 1956, p. 61). 
Human biology derives its significance from the way it is experienced in 
a historical context: 
 
Once we adopt the human perspective, interpreting the body on a basis 
of existence, biology becomes an abstract science; whenever the 
physiological fact (for instance, muscular inferiority) takes on meaning, 
this meaning is at once seen as dependent on a whole context; the 
‘weakness’ is revealed as such only in the light of the ends man 
proposes, the instruments he has available, and the laws he establishes. 
(Beauvoir, 1956, p. 61) 
 
Inversely, what gender does is in many ways intensely physically felt. 
For example, if I am the only woman in a room full of men, I may 
physically feel my body as too visible if I decide to speak. This physical 
sensation of bodily hypervisibility can be simultaneously entangled with 
feeling out of place, or with thinking of myself as incompetent.  
 
6.2.3 What the lived body reveals 
 
A second reason for returning to Beauvoir’s account of gender is its 
engagement with the revelatory potential of the lived body. Beauvoir’s 
phenomenological analysis conceives the body in a less reductive manner 
than the feminist debates “ghettoized” around the sex/gender distinction. 
On the one hand, Beauvoir’s phenomenology does not reduce the body to 
a passive “surface” that either natural or social forces act upon or 
“shape”, “in the same old mechanistic, causally implicated, object-body of 
the naïve sciences that phenomenology had long recognized as an 
abstraction from the lifeworld” (Mann, 2014, p. 82). On the other hand, 
her analysis enables us to pay attention to the plasticity of the body, i.e., 
its capacity to resist. As Shannon Sullivan contends, plasticity is not to 
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be understood in the simple sense of “malleability” or “shapeability”. 
Rather, the body is plastic also in its capacity to resist: “As William 
James clarifies, plasticity ‘means the possession of a structure weak 
enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at 
once’” (Sullivan, 2015, p. 13)40. Bodies are therefore not merely shaped 
by social or natural forces but have a degree of freedom or agency in how 
they “bend” or “inflect” social or natural forces: 
 
For phenomenologists, one doesn’t live one’s body primarily as an object 
acted on by others, though one may live it this way, in situations of 
illness, vulnerability, exploitation or violence. Even then, Husserl 
teaches us, the body is lived in the mode of the “I suffer,” which is not 
the mode of an impersonal object, but of a sentient and conscious being 
for whom freedom is one essential possibility. (Mann, 2014, p. 82) 
 
By engaging with embodiment rather than with the question of the 
essence of sexual difference, Beauvoir’s political phenomenology is 
attentive to the intertwining between biology and culture, and between 
what is “profoundly personal and individual yet through and through 
socially constituted and collective” (Mann, 2014, p. 83). The notion of 
“style” plays a key role here. Style names a particular way of engaging 
with the world, or, as Sullivan puts it, of transacting with the 
                                            
40 Catherine Malabou conceives “plasticity” as situated “between determination and 
freedom”. Plasticity, as a concept, is placed between two “semantic extremes”: first, 
according to a “‘closed’ signification”. Something is plastic “if it cannot return to its 
initial form after undergoing a deformation” (Malabou, 2008, p. 15). For example, a 
block of marble is plastic in that it can be sculpted into a pair of hands: it’s supple 
enough to be modified, and solid enough to retain the shape that results from this 
modification. “Suppleness” and “solidity” are thus opposed to elasticity (that which 
returns to its original form) and rigidity (that which cannot be modified). Secondly, the 
“open” significance of plasticity points to its spontaneous capacity for transformation. 
Malabou offers the paradigmatic example of “[stem-cell’s] capacity to differentiate and 
transdifferentiate themselves” (2008, p.16). Attending to its chemical sense, Malabou 
reminds us that plastique is “an explosive substance made of nitroglycerine and 
nitrocellulose, capable of causing violent explosions” (2008, p. 5). Plasticity is therefore 
that which is capable of taking a form and, at the same time, of opposing a degree of 
resistance to the informing force: “to talk about the plasticity of the brain means to see 
in it not only the creator and receiver of form but also an agency of disobedience to 
every constituted form, a refusal to submit to a model” (2008, p. 6). 
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environment. Style is manifest, for example, in how my body moves 
through space. Phenomenological accounts do not reduce style to the 
workings of physiology: “Style is gestural, rather than merely 
physiological”41. One’s movements may be quick or slow, flexible or rigid; 
one’s voice may be loud or low, monotonous or musical. But these ways of 
engaging with the world are not merely personal. Their meanings are 
also socially inflected: “Walking in high heeled shoes (...) [is] located, so 
to speak, between feet, legs, shoes, floors, and gendered expectations” 
(Sullivan, 2015, p. 12). Style is therefore plastic in the sense that it is 
“an open structure”, both limited and enabled by the environment with 
which we engage: 
 
(…) though “style” is an open structure, it is not merely voluntary. 
Personal and cultural/social habits sediment into style. Habits formed 
through repeated actions (and more so those repeated over generations) 
“also get sedimented into the environment, in the structures of 
ustensils, instruments, and habitation, as such they direct action from 
outside. A path, for example, is a result of the repetition of a certain 
mode of walking.” (Heinämaa 2003, p. 44, as cited in Mann, 2014, p. 83) 
 
Attending to embodiment as habitual or “stylistic” shows how gender 
“gets its ontological weight” in a more fruitful way than the post-
structuralist accounts that privilege the analysis of discursive signifiers. 
Gender, Mann argues, is not only located “in the realm of the symbolic” 
(Mann, 2014, p. 69).  
Helen Fielding’s emphasis of the primacy of the body over 
language supports Mann’s argument for a return to the insights of 
Beauvoir’s phenomenology: 
 
                                            
41 While Merleau-Ponty focuses on bodily experience, Sullivan contends that 
phenomenology thus underplays the role of physiology in our understanding of habit. 
Sullivan argues that “physiological functions are habits” in that they are also 
transactional: “Breathing, for example, cannot take place by means of lungs alone; it 
requires air (or oxygen, more precisely). Likewise, digestion occurs only when the 
stomach and intestines have food to process and absorb. Respiration and digestion are 
made up of a cooperative, active relationship between organism and environment” 
(Sullivan, 2015, p. 12). 
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Because we are corporeal… meaning does not come to us only, or even 
primarily, through language. We are first perceptual, motor, and socio-
affective beings. We learn to move as embodied, to perceive the world, 
and to engage with others according to the particular ways that the 
world manifests itself in this epoch. (Fielding, as cited in Mann, 2014, p. 
69) 
  
In this sense, Mann echoes a familiar critique of post-structuralism’s 
excessive emphasis on discursive operations, and implicit 
characterization of bodies as indeterminate “surfaces” “shaped” by 
discursive practices, of which they are the mere products. Connell 
highlights the limitations of such accounts in their tendency to neglect 
the role of the body in gender: 
 
With so much emphasis on the signifier, the signified tends to vanish 
(…) [i.e.,] when gender is seen as, above all, a performance; or when the 
rending contradictions within gendered lives become ‘an instatement of 
metaphor’ (...). The surface on which cultural meanings are inscribed is 
not featureless, and it does not stay still. Bodies, in their own right as 
bodies, do matter. (Connell, 2005, p. 51). 
 
Similarly, as Young indicates, Toril Moi views Butler’s theory of gender 
as unsatisfactory insofar as it “makes bodies and sexual identity simply 
a product of discourse” (Young, 2005, p. 15):  
 
Deconstructive challenge to the sex/gender distinction has increasingly 
abstracted from embodiment, (…) at the same time that it has rendered 
a concept of gender virtually useless for theorizing subjectivity and 
identity. At this theoretical pass, Moi proposes that we throw over the 
concept of gender altogether and renew a concept of the lived body 
derived from existential phenomenology, as a means of theorizing sexual 
subjectivity without danger of either biological reductionism or gender 
essentialism. (Young, 2005, p. 12) 
 
It may be objected that in presenting “denaturalizing” (materialist and 
post-structuralist feminisms) or “renaturalizing” (sexual difference 
feminisms) accounts of gender as narrowly linearly causal, Mann fails to 
do justice to their complexity. Since examining this critique goes beyond 
the scope of this chapter, and granting that it is not necessarily 
unfounded, it may suffice to point out that Mann – along with Connell 
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and Moi – may be right to emphasise that gender is not only about 
language. Embodiment plays a crucial role in gendered subjectivities. 
Moreover, Mann’s defence of Beauvoir’s political phenomenology does 
not exclude the insights of post-structuralist and materialist feminist 
analysis. In fact, Mann’s account expands Beauvoir’s phenomenology of 
gender: it aims to develop something that, in Beauvoir’s analysis, is in 
its “embryonic” stages (an account of masculinity in its sovereign form), 
and it opens it “to other modes of inquiry”, whether poststructuralist, 
psychoanalytic, or materialist, always keeping in mind the centrality of 
the body: 
 
Gender as an operation of power that is personally assumed in the most 
intimate sense (...) is always already at work in/on the body. But when 
gender takes on its gender tasks; when it is deployed in the making and 
unmaking of nations; when it is central to gathering an army and 
waging a war; when it is at work in practices of colonial aggression, 
detention and torture, it does not leave the body behind. Indeed the 
body at its most vulnerable, in its neediness, is the reservoir of nature 
from which gender must always return to drink. (Mann, 2014, p. 45). 
 
In other words, poststructuralist, materialist and psychoanalytic 
analyses can be put to work in a similar direction to Beauvoir’s political 
phenomenology, namely, to analyse what gender does. They can help us 
understand how operations of gender, through the use of a gendered 
imaginary, through gendered operations of language, or through 
“material operations of gender in acts of war”, are at the same time 
always parasitic on bodily features, which they use to justify instituted 
hierarchies: “at every level of analysis, we will see that gender feeds on 
the natural – even as the natural pushed back, insists, rebels.” (Mann, 
2014, p. 30) For example, when analysing the operations of gender in 
acts of war, Mann attempts not to lose sight of “the heavy-handed 
materiality of gender as lived in the body” (Mann, 2014, p. 12), such as 
“the brute physicality of the body, its vulnerability to violence, its 
capacities for shame and pain” (Mann, 2014, p. 30).  Again, analysing 
the practice of torture by the U.S. military, Mann highlights how the 
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production of a national manhood is partly achieved through an 
appropriation of tortured bodies:  
 
I would add that the sexual humiliation of the prisoner, the feminization 
or homosexualization of the prisoner, which the prisoner experiences in 
his body as excruciating shame, can be appropriated, lifted out of the 
prisoner’s body, and used in the shame-to-power conversion on which 
the sovereign manhood of the torturing regime depends It is precisely 
the nonexistence of the manhood of the nation, its evident fragility, its 
ephemeral nature, that requires bodies to be tortured, so that “the sheer 
material factualness of the human body” might be “borrowed” by the 
regime. (Mann, 2014, p. 192).  
 
This example shows how an analysis that puts embodiment at its centre 
enables us to identify some of the ways in which emotions and 
masculinity are entangled. Humiliating the prisoner and using his 
shame are instrumental for the production of “the sovereign manhood”. 
I now move on to show how Bonnie Mann extends Simone de 
Beauvoir’s analysis of gender as justification in her account of sovereign 
masculinity. Her attention to embodied habits of gender or “style” will 
enable us to extract the emotional structuring of masculinity, in the 
context of twenty-first-century United States. 
 
6.3 Embodiment and emotional patterns 
 
6.3.1 Sovereign masculinity as an operation of gender 
 
Mann extends Beauvoir’s analysis of gender by analysing sovereign 
masculinity as a justificatory operation. Sovereign masculinity 
designates more precisely how “masculinity” and “sovereignty” are 
enmeshed in the way the American nation imagines itself: 
 
If we want to understand the United States’ vision of empire, we have to 
understand its culture and practices of gender, and if we want to 
understand gender as it is lived in the United States today, we need to 
understand sovereignty as it is imagined and practiced by the nation. 
The notion of ‘sovereign masculinity’ reminds us of this relation. (Mann, 
2014, p.3)  
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Drawing on Judith Butler’s characterization of the sovereign subject, 
Mann understands “sovereignty” as consisting in both a denial of 
injurability and in its projection onto the Other. The sovereign subject is 
“one that builds itself on the conceit of its own inviolability: ‘Such a 
sovereign position not only denies its own constitutive injurability but 
tries to relocate injurability in the other’ ([Butler], 2009, 278)” (Mann, 
2014, pp. 3–4). 
However, Mann’s analysis is not merely concerned with 
masculinity as the imagined gender of the nation. Her account aims to 
clarify the formation of individual masculinity by analysing “how the 
images and stories that circulate wildly in service to [America’s] quest 
for national manhood get their claws into the very identity structures of 
individual persons” (Mann, 2014, p. 11). For example, national manhood 
can be appealing for young men in conditions of poverty because it 
“offers military recruits a way to earn a salary and participate in a 
fantasy of masculine sovereignty at the same time” (Mann, 2014, p. 11). 
At the same time, as an imaginary formation, national manhood lacks 
reality, or “ontological weight”, on its own. National manhood therefore 
needs to “borrow” from “the ontological weight that accrues to the 
individual subject at the lived embodied level” to become “real” in its 
turn, as the previous example of the use of torture suggests. This does 
not mean that, at the individual level, gender has ontological weight 
exclusively from lived bodily experience, independently of the social 
imaginary and the discursive realm: “The ontological weight that 
gathers and sediments in lived gender is itself partly a product, of 
course, constituted between the uniquely situated individual subject and 
the social world” (Mann, 2014, p. 11). Consequently, gender operates 
here as a justificatory entanglement: the production of masculine 
embodiment is causally entangled with the appropriation of the lived 
reality of masculinity, required “to lend reality to the manhood of the 
nation” (Mann, 2014, p. 11), which also serves as an aspirational image 
for individual men. 
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6.3.2 How gender is grounded in bodily style 
 
Let’s examine more closely how gender gains its ontological weight. Here 
Mann turns first of all to bodily experience: “when we look at how gender 
is lived by both women and men, the aesthetic dimension has a certain 
primacy.” (Mann, 2014, p. 70) This “aesthetic dimension” lies in the fact 
that when we try to make sense of the world around us, gender is 
already in play through our perceptual and sensorial capacities. Mann 
draws on Young’s phenomenological analysis of female body experience 
as revealing a fundamental structure of femininity and masculinity. In 
her essay “Throwing Like a Girl”, Young (2005) describes a common 
contrast between typical female and male body motility. Female bodily 
experience is characterized by an inhibited and disrupted motility, called 
by Young “the disruption of the ‘I can’ body”:  
 
Young concludes that enclosure is one modality of feminine spatiality, 
since the space of the ‘I can’ for women tends to be gathered tightly and 
held close, and is represented by girls in their drawings as enclosed by 
high walls. (Mann, 2014, p. 88) 
 
To illustrate Young’s claim, Mann recounts her experience as a 
voluntary volleyball coach to a small group of 8-year-old kids (4 girls and 
2 boys). Echoing Young’s description of feminine and masculine bodily 
motility, Mann describes how all but one boy and one girl started off 
moving “like a girl”, displaying an “inhibited intentionality”, by starting 
an action with an “I can”, but “withhold[ing] its full bodily commitment 
to that end in a self-imposed ‘I cannot’” (Young, 2005, p. 36, as cited in 
Mann, 2014, p. 86). However, although all the children started at a 
similar level, the boys learned more quickly than the girls how to use the 
space effectively. Instead of the “discontinuous unity” and “ambiguous 
transcendence” that characterizes feminine motility, the boys were soon 
able to “organize the world as a unitary field of the ‘I can’” (Mann, 2014, 
p. 87): 
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For these eight-year-olds, serving was only one skill in which this 
discontinuous unity manifested itself. I had to convince them that they 
could move decisively toward the ball. At first they stood stuck still and 
let the ball drop right next to them. Later the girls would run toward 
the ball only to stop and pull back, flinch away from it, just before they 
got there. When I insisted they call out “mine” to claim the ball from 
their teammates, they would start to say the word then almost swallow 
it, move toward the ball, then turn away from it. “I want commitment!” I 
hollered over and over again, making the good-natured parents on the 
bench laugh. The first time I said it, one of the parents joked that the 
boys wouldn’t have any idea what it meant. Yet when it came to having 
a bodily sense of “commitment” it was all four girls who lagged behind. 
Soon both boys were all over the court, practically pushing their 
teammates out of the way and shouting “mine,” sliding dramatically in 
their all-out efforts to get to the ball (even when they didn’t need to). 
(Mann, 2014, p. 87) 
 
Young’s analysis of female body experience and her identification of the 
structure of female motility as disruption of the “I can body” allows us to 
account for the nature of a particular kind of emotional phenomenon 
that proves to be instrumental in the formation of the masculine self. 
Drawing on Young’s insights, Mann argues that in the “doing” of the 
self, the gendered experience of the body is crucial. This is clear from the 
fact that gender misrecognition can intentionally be used as a form of 
violence. Furthermore, gender misrecognition can elicit unpleasant or 
painful emotional reactions, to different degrees. What is at stake in 
these emotional reactions is an “undoing of the self”:  
 
The fact that gender misrecognition can effect a kind of undoing of the 
self is one of the clues which proves what psychologists and feminists 
have long noted: that gender recognition and gender-presentation that 
enables it is part of the doing of the self” (Mann, 2014, p. 77). 
 
This undoing of the self is manifested in the fear, shame, and even terror 
of feminisation felt by many men. Arguably, the experience of the 
undoing of the self crucially depends upon particular beliefs and cultural 
notions to the effect that women are inferior. Mann does not deny this. 
However, her point is that appealing to cultural beliefs is not sufficient 
to explain the emotional intensity manifest in instances of gender 
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misrecognition. When men express the fear or shame of being “like a 
woman”, they describe  
 
a spontaneous giving way, a dissolution, an unravelling at the heart of 
the self, which coheres with beliefs about women’s inferiority but is not 
reducible to them. The experience doesn’t seem to pass through belief at 
all, at least if we think of belief as cognitive and conscious. (Mann, 2014, 
pp. 85–86) 
 
The experiences of shame, fear and terror of being feminized do not 
merely depend on beliefs. Rather, Mann contends, these emotions are 
strongly grounded in embodiment. The fear/terror felt at the undoing of 
the self is grounded in the risk of a loss of the male body through 
feminization. More particularly, the unravelling of the masculine self is 
experienced as a disorganization and disruption of the “I can body”: 
 
What is at stake when the “‘I can’ body” is disorganized and disrupted? 
The capacity to act, of course, the capacity to be a body-in-the-midst-of-
doing, immersed in its own action. The habit body that undergirds and 
guarantees most of our skilled, coordinated, physical doings, is undone 
in these moments. It becomes painfully conscious of itself, and the 
consciousness disrupts the skill and coordination of the action. The 
body-subject becomes awkward, tentative, vulnerable, shamed. 
Ultimately, she or he becomes injurable, violable, rapable; in other 
words, available for violent use by stronger others, weak in the face of 
impending harm. (Mann, 2014, p. 91) 
 
The undoing of the self is not merely feared at an “intellectual” or 
cognitive level. It is not only what we “believe” that sustains or 
threatens the self. More radically, the body holds the self together 
through the way it is habituated to interact with its environment, i.e., in 
its style, and in the reading of this style by others. Feeling terror at 
being feminized is a fear of being vulnerable to violence. In other words, 
if, following Butler, part of what sustains the male sovereign subject is a 
denial of its own vulnerability (injurability or violability), the fear of 
“feeling like a woman” is a fear of “losing” one’s sovereign position in the 
world.  
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The fact that masculine identity-formation is importantly 
grounded in the “I can body” is also manifested in the way gendered 
style is interpreted socially, without the sociocultural meanings of 
feminine and masculine motility needing to be consciously, “cognitively 
grasped to be operative”: 
 
How I live gender in my body, my gendered style, signals (among many 
other things) my availability for use, or lack thereof. The more centered 
my habitual body comportment is in the use of the “I can” body, the less 
I am marked intersubjectively for such use. The more centered my 
bodily comportment is on what Young might call the “I cannot.” body, 
which in feminine body experience is closely tied to the “I am watched 
and judged by the male gaze.” body, the more I am marked 
intersubjectively for use. (Mann, 2014, p. 91) 
 
The grounding of the masculine self in bodily style becomes more evident 
in the experience of men who do not embody it, who are therefore 
vulnerable to violence, and under pressure to adopt a stereotypical 
masculine style as a way of protecting themselves, not only from 
different forms of aggression, but from feeling undone in their self. In his 
autobiographical essay Returning to Reims (2013), Didier Eribon 
describes the terror that discovering his homosexuality meant for him. It 
was both a terror of being located in a degraded category, and terror of 
feeling his self being or becoming abject:  
 
Discovering little by little what my desires were, and what my sexuality 
would be thus meant inserting myself into a predefined category, one 
that had been stigmatized by means of these words of insult. It meant 
experiencing the terrorizing effect these words can have on those to 
whom they apply, on those who run the risk of exposing themselves to 
them for an entire lifetime. To use an insult is to cite the past. It only 
has meaning because it has been used by so many earlier speakers: “a 
dizzying word that rises from the depths of time immemorial,” as one of 
Genet’s verses puts it. Yet, for those at whom it is aimed, it also 
represents a projection into the future: the dreadful presentiment that 
such words, and the violence they carry, will accompany you for the rest 
of your days. To become gay is to become a target, and to realize that 
you already potentially were such a target even before you had actually 
entirely become one, before you were ever fully aware of what this word 
that you had heard hundreds of times might mean, even if you had 
217 
 
always known how powerfully insulting it was. The stigmatized identity 
precedes you, and you step into it, you embody it, you have to deal with 
it in one way or another. They may be numerous and diverse, all the 
different ways it is dealt with, but they are all marked by the 
constitutive power of the verbalized insult itself. (Eribon, 2013, p. 98) 
 
Similarly, in his autobiographical narrative The End of Eddy (2018), 
Edouard Louis describes the strategies that he needed to use to conceal 
his homosexuality and his effeminate style. A working-class French 
teenager living in terror of being “found out”, Eddy repeated – as a 
mantra – his determination to be “a tough guy”. He tried to modify his 
tone of voice and gestures, and was under pressure to perform 
heterosexuality, to manifest hatred for homosexuals and love for 
masculine-coded sports, like football: 
 
With Sabrina I had failed, losing the battle between my desire to become 
a tough guy, and the desire of my own body, which was pushing me 
towards men, which is to say pushing me away from my family, away 
from the whole village. And yet I didn’t want to give up, so I continued 
repeating to myself that obsessive phrase, Today I’m gonna be a tough 
guy. My failure with Sabrina made me redouble my efforts. I took care to 
make my voice deeper, still deeper. I kept my hands immobilised in my 
pockets whenever I spoke, so I wouldn’t have them around. Following the 
night that had revealed to me more clearly than ever the impossibility of 
my becoming aroused by a woman’s body, I took a more serious interest in 
football than ever before. I began watching it on television and memorised 
the names of all the players on the French team. I watched wrestling as 
well, just like my brothers and my father. I made my hatred of gay people 
ever more explicit in order to deflect suspicion. (Louis, 2018, p. 170) 
 
Both Louis’ and Eribon’s narratives show the role played by class in 
masculine identity formation in France. In the working-class 
environments of their childhood, masculinity was asserted through 
toughness and prowess in sports. At the same time, the bodily styles of 
the bourgeoisie were at the time coded as feminine. To be an intellectual, 
to be effeminate and to be gay were imaginatively associated. Later as a 
student at an upper-middle-class lycée, Louis noticed the contrast in 
bodily style between working-class and bourgeois young men:  
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Here boys kiss each other on each cheek when they say  
bonjour, they don’t shake hands 
They carry leather satchels 
They have gentle manners 
They would all have been called fags at my college 
Bourgeois people don’t exhibit the same kind of bodily 
habits 
They don’t define virility the way my father did, the way  
the men at the factory did 
(this will be even more apparent at the École Normale, 
 all those feminine bodies belonging to middle-class 
 intellectuals) (Louis, 2018, pp. 189–190) 
 
In Returning to Reims, Didier Eribon describes how he needed to escape 
two forms of social “condemnation”, sexuality and class, by “playing one 
off against the other”. Eribon interprets his effort to escape his working-
class origin as a strategy that allowed him to become gay: 
 
So it is not, as Sartre would have it in an enigmatic phrase he writes 
about Genet, that homosexuality is a way out that someone invents in 
order to avoid suffocating. It is rather that someone’s homosexuality 
obliges them to find a way out in order to avoid suffocating. I can’t help 
thinking that the distance that came into being — that I created — 
between myself and the world I grew up in, that my self-creation as an 
“intellectual,” represented the way I found to deal with what I was 
becoming. I couldn’t become what I was becoming without inventing 
myself as different from those from whom I was in fact already different. 
A bit earlier in this book, discussing my path through school, I described 
myself as a miracle case. It could well be that what made that miracle 
possible for me was my homosexuality. (Eribon, 2013, pp. 198–199). 
 
“Class betrayal”, through the adoption of the styles of the intellectual 
bourgeoisie (accent, intonations, bodily movements) became for Eribon a 
necessary way out, to live his sexuality without the constraints of his 
social environment. At the same time, the original terror of being found 
out as gay (i.e., as an “abject man”) transmuted into a terror of being 
found out to be of working-class origin: 
 
(...) it doesn’t seem exaggerated to assert that my coming out of the 
sexual closet, my desire to assume and assert my homosexuality, 
coincided within my personal trajectory with my shutting myself up 
inside what I might call a class closet. I mean by this that I took on the 
constraints imposed by a different kind of dissimulation; I took on a 
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different kind of dissociative personality or double consciousness (with 
the same kinds of mechanisms familiar from the sexual closet: various 
subterfuges to cover one’s tracks, a very small set of friends who know 
the truth but keep it secret, the taking up of different registers of 
discourse in different situations and with different interlocutors, a 
constant self-surveillance as regards one’s gestures, one’s intonation, 
manners of speech, so that nothing untoward slips out, so that one never 
betrays oneself, and so on). (Eribon, 2013, pp. 26–27)  
 
In order to be able to affirm his life as a gay intellectual, Eribon had to 
disown the environment of his family: “in one case I needed to become 
what I was, but in the other I needed to reject what I was supposed to 
have been”. (Eribon, 2013, p. 225) 
Eribon’s and Louis’ narratives illustrate how bodily style has a 
major role in the formation of (heterosexual) male subjectivity. As an 
additional example, we find in Mann an anecdote of how her daughter 
Dee Dee was bullied by other children when she cut her hair very short: 
Dee Dee “announced her decision to grow her hair long and never cut it 
‘so that I will be a girl again.’” What Dee Dee learnt through this painful 
experience, Mann argues, is that “to be a girl (...) requires an agreement. 
You must show that you are one, and show it in ways that others will be 
able and willing to perceive” (Mann, 2014, p. 77). This agreement is 
manifest through one’s bodily way of engaging with the world. 
 
6.3.3 Fear-of-shame: an emotional structure of masculinity 
 
Attending to what female and male embodiment reveal allows us to 
extract an emotional structure non-accidentally linked to “sovereign 
masculinity”. Mann characterises it as “systematic shame”, but it can be 
more precisely understood as a cluster of shame and fear. Fear-of-being-
shamed for feeling or looking “like a woman” – which in an extreme 
degree can be terror-of-being-shamed – is a salient thread in the 
configuration of sovereign masculinity. Viewed in this light, masculinity 
appears as a reactive or defensive formation against the systematic fear 
of being shamed. 
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Mann identifies this existential emotional structure of 
masculinity and femininity in the context of contemporary U.S. culture. 
Her account reveals a dialectic where shame – or the spectre of it, in the 
shape of the feminine – plays a crucial role. This is visible in the fact 
that shaming is systematically used to form masculine identity. 
Language, imagination and culture are saturated with images 
reminiscent of shame and shaming instances: 
 
The nation and the culture come under the spell of an inflated and 
hyperbolic manhood, not for the first time, after the defeat in Vietnam 
and the rise of Women’s Liberation Movement. This is perhaps most 
poignantly documented in Jackson Katz’s landmark film Tough Guise: 
Violence, Media and the Crisis in Masculinity, in which he shows the 
literal inflation of images of manhood in the 1980s and 1990s – guns get 
bigger, muscles are pumped to extreme dimensions through the use of 
steroids, and the fantasized efficacy of violent masculine action becomes 
almost absolute (2002). In a world suffering through this capture, 
gendered identifications are achieved in the thick of an imaginary 
domain replete with narratives and images saturated by shame, its 
anticipation, and its defeat through redemptive violence. (Mann, 2014, 
p. 108) 
 
The abundance of images of shame has an important impact on the 
formation of the individual masculine self: 
 
While isolated shame experiences may have little lasting impact, when 
they are consistently reinforced or echoed in the imagery and language 
of a culture, such as when a young boy notices that boys are regularly 
shamed for showing fear, distress, sensitivity, or sympathy – that 
language provides names for such boys: “wimp,” “sissy,” “pussy,” 
“faggot,” “little girl” – that the cultural space is saturated with images of 
“real” men who have apparently shed any relation to such names, as 
well as with images of those who haven’t – these “isolated shame 
experiences become magnified and fused” (Kaufman 1980, 73) to such 
an extent that “shame becomes basic to identity”. (Mann, 2014, p. 115) 
 
Insofar as such images are ubiquitous, the threat of shame appears as 
an existential condition for the formation of masculine subjectivities. 
This does not mean, of course, that all men have the same aspiration to 
attain sovereign masculinity. However, in one way or another, all men 
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form their identities in relation to sovereign masculinity, either by 
resisting, subverting or pursuing it. In the latter case, a young boy 
attempting to become a sovereign man “must disown the parts of the self 
that are connected to regimented scenes of shame” (Mann, 2014, p. 116), 
and coded as feminine. Shame and the feminine are entangled in the 
emotional structure to which masculine formation is reactive. Mann 
names this process “shame-to-power conversion”, understanding 
“conversion” in Beauvoir’s sense, as “the process of fleeing 
intersubjective risk for the comfort of sovereignty”: 
 
Now we see that the aspiring sovereign man must hide the parts of the 
self that remain connected to regimented scenes of shame, in order to 
convert shame to power. Shame in masculinity formation initiates a 
lifelong process of self-cloaking (…) that promises to eliminate exposure, 
vulnerability. In sovereign masculinity, the cloak is pieced together from 
displays of agency, often hyperbolic, paradigmatically violent, which 
obsessively bring to visibility a fantasized invulnerability. Sovereign 
masculinity has no other purpose than this display, than this cloaking. 
The shamed one must explode into hyperbolic self-assertion or cease to 
exist as a man. (Mann, 2014, p. 116) 
 
Shame-to-power conversion is of course not the only strategy that 
individual men can use in reaction to the risk of systematic shaming. As 
Louis and Eribon show, embracing those areas of culture in which 
femininity seems more permissible can constitute a way out. However, 
shame-to-power conversion may be all the more common when other 
alternatives are unavailable. For example, before being able to escape 
from an homophobic social environment – where homophobia was 
expressed through misogynistic insult: “Most of the time they would say 
pussy when speaking to me, and pussy was about just the worst insult 
they could imagine” (Louis, 2018, p. 18) – Louis describes what Mann 
might count as a shame-to-power-conversion strategy: 
 
It must have been towards the end of my last year at the collège. There 
was another boy, even more effeminate than I was, and people called 
him Trout Lips. I hated him because he didn’t share in my suffering, he 
didn’t seem interested in sharing it, he never made any effort to get to 
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know me. (…) One day he was being loud in a hallway where a large 
group of students had gathered, and I called out: Shut the fuck up 
faggot! All the students laughed. Everyone looked at him and looked at 
me. I had managed, for the moment of an insult shouted in a hallway, to 
transfer my shame to him. (Louis, 2018, p. 171) 
 
Within an oppressive environment, and lacking opportunities to protect 
himself, Louis was socially constrained to use shame-to-power-
conversion as a response against the threat of shame.  
If masculinity is formed through strategies of shame-to-power-
conversion, then shame constitutes an essential condition for the 
emergence of masculinity. In other words, without the threat of shame, 
masculinity would lose its function as a reactive formation: 
 
When sovereign manhood has established itself against the experience 
of shame, shame and its production become the necessary motor for the 
realization of its power. When it is no longer shamed, it must shame 
others to reproduce itself. To repeat: the core structure of sovereign 
masculinity is this shame-to-power conversion. (Mann, 2014, p. 116). 
 
Shame-to-power conversion therefore constitutes a sort of redemption 
that “saves the degraded self, restores him to his world, secures him 
from the threat of abandonment” (Mann, 2014, p. 117). One example of 
this redemption is manifest in Stanley Kubrick’s film, Full Metal Jacket 
(1987). Mann comments how shame and its projected redemption play 
central roles in the formation of the soldier: 
 
In one of the opening passages of the film, the shame-to-power 
conversion that is at the heart of sovereign masculinity is articulated in 
an anticipatory promise by Sergeant Hartmann, the drill instructor. 
Hartmann is played by R. Lee Ermey, who served as an actual drill 
instructor during the Vietnam War and famously wrote many of his own 
lines for the film. “If you ladies leave my island,” Hartmann promises 
the all-male recruits, “if you survive recruit training… you will be a 
weapon, you will be a minister of death, praying for war. But until that 
day you are pukes! You’re the lowest form of life on Earth. You are not 
even human fucking beings! You are nothing but unorganized grabasstic 
pieces of amphibian shit!” (Mann, 2014, p. 118). 
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At the end of the film, the formation of the soldiers is achieved through 
the transformation of shame into honour: 
 
On the final day of basic training, hours before he is killed, Hartmann 
makes the long awaited declaration: “Today you people are no longer 
maggots. Today you are Marines. You’re part of a brotherhood… From 
now on, until the day you die, wherever you are, every Marine is your 
brother. Most of you will go to Vietnam, Some of you will not come back. 
But always remember this: Marines die, that’s what we’re here for! But 
the Marine Corps lives forever. And that means you live forever!” At the 
culmination of the shame-to-power conversion, the soldier is offered a 
place in the collective, fraternal agency of his military unit. He is offered 
honor as an antidote to shame, and this honor equated with loyalty, first 
and foremost to the brotherhood he has been invited to enter, which is 
the locus and life of this collective, fearsome, sovereign masculinity 
(Mann, 2014, pp. 119–120). 
 
Kubrick’s portrayal of the training of the soldier may be an extreme 
example of sovereign masculinity, but it offers a clear picture of a 
complex and widespread social process. 
 
6.3.4 The spectre of infantile vulnerability 
 
These strategies of conversion aim to restore the “I can body”, to rescue 
it from the threat of “feeling like a woman”, which means falling into the 
feminine “I cannot body”. In this sense, the insult “like a girl” names the 
impotence of the body. However, according to Mann, the insult goes even 
further. “Like a girl” connects the meaning of impotence with the 
absolute dependence, helplessness and vulnerability that characterise 
infancy: “At the most basic level, shame taps into the memory of a deep, 
bodily incapacity to live without engaging the regard and the embodied 
agency of someone else” (Mann, 2014, p. 122). 
Mann connects the experience of infantile helplessness with “a 
kind of exposure to death”. This is expressed, for example, in the anxiety 
that children of around seven months display when they encounter 
strangers: 
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While the infant’s cries and demands bespeak a constant need to be 
noticed, her abrupt facial retreat from the surprise of the stranger’s 
gaze implies that her visibility becomes a problem and a danger, a kind 
of exposure to death. Far worse than not being seen, is being seen by 
one who is hostile or contemptuous. While her visibility to the one who 
loves and cares for her is a comfort and a necessity, her visibility to the 
stranger hurts. (Mann, 2014, p. 122) 
 
This “infantile vulnerability-onto-death” (Mann, 2014, p. 123) is 
repressed, and recalled in future experiences of shame.  
 It would be too easy to reject Mann’s analysis by claiming that the 
infant does not have a clear notion of death, let alone of its own 
mortality. We can understand being exposed to death, not in the sense of 
having the intuition that one’s vital physiological functions will fail, but 
as a feeling of a shattering of the self. In early infancy the child is 
radically dependent upon others, not only for nutrition, hygiene and 
shelter, but also because it is through others (through their touch, care, 
love, words, etc.) that its sense of self is constituted and held. Being 
“exposed to death” by becoming a captive of the stranger’s gaze involves 
feeling a loss of self connected with a loss of the familiarity of one’s 
world. In Full Metal Jacket, humiliation through infantilization in the 
process of training the soldier is therefore not incidental: “When 
Sergeant Hartmann forces his failing recruit to march with his pants 
down, sucking his thumb, he makes graphically explicit the infantile 
helplessness that shame always recalls.” (Mann, 2014, p. 122) 
The shame associated with infantile helplessness is likely strongly 
tied with the feminine as the abject, since those who most commonly 
procure this kind of care are women: 
 
Persons whom we learn to identity as women, as female, as feminine, 
are those responsible, most directly and most often (not always), for 
keeping us alive when we are pathetic, desperate, weak little creatures 
who cannot keep ourselves alive, or even when we are teenagers with 
certain challenges located in the frontal lobe of our actions. My way of 
having a world is infused with these gendered realities from the 
beginning (Mann, 2014, pp. 126–127) 
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Therefore, gendered shame is lived as a threat of losing one’s world, 
which is felt as a loss of self: 
 
When the “I can” body is disrupted and disorganized through gendered 
shame, then, the threat of a loss of world is in play. We see this 
disruption carried out in its most extreme form in Full Metal Jacket 
when the other marines brutally beat “Gomer Pyle” as punishment for 
his shameful failures. The stakes are high. Without a world, I am not an 
“I” in any meaningful sense of the word, since to be an “I” is precisely to 
have a world. (Mann, 2014, p. 127) 
 
In this sense, to lose a world is to lose meaningful connections to others. 
We do not only depend upon others for our subsistence. We need others 
to sustain our sense of self and our self-esteem. To have a world goes 
beyond that of the nuclear family: 
 
My own personal embodied “style” bears the mark of the claims made on 
me by various collectivities, my gender, my race, my nation – if I am a 
soldier, my branch of military service. My way of having a world is 
infused by my belonging to, resisting, or both, the claims of these 
collectivities. This is to say that my way of having a world is already 
deeply intersubjective. (Mann, 2014, p. 126) 
 
Mann’s analysis of what gender does, i.e., of its function in justifying 
male domination, therefore portrays sovereign masculinity as a 
defensive formation against the threat of shame, the threat of a loss of 
self through the loss of one’s community, or one’s place in one’s 
community. Shame-to-power conversion can be attempted through 
various compensatory strategies. However, sovereign masculinity is not 
only a defensive formation, but a parasitic one, which feeds on the 
degradation of the feminine and the infantile: 
 
each hyperbolic display of agency will be at the same time an act 
designed to create vulnerability, humiliation and shame for someone 
else. The machine of conversion needs the other’s powerlessness and 
shame, and will produce it prolifically. The replication and 
magnification of power requires the constant production of shame as the 
raw material that is converted into aggression, hostility and contempt. 
(Mann, 2014, p. 124). 
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These strategies of shame-to-power conversion seek to create shame and 
vulnerability not only in women but in anyone perceived as deviant.  
In the context with which Mann is concerned, sovereign 
masculinity is also importantly defined in terms of race and sexuality. 
The production of power feeds itself upon the degradation of the man 
and woman of colour, the “effeminate gay”, etc. Men who simultaneously 
stand in relations of subordination with respect to race and class, and of 
dominance with respect to sexuality and gender, may therefore 
reproduce the logic of shame-to-power conversion as a way of 
maintaining their status. This, according to Susan James, is a dimension 
that Beauvoir also explores. As James puts it, Beauvoir was sensitive to 
the way in which “men’s experience of domination can shape their 
behaviour towards women”: 
 
In dominating his wife [Beauvoir] argues, a husband makes up for “all 
the resentments accumulated during his childhood and his later life, 
those accumulated daily among other men whose existence means that 
he is browbeaten and injured –all this is purged from him at home as he 
lets loose his authority upon his wife (SS 1972, 483; DS 1986, ii. 297) 
Invalid source specified. 
 
In her analysis of the oppression suffered by the Chicana mestiza, 
Anzaldúa interprets the violence that men exert upon them (their 
“machismo”) as partly deriving from their loss of self through racial 
oppression: 
 
Today’s macho has doubts about his ability to feed and protect his 
family. His “machismo” is an adaptation to oppression and poverty and 
low self-esteem. It is the result of hierarchical male dominance. The 
Anglo, feeling inadequate and inferior and powerless, displaces or 
transfers these feelings to the Chicano by shaming him. In the Gringo 
world, the Chicano suffers from excessive humility and self-effacement, 
shame of self and self-deprecation. (…) The loss of a sense of dignity and 
respect in the macho breeds a false machismo which leads him to put 
down women and even to brutalize them. (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 83) 
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Because machismo is partly a reaction to a “deep sense of racial shame”, 
heterosexual Chicanos have a greater investment in gender roles than 
Chicanas and gay men:  
 
Tenderness, a sign of vulnerability, is so feared that it is showered on 
women with verbal abuse and blows. Men, even more than women, are 
fettered to gender roles. Women at least have had the guts to break out 
of bondage. Only gay men have had the courage to expose themselves to 
the woman inside them and to challenge the current masculinity. 
(Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 84) 
 
Men have a greater emotional attachment to structures of domination, 
and are therefore more dependent upon their need to dominate women 
than women are conditioned to endure it. From a psychological point of 
view, heterosexual men are in this sense less free than those they 
oppress.  
We can see through these examples that the displacement of 
shame, as an emotional pattern non-accidentally connected to 
masculinity, takes complex forms in its connections with other 
structures of domination, which are also maintained through emotional 
mechanisms, as we discussed in Chapter 5. Emotional structures of one 
kind of oppression have complex ramifications for other forms of 
dominance and subordination. 
 
6.3.5 Admiration and esteem 
 
So far, we have identified fear-of-shame as an emotional structure that 
plays a key role in the formation of masculinity. By projecting shame 
onto the other through feminization and infantilization, shame is 
transformed into power. However, as Beauvoir points out, the parasitic 
dimension of sovereign masculinity not only works by depicting the 
feminine as the site of the abject. A further emotional source of male 
domination can be traced to men’s demands for admiration and esteem. 
James situates Beauvoir’s account of men’s need for admiration and 
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esteem in the tradition of seventeenth-century moral psychology, where 
“hierarchical social relations are widely held to depend on the affects of 
admiration and contempt, which are understood to operate on and 
through the body” (James, 2004, p. 76): 
 
The central features of this seventeenth-century discussion all recur in 
Beauvoir, who allots an important place to admiration in her analysis of 
the hierarchical relations between man and woman. In her role as 
Absolute Other, woman sustains man’s self-esteem by reflecting back to 
him an image of himself; but the image must be an admiring one. Men 
“seek to find in two living eyes their image haloed with admiration and 
gratitude, deified” (SS 1972, 217; DS 1986, i.302). The look or gaze so 
central to Beauvoir’s account is significant. Man searches for his image 
in two human eyes, he looks to woman’s facial expression for 
confirmation of his worth, and it is through her body that she makes her 
admiration manifest. (James, 2004, p. 79) 
 
In Beauvoir’s analysis of admiration and esteem as passions that uphold 
gender hierarchies, we find another illustration of gender as justification 
whereby “nature” and “culture” feed on one another. Admiration and 
esteem are taken to be given by nature, as if what is admirable in men – 
and despicable in women – derived patently from bodily differences. 
Men’s bodily manifestations tend to be interpreted as the expression of a 
“naturally” active character and power: 
 
The comparative hardness and containedness of man’s body, the 
neatness and visibility of his sexual organs, his well-defined erotic 
climax, and his role in intercourse contribute to the association of 
masculinity and activity. (James, 2004, p. 82) 
 
By contrast, women’s bodily features are traditionally interpreted as a 
sign of their passive and inferior character. These interpretations are of 
course grounded in the materiality of bodies themselves but, as James 
argues, tend to be reinforced by “a range of further interpretative 
devices”: 
 
(…) Bodily differences that are a matter of degree are imagined as 
oppositions; for example, although man is prey to uncontrollable bodily 
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secretions these are obliterated in the contrast with flows of menstrual 
blood or amniotic fluid, so that woman alone emerges as leaky and 
unbounded. (James, 2004, p. 82) 
 
Because bodily differences are socially understood in terms of a valued 
activity for men and a devalued passivity for women, “the scene is set for 
admiration and contempt”. In other words, the emotions of admiration 
and contempt are articulated and justified as if deriving naturally from 
these differences in bodily features. 
Admiration and esteem are emotional mechanisms through which 
men maintain their power, but which may reinforce women’s oppression. 
For example, some women may come to develop a sense of themselves as 
defective and may only find value for themselves through their 
relationship with men:  
 
The self-esteem gained from associating with those who possess 
grandeur is still self-esteem, but this way of getting it depends on 
psychological strategies which have their own costs. Since woman is 
‘doomed to dependence, she will prefer to serve a god rather than obey 
tyrants’ (SS 1972, 653; DS 1986, ii. 547) and will therefore project her 
desires on to her relationship with man (…) (James, 2004, p. 84) 
 
We can recall here the case of Capécia in relation to André, discussed in 
Chapter 2, of the kind of alienation that women in heterosexual 
relationships tend to suffer. They only derive satisfaction and pride by 
entering “the world according to him”. 
I have argued that Mann’s analysis allows us to identify the key 
role played by certain emotional patterns in the formation of male 
subjectivity. By understanding what is at stake in its fantasized 
undoing, we can gain a sense of how masculinity attempts to “keep itself 
together”. Masculinity is thus understood as a strategy deployed in 
reaction to what threatens its constitution and maintenance. By focusing 
on how gender is lived in the body, we can give a richer explanatory 
account of the nature and intensity of men’s fear/terror of being shamed 
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for looking or feeling “like a woman” than by merely appealing to 
cultural signifiers of women as inferior.  
In order to understand the nature of men’s fear or terror at the 
prospective of being feminized, Mann looks at what being feminized 
means in terms of bodily experience. Identifying the structure of the 
stylization of the female body as the disruption of the “I can body” 
enables us to perceive the nature of “the threat experienced by the 
masculine subject who finds himself slipping, against his will, into 
womanhood” (Mann, 2014, p. 84). By analysing what the masculine 
subject fears (“to be shamed for being/feeling like a woman”), Mann 
contends that shame at being feminized is experienced as an undoing of 
the self. The shame felt in being feminized is the shame of falling into 
the “I cannot body”, i.e., of feeling impotent and helpless. Thus, to be 
feminized is to be degraded to the humiliating helplessness of infancy, a 
state of radical dependence and vulnerability.  
The emotional structure of masculinity is shame-based because it 
is in reaction to shame that masculinity takes shape, through a variety 
of strategies among which shame-to-power conversion is prominent. We 
have explored two main forms of shame-to-power conversion: the first 
involves projecting shame onto others as a way of ejecting the abject 
from the self. The second, as presented in James’ reading of Beauvoir, 
consists in men’s demands for admiration and esteem, which in turn 
reinforce women’s subordination.  
 
6.4 What about entitlement? 
 
How does this account of the emotional patterns that sustain 
masculinity square with the apparent self-confidence and sense of 
entitlement that men commonly display? Does not male privilege protect 
many men from being shamed, so that they are less likely to experience 
this emotion? This is suggested by Kate Manne: 
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What are the masculine-coded perks and privileges in question? These 
include social positions of leadership, authority, influence, money and 
other forms of power, as well as social status, prestige, rank, and the 
markers thereof. Then there are less tangible facets of social “face,” 
pride, reputation, or standing, and the relevant absences – for example, 
the freedom from shame and lack of public humiliation, which are more 
or less universally desired but only some people feel entitled to. (Manne, 
2017, p. 113) 
 
However, if shame is a pervasive emotion against which masculinity 
must constantly protect itself, Kate Manne’s description may be 
incomplete. Masculinity does not simply deliver men from shame. To be 
a man is not to be less prone to feeling shame or being shamed. Rather, 
the contexts and contents of men’s shame, together with their responses 
to instances of shame/shaming, will be distinctive.  
In Chapter 5, I argued that entitlement is also an affective-
embodied phenomenon that plays an important role in sustaining 
whiteness as domination. If entitlement manifests in similar ways for 
men, then patterns of entitlement may effectively protect men from the 
kinds of shame that affect oppressed groups in specific contexts, such as 
women. For example, if institutional practices facilitate the sense of 
belonging and even owning a professional space, this may translate into 
men being less prone to feeling insecure, defective or ashamed of their 
capacities to fulfil their professional tasks. 
By contrast, as we have analysed, members of oppressed groups 
may suffer from systematic shame in contexts where their bodies do not 
“fit”, or have not done so historically. The incorporation of shame by the 
oppressed may, in fact, function as an instrument of power that 
reinforces existing structures. The low numbers of women in STEM or 
academic Philosophy, for example, will be taken as proof of the fact that 
women are not “fit” to be there, owing to their lack the talent or natural 
abilities, or because they do not “like” such spaces42. Where some spaces 
                                            
42 Recently, the physicist Alessandro Sturmia claimed that “the data doesn’t lie — 
women don’t like physics”. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/oct/01/physics-
was-built-by-men-cern-scientist-alessandro-strumia-remark-sparks-fury ; 
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and institutional practices are organized in ways that traditionally fit 
men’s profiles and needs, feelings of entitlement (in the form of self-
confidence and lack of shame), may become salient. 
This does not mean, however, that the spectre of shame isn’t 
lurking on the horizon. Once the scaffolding of entitlement becomes 
fragile shame may be felt all the more intensely; those who feel it 
consider themselves as entitled to be free from shame. How are we to 
make sense of Kate Manne’s claim that one of the dimensions of 
entitlement consists in feeling entitled to not be shamed?  
Building on the analysis above, we can hypothesise that 
entitlement functions as a strategy through which shame can be 
deflected. Entitlement may function as a fiction through which the 
masculine self aims to protect itself from shame. To become a man is to 
feel entitled not to be shamed precisely because to be shamed would 
threaten a masculine sense of self. If one feels like a man, one feels 
entitled to be free from shame and will therefore use whatever strategies 
are necessary to deflect shame43.  
Kate Manne offers this suggestive description of Donald Trump to 
illustrate how shame is rejected, not allowed to infiltrate the subject. 
Trump, she writes, is at “the most extreme of a spectrum of toxic 
masculinity” (Manne, 2017, p. 126). Humiliated by Barack Obama’s 
mockery of his request that the latter produce his birth certificate during 
the White House correspondents’ dinner: “[Trump] jutted out his chin, 
pursed his lips, and turned a deeper shade of orange (...)”. Kate Manne 
asks whether that is “really the face of shame”. She continues: 
 
But then I realized that Trump’s was the face of shame turned inside 
out – its exterior wall, as it were – shame refused, with fury substituted, 
since he and his ilk are accustomed to being treated with the greatest 
respect on all occasions. It was the face of someone who fully expects 
                                            
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/alessandro-strumia-the-data-doesnt-lie-women-
dont-like-physics-jl0bpfd9t 
43 In its most extreme forms, this can take the form of what Kate Manne calls “entitled 
shame” displayed by “family annihilators”. 
233 
 
and feels entitled to the admiring gaze of others positioned beneath him, 
looking upward. (Manne, 2017, p. 128) 
 
Trump’s display of entitlement to admiration is, Kate Manne suggests, 
“the face of shame turned inside out”. In other words, this kind of 
entitlement does not consist in simply being free from shame, but could 
be seen as another example of a “shame-to-power conversion” strategy.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that there are salient emotional patterns 
which are non-accidentally connected to masculinity as a form of 
domination and which sustain male privilege and women’s oppression. I 
have, with Bonnie Mann, contended that an account of the emotional 
patterns of masculinity can be extracted from phenomenological 
analyses of the lived body. Following Beauvoir’s account of gender as 
justification and Young’s analysis of female bodily motility as disruption 
of the “I can body”, Mann’s analysis reveals that shame is an emotional 
structure of sovereign masculinity. Masculinity, as a form of domination, 
is maintained through emotional strategies that seek to transform 
shame into power. The narratives of men such as Didier Eribon and 
Edouard Louis, whose bodily styles do not typically embody sovereign 
manhood, reveal how systematic humiliation through feminization and 
infantilization help to sustain sovereign masculinity. Beauvoir’s analysis 
of admiration and esteem as emotions that support hierarchical 
relations between men and women can also be seen as playing a role in 
shame-to-power conversion strategies. Such demands for admiration and 
esteem potentially increase men’s power as they further disempower 
women. This account of the relation between masculinity and shame 
may seem hard to reconcile with men’s characteristically greater self-
confidence and sense of entitlement. In the light of Bonnie Mann’s 
analysis, I suggest that entitlement may be part of men’s reactive 
strategy against the threat of systematic shaming.
234 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have argued that, when political philosophers 
explore the harm done by oppression, they should pay more attention to 
its emotional dimension. Unless we take account of this dimension, we 
shall not fully understand what oppression is, or grasp the nature of the 
harm it can do. 
 
Analytical philosophers commonly approach oppression by trying 
to define it, and in doing so habitually neglect its emotional character. In 
the opening chapter, I appealed to Haslanger’s work to illustrate this 
claim. Her widely discussed definition of oppression is silent on the 
subject of emotion. As a result, I argued, it lacks the resources to explain 
some of the most powerful and insidious features of oppression. Defining 
the harms that oppression causes through abstract notions such as 
“injustice”, “inequality” or “imbalance of power” does not allow us to fully 
comprehend them. Instead, a more fruitful explanatory approach lies in 
attending to the emotional aspects of oppression. In chapter 1 I offered a 
preliminary defence of this claim. If we want to understand what 
oppression is, we need to understand what oppression does. When 
oppressed people themselves describe what oppression does, it becomes 
clear that its emotional aspects play a crucial role. 
 
I subsequently presented a series of narrative testimonies and 
fictions, which provide evidence for the main claims of my thesis, namely 
that oppression has a distinctive emotional profile and, consequently, 
that certain patterns of emotion are among its characteristic features 
(chapter 2). The narrative material that I analysed reveals a significant 
connection between structures of oppression and emotions such as 
shame, guilt and self-loathing. Feelings of internal division, together 
with disorientation and paralyzing psychic conflict, are also prominent 
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in the testimonies I discussed. While I take the salience accorded to 
these emotions as indicative of a significant connection with oppression, 
I do not contend that these are the only emotions that deserve to be 
considered. There may be other important emotional phenomena that 
are integral to experiences of oppression with which this thesis does not 
engage, but which could be the subject of future investigative work. For 
example, although I claim that fear is one of the emotions through which 
oppression works, its place in my analysis is marginal by comparison 
with shame. Future research could examine in more detail what makes 
some disempowering emotions more or less pervasive than others in 
lived experiences of oppression. 
 
In chapter 3 I considered what account of emotions can best 
illuminate the link between emotion and oppression. I argued that a 
model of emotions as mainly short-lived and episodic does not allow us to 
capture the ways in which structures of oppression and privilege shape 
our affective lives. I contended that we need to conceptualise emotions as 
extending over time, as attunements or patterns, and as relational. With 
the help of this model, we can also get a fuller grasp of how emotions are 
connected to power. To make this argument, I took issue with Gabrielle 
Taylor’s (1985) account of shame, criticising it for its tendency to reduce 
this emotion to discrete and short-lived episodes, and for its failure to 
pay adequate attention to its social character. I argued that Bartky’s 
(1990), notion of “emotional attunement”, and Peter Goldie’s (2012) 
account of “emotional patterns”, offer a better way to articulate the 
entanglements between emotion and oppression, insofar as these notions 
help us capture the character of the feelings involved in oppression, and 
explain why they endure over time. Additionally, I argued that Sara 
Ahmed’s (2004) account of emotions as “relational” offers a fruitful way 
of construing the interconnection between emotion and structures of 
power. As I went on to show, Ahmed’s analysis provides an argument for 
one of the implications of the main claim of my thesis, namely that if 
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there is a significant connection between a certain emotional pattern 
and a structure of oppression, we may expect to find a significant 
connection between certain emotional attunements and structures of 
privilege. 
 
The claim that there is a significant connection between 
oppression and certain patterns of emotion stands in need of 
clarification. What precisely is the nature of this link? I discussed this 
problem in chapter 4. After rejecting the view that the link can be 
formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, I argued that 
the narrative material discussed in chapter 2 nevertheless indicates that 
oppression is non-accidentally connected to certain emotional patterns or 
attunements. I therefore proposed that the nature of this connection 
should be understood as non-accidental. I showed that, although the 
emotional patterns I identify are not necessary and sufficient features of 
oppression, they are indicative ones. In other words, the salience of 
certain emotional patterns in narratives and testimonies of oppression is 
not a matter of chance. We have good reasons for thinking that these 
emotions are characteristic features of oppression. I subsequently argued 
that difficult cases, in which the relevant emotions are not obviously felt 
or acknowledged, offer further evidence of the emotional character of 
oppression, insofar as they point to strategies through which these 
emotions are repressed or transformed.  
 
I pointed out in the Introduction that my exploration of the 
emotional patterns non-accidentally connected with structures of power 
does not systematically examine the extremely complex question of the 
place of beliefs and judgements in emotions, as some contemporary 
philosophers do. I have chosen to take it for granted that our emotions 
have a cognitive dimension, without entering into the discussion about 
whether they are reducible either to their cognitive, or to their 
evaluative aspects. Setting this debate aside, my account in chapters 5 
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and 6 focused on exploring the link between embodiment and habitual 
ways of feeling. These ways of feeling, I contended, do not only derive 
from our beliefs, although I do not deny that they may incorporate both 
beliefs and evaluative judgements. As I have argued, they are also 
constituted by feelings that are embedded in bodily habits, and it is this 
aspect of oppression that I have been concerned to examine.  
 
In chapters 5 and 6 I used the conception of emotions as long-lived 
and relational patterns set out in chapter 3 to examine the emotional 
configuration of two forms of privilege: whiteness and masculinity. In 
different ways, Sullivan’s account of the “unconscious embodied habits” 
of white privilege (chapter 5), and Mann’s analysis of masculinity as 
partly grounded in “bodily style” (chapter 6), provide a framework that 
allows us to capture the patterned – in the sense of recurrent and 
temporally extended – character of emotions. As habits or styles, these 
forms of feeling are characterised by their relative stability over time, 
insofar as they are a way of being in the world. 
 
Much of the literature on white ignorance has accounted for the 
role of racism in white subjectivity by focusing on its cognitive aspects, 
or to put it differently, on its patterns of cognition. White ignorance, as 
analysed by Charles Mills, accounts for a habitual way of thinking and 
(un)knowing, which constitutes a form of persistent “cognitive handicap” 
that is widespread among White people. Drawing on José Medina’s 
analysis of the affective aspects of white ignorance, I highlighted the 
need to explore its embodied dimensions in greater depth. The 
hypothesis that guided my argument was that, if there are persistent 
cognitive mechanisms that constitute white ignorance as a habitual way 
of (un)knowing, we may expect to find persistent patterns of feeling in 
which race plays a significant causal role, and which are also 
instrumental to the reproduction of racial oppression. Drawing on 
Shannon Sullivan’s exploration of the unconscious embodied habits of 
238 
 
white privilege, I traced the ways in which these patterns of feeling are 
embodied and are often transgenerationally transmitted through bodily 
signals that need not take the form of propositional beliefs. Such 
embodied habits, which are simultaneously psychic and somatic, 
constitute some of the unconscious ways in which White people 
“transact” with their social environment – a point that Sullivan develops 
following Laplanche’s “theory of seduction”. In addition, I used Sara 
Ahmed’s phenomenological analysis of whiteness as an embodied habit 
to shed light upon comfort as a habitual emotional structure connected 
to white privilege, whose role in sustaining domination can be made 
visible through the different defensive emotional reactions that are 
typically deployed when white comfort is challenged. 
 
I subsequently showed that the habitual character of comfort, as a 
commonly unacknowledged feeling of “sinking in”, can be understood as 
an affective structure that ‘supports’ feelings of entitlement, in the form 
of expectations of comfort. I brought out this emotional aspect of 
domination by discussing how White bodies, but not non-White ones, are 
typically allowed to move and take up space. Domination partly 
manifests itself in the feeling among White people that they are entitled 
to a familiar environment in which they can move easily. I also drew out 
a connection between Sullivan’s account of “ontological expansiveness” 
and Ahmed’s phenomenological perspective on comfort as a structural 
affective experience of whiteness. It is mainly when comfort is 
challenged that, as Ahmed contends, comfort comes to be acknowledged; 
the fact that one’s expectations of familiarity are unmet can be the cause 
of discomfort. The presence of non-White others in a traditionally all-
White context is therefore typically experienced as a disturbance, and as 
a source of discomfort. Similarly, I discussed how expectations of comfort 
are made manifest when White people are challenged about their 
complicity in sustaining racial oppression. Through defensive emotional 
reactions, white people seek to reinstate comfort as a way of restoring 
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power, for example by demanding that non-Whites restore their comfort. 
They demand, for example, that racism is addressed in ways that protect 
“white feelings”. 
 
In chapter 6, I developed my examination of the patterned aspect 
of emotions by taking a slightly different approach. Rather than 
exploring the gender equivalent of white ignorance, as many scholars of 
patriarchy have done, I used Bonnie Mann’s analysis of bodily style as a 
feature of male subjectivity to highlight the role of shame in the 
formation of masculinity. Sovereign Masculinity, as the way in which 
the nation “imagines itself” (Mann, 2014), “borrows” its “ontological 
weight” from the lived experience of bodily style. Men’s sense of self, 
their sense of self-esteem and pride, is strongly rooted in a bodily style 
characterised by Mann as “the I can body”. We find evidence of this 
formation in the fact that men’s sense of self-esteem and pride is 
strongly challenged when their masculine bodily style is undermined. In 
other words, challenges to men’s bodily style are experienced as threats 
that may shatter the self, and these threats take the form of the spectre 
of femininity, experienced as “the I cannot body”. Humiliating the male 
self therefore typically takes the recurrent form of feminising the body: 
by insulting it; highlighting its femininity; subjecting it to feminine-
coded behaviour; or infantilising it.  
As a form of domination, I showed, masculinity therefore has a 
fundamentally emotional configuration. Shame is used both to sustain it, 
and to maintain some forms of oppression. Mann’s analysis, I contended, 
reveals how male subjectivity is upheld through a series of strategies 
that she calls “shame-to-power conversion”. These involve forms of 
humiliation (ranging from insults to physical violence) through which 
the self seeks to eject the ‘abject’, coded as feminine, and project it onto 
Others. I’ve emphasized this aspect of Mann’s discussion of the case of 
the recruit in Full Metal Jacket, forced to suck his thumb and wear 
diapers in the process of becoming a soldier and thereby acquiring a 
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supreme form of masculinity.  In addition, I have argued, shame-to-
power conversion is sought through the demands for admiration and 
esteem that (heterosexual) men make of women, thus reinforcing their 
oppression. In order to “conjure” the existential threat of femininity, 
masculinity relies on these emotional strategies. 
In chapter 3 I also claimed that emotions are relational. Following 
Sara Ahmed, I argued that they are not simply “inside” the mind of 
individuals, nor “outside”, in “the collective”. Rather, we should think of 
emotions as relational, in the sense that they are what allows us to draw 
a distinction between an “inside” and an “outside”, an “us” and “them”. 
To put the point another way, emotions are not simply “possessed”. They 
are ways of reacting to objects, persons, or situations; and it is in these 
ways of reacting that an “I” and “we”, an “us” and “them”, are delineated 
and constituted. It’s not as if the “I” and the “them” are fully constituted, 
and objectively distinguished, with emotions coming “in addition” to 
what is already “there”. Instead, an “I” becomes “I” through the felt 
effect of its contact with what becomes a “them” and vice versa. In other 
words, it is through emotions, as ways of reacting to contact, that we are 
constituted in our relationships to others; and it is through emotions 
that relationships with others are felt and come to be seen as relations. 
In this sense, then, emotions have a revelatory dimension; they are 
disclosive of relations of power and of our situation with respect to 
power. 
Taking up this view in chapter 5, I explored the relational 
character of emotions through Sullivan’s accounts of embodied habits as 
transactional, i.e., as shaped by and shaping of a social environment. 
Embodied habits, and the correlative affective phenomena that I 
identified, are the ways in which we react to contact with a social 
environment. Our habits shape who we are; and we are also shaped by 
the embodied habits of others. I pursued this relational aspect of 
emotions by highlighting the dialectical character of emotional patterns. 
For example, White people’s comfort and entitlement to comfort, as one 
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of the affective dimensions of privilege, is experienced at the expense of 
non-White people’s capacity to feel “at home”. Thus, white comfort partly 
explains non-white discomfort. Similarly, white fear of the Black body, 
and the multiple mechanisms by which Whites project the abject from 
the White self onto the Other, can partly explain the pervasiveness of 
shame and guilt, which are commonly found among the oppressed. 
Many of the emotional patterns characteristic of the oppressed 
can therefore be understood, at least in part, as an effect of the defensive 
emotional attunements of their oppressors, through which the latter 
seek to sustain their power. To return to central claim I made in chapter 
4, there is a non-accidental connection between the relational emotional 
patterns I have identified and oppression. Throughout this thesis I have 
sought to make this relationship visible by exploring the place of shame 
in the mutually dependent emotional patterns of oppressors and 
oppressed. As I have sought to show, the difference between the 
oppressed and the privileged does not lie simply in the presence or 
absence of a particular emotion such as shame. It lies, rather, in the 
ways an emotion is experienced, how it shapes the self, and how it 
empowers or disempowers. The disgust felt by White people when 
sharing food with Blacks, for example, is not a random phenomenon. It 
finds an explanation in the way people’s feelings have been shaped by 
structures of power. The same is true, as I showed in Chapter 6, of men’s 
excruciating fear of being shamed. 
 
Attending to these embodied habits, or styles of engaging with the 
world, allows us to comprehend how privilege and oppression shape our 
ways of being in the world, or, more specifically, our ways of feeling. Both 
Sullivan and Mann conceive habit and style as “plastic”. But because our 
embodied habits are partially unconscious, they often thwart our efforts 
to change our investment in racial hierarchies. In a longer work it would 
be interesting to map out the cognitive aspects of male privilege and 
analyse the affective components of the cognitive handicaps typically 
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displayed by men. Such an investigation would build on my chapter 6, 
where my point was to identify some of the emotional aspects of 
embodied masculinity.  
 
I see my thesis as having implications for two main areas of 
enquiry. On the one hand, it is part of a broader attempt to understand 
the role played by emotions in relations of power, and thus part of an 
attempt to understand power. On another hand, by understanding how 
emotions are involved in power, it aims to cast new light on our 
understanding of emotions themselves.  
 
In relation to the first point, I have aimed to provide a non-
reductive account of the emotional lives of the oppressed and their 
oppressors by showing how oppression is sustained and reinforced 
through emotions as instruments of power. I do not contend that 
oppressed and oppressors are fatally stuck in these entanglements. 
Resistance and liberation are, of course, possible. But paying attention 
to the interplay between emotions and structures of power helps us to 
explain why oppression is pervasive, and why overcoming it is difficult. 
In my discussion of the narratives first introduced in chapter 2, I have 
highlighted some of the individual and collective emotional strategies on 
which resistance depends. But there is much further work to be done on 
this topic, and I aim to pursue it in future. As I hope my account shows, 
my framework has potential for examining the emotional character of 
resistance to oppression in more detail. The arguments that I have 
developed go some way to suggesting why certain instances of oppression 
are so pervasive and hard to shift. One obvious question this raises is 
whether resistance to oppression requires breaking or disrupting 
dialectical emotional patterns, and if so, which ones, and how. This 
might also lead us to address the question of what is involved in taking 
responsibility for oppression. How can we mobilise our knowledge of the 
emotional patterns non-accidentally connected to oppression in order to 
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change them? And how can emotions be engaged in a way that modifies 
the structural roots of oppression? As my discussion has emphasized, 
attending to the emotional aspects of oppression captures important 
aspects of what is involved in being an oppressor, and what it is to have 
emotional investments in sustaining oppression. My framework 
therefore contains helpful resources for thinking about two 
interconnected problems:  the kind of engagement with resistance that 
oppressors need to develop; and the difficulties that oppressed people 
face when challenging oppression.  
 
To explore these issues in greater depth, one would need to 
explore a wider range of emotional transactions between oppressors and 
oppressed. One issue that would need further thought concerns the 
normative status of particular emotional states within an emotional 
pattern that may oscillate between being empowering and 
disempowering. Are there, for example, some forms or occurrences of 
shame and guilt that can play a more productive role than others in 
challenging oppression? If so, how are the empowering and 
disempowering forms related? And how can each of them be used to 
modify the dialectical emotional relationships within which oppressors 
dominate the oppressed? A second issue that would benefit from further 
investigation returns us to my decision to use “emotion” in a broad, all-
encompassing sense. As my argument has made clear, the notion of an 
enduring emotional pattern forms a “matrix” made up of many kinds of 
embodied states. In explaining particular emotional relationships, I have 
appealed to different elements of this matrix; but there is obviously more 
to be said about what the elements are and how they interconnect.  
 
These are large philosophical ambitions; but in pursuing them I 
would like to stay close to the emotional character of oppression. The 
main aim of my thesis has been to show that there is a non-accidental 
connection between certain emotional patterns and oppression, and thus 
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between these emotional patterns and power. This is the claim I should 
like to develop in my future work.
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